B.T.H. v. County of Modoc ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 B.T.H., a minor, T.J.H., a No. 2:20-cv-00566-JAM-DMC minor, and V.C.H., a minor, by 12 Guardian Ad Litem PAMELA HINTON, 13 ORDER GRANTING WITH LEAVE TO Plaintiffs, AMEND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 14 DISMISS v. 15 COUNTY OF MODOC, MODOC COUNTY 16 SHERIFF MIKE POINDEXTER, UNKNOWN MODOC COUNTY 17 CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS, SUPERVISORS, AND UNKNOWN MODOC 18 COUNTY MEDICAL CARE PROVIDERS, and DOES 1 through 50 19 inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 This matter is before the Court on County of Modoc and 23 former Modoc County Sheriff, Mike Poindexter’s (“Defendants”) 24 Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 25 can be granted. Mot., ECF No. 13. B.T.H., T.J.H., and V.C.H., 26 all minors, and their Guardian Ad Litem, Pamela Hinton 27 (“Plaintiffs”), filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion, Opp’n, 28 ECF No. 17, to which Defendants replied, Reply, ECF No. 18. 1 After consideration of the parties’ arguments on the motion and 2 relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 3 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.1 4 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 On March 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants 7 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs 8 allege Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by 9 denying their father medical care and due process and maintaining 10 an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. Id. 11 Plaintiffs’ father, Jeramy Hinton, suffered from chronic bodily 12 pain and suicidal depression stemming from numerous surgical 13 procedures he underwent in 2003. Id. ¶ 11. In addition, Hinton 14 was diagnosed with bilateral foraminal stenosis, spondylolysis, 15 and spondylolisthesis in 2018. Id. ¶ 12. He was prescribed 16 oxycodone and morphine sulfate to manage those conditions. Id. 17 On March 24, 2018, Hinton was arrested and taken into 18 custody at the Modoc County Jail. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs 19 allege Hinton received inadequate psychiatric and medical care 20 while incarcerated. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs further allege that 21 Hinton’s pain medications were withheld, which increased his 22 depression and suicidal ideations. Id. On March 29, 2019, 23 Hinton committed suicide by hanging himself with a bedsheet in 24 his cell. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. Plaintiffs allege substandard care, 25 resulting in Hinton’s death, is attributable to the County’s 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for July 14, 2020. 1 inadequate hiring, training, and supervision of jail personnel. 2 Id. ¶ 18. 3 Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint arguing that 4 Plaintiffs have failed to state any viable claims under Federal 5 Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. at 4–12. 6 7 II. OPINION 8 A. Legal Standard 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 10 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 11 entitled to relief.” A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the 12 complaint as not alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for 13 relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 12(b)(6)], a 14 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 15 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted). While “detailed factual 18 allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more 19 than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 20 action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. at 678. 21 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the 22 non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from 23 that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 24 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 25 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Analysis 2 1. The Survival Statute 3 Defendants’ primary argument in support of their motion is 4 that Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because 5 Plaintiffs failed to comply with California’s survival statute. 6 Mot. at 4–5. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), the 7 capacity to sue a public officer is determined by “the law of the 8 state where the court is located.” And a claim raised under 9 § 1983 “survives the decedent if the claim accrued before the 10 decedent’s death, and if state law authorizes a survival action.” 11 Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1094 n.2 12 (9th Cir. 2006). In general, a survival claim is filed by the 13 estate’s personal representative. However, absent a personal 14 representative, the decedent’s successor in interest may 15 prosecute the action so long as they satisfy the requirements of 16 California law. Id. (citing Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police 17 Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 18 §§ 377.30, 377.32). 19 California’s survival statute requires a decedent’s 20 successor in interest to “execute and file an affidavit or 21 declaration” stating: (1) the decedent’s name; (2) the date and 22 place of decedent’s death; (3) that no proceedings are pending in 23 California for the administration of the decedent’s estate; 24 (4) either that the declarant is the decedent’s successor in 25 interest or is authorized to act on behalf of the decedent’s 26 successor in interest; and (5) that no other person has a 27 superior right to commence the action or proceeding for the 28 decedent. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.32(a). It also requires 1 that “a certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate [] be 2 attached to the affidavit or declaration.” Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 3 § 377.32(c). 4 Plaintiffs did not file an affidavit or declaration 5 demonstrating their ability to pursue their claims as Hinton’s 6 successors in interest when they commenced this action. Nor did 7 they plead compliance with California’s survival statute. 8 Plaintiffs acknowledge their failure to do so. See Opp’n at 6:6– 9 7. They cannot cure this defect by merely attaching the 10 necessary documentation to their opposition. See Attach. 1 to 11 Opp’n, ECF No. 17; see also Ex. A to Opp’n, ECF No. 17. To do so 12 they must formally amend their complaint. Thus, Plaintiffs 13 presently lack the ability to assert survival claims against 14 Defendants as successors in interest. See In re A.C., 80 15 Cal.App.4th 994, 1002–03 (2000) (failure to comply with § 377.32 16 precludes a plaintiff from bringing a survival action). 17 2. Claim I: Medical Care 18 Plaintiffs generally allege that the County of Modoc, 19 former Modoc County Sheriff Mike Poindexter, and a host of 20 unknown employees failed to give Hinton adequate medical 21 care. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 21–23. Specifically, Plaintiffs 22 allege that Hinton’s medications were withheld, but they do 23 not specify the individual(s) who did so. Id. ¶ 13. 24 Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants were aware of 25 Hinton’s deteriorating medical conditions and the likelihood 26 that he would harm himself. Id. ¶ 14. Defendants move to 27 dismiss this cause of action for failure to state a 28 plausible claim of deliberate indifference to a serious 1 medical need. See Mot. at 5–7. The Court agrees. 2 In asserting a medical care claim against an individual 3 defendant under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 4 Amendment, a pretrial detainee must allege: (1) the 5 defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 6 conditions under which plaintiff was confined; (2) the 7 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of 8 suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take 9 reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 10 though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have 11 appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the 12 consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) by 13 not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 14 plaintiff’s injuries. Gordon v. City of Orange, 888 F.3d 15 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 16 With regard to the reasonableness of the defendant’s 17 conduct, it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. 18 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This 19 means the reasonableness determination will “necessarily 20 turn on the facts and circumstances” of the case. Id. 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The mere 22 lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an 23 individual of life, liberty, or property under the 24 Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 25 citations omitted). “The plaintiff must prove more than 26 negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to 27 reckless disregard.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 28 citations omitted). 1 Plaintiffs’ allegations lack sufficient facts or 2 details and amount to nothing more than conclusory 3 statements. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiffs fail 4 to describe the conduct of a specific defendant with any 5 degree of detail. See Moreno v. Penzone, 2020 WL 1047068 at 6 *2 (D. Ariz. 2020) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 7 371–72, 377 (1976)) (“To state a valid claim under § 1983, 8 plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific injury 9 as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an 10 affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that 11 defendant.”). Nor do they set forth how a specific 12 defendant’s conduct caused Hinton’s suicide. Barren v. 13 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1994 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A 14 plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that 15 show an individual was personally involved in the 16 deprivation of his civil rights.”). 17 To the extent Plaintiffs assert a claim of denial of 18 medical care under a theory of supervisory liability against 19 former Sheriff Poindexter, it similarly fails because 20 Plaintiffs have not alleged his personal involvement in the 21 constitutional violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 22 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held liable 23 as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his 24 or her personal involvement in the constitutional 25 deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between 26 the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 27 violation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 28 omitted). 1 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim of denial of medical 2 care is dismissed without prejudice. 3 3. Claim II: Monell 4 Plaintiffs allege that the Modoc County Jail personnel 5 were hired by the County of Modoc “without adequate training 6 and were thereafter inadequately trained and supervised to 7 render psychiatric and medical treatment to patients.” 8 Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs add that the County of Modoc was 9 aware of prior instances of self-inflicted injury by 10 pretrial detainees at the jail but did nothing to prevent 11 their recurrence. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs further allege that 12 the County of Modoc has a “policy, custom, or habit” of 13 providing substandard psychiatric and medical care to 14 inmates at the facility. Id. ¶ 27. Defendants move to 15 dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Monell claim for 16 failure to allege a municipal custom or practice. See Mot. 17 at 7–9. 18 Municipalities may be held liable under Section 1983 for 19 constitutional injuries inflicted through a municipal policy or 20 custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 21 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To establish municipal liability under 22 Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a 23 constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the 24 policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to his 25 constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force 26 behind the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 27 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and 28 quotations omitted). 1 A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by 2 demonstrating that: (1) the constitutional tort was the result of 3 a longstanding practice or custom that constitutes the standard 4 operating procedure of the local government entity; (2) the 5 tortfeasor was an official whose acts fairly represent official 6 policy such that the challenged action constituted official 7 policy; (3) an official with final policy-making authority 8 delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a 9 subordinate; or (4) the municipality failed to adequately train 10 the tortfeasors. See Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 11 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 12 Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, 2017 WL 344998 at *14 (N.D. Cal. 13 2017). To properly state a Monell claim, allegations in a 14 complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of 15 action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying 16 facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 17 defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of 18 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 19 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). 20 Plaintiffs’ Monell claim also fails to allege more than 21 unsupported conclusory statements. To the extent the claim is 22 predicated upon an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice, 23 Plaintiffs fail to properly allege how any such custom, policy, 24 or practice was the “moving force” behind the alleged inadequate 25 psychiatric or medical care. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 26 (1978). Nor do Plaintiffs identify other instances in which 27 inmates at the County Jail received substandard care in order to 28 demonstrate that the alleged custom, policy, or practice was 1 “standard operating procedure.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 2 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992). 3 To the extent the claim is predicated on inadequate 4 training, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) decedent was deprived of a 5 constitutional right; (2) the policy amounts to deliberate 6 indifference to constitutional rights of persons whom officers 7 are likely to interact with; and (3) the constitutional injury 8 would have been avoided had the officers been properly trained. 9 Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 10 2014). To meet this standard, there must be “program-wide 11 inadequacy in training.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 12 463, 484–85 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and 13 citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not describe what training 14 County Jail personnel did or did not receive, nor do they 15 causally connect deficiencies in the training to the harm Hinton 16 suffered. 17 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is dismissed 18 without prejudice. 19 4. Claim III: Due Process 20 Plaintiffs allege Hinton was denied due process in 21 receiving inadequate psychiatric and medical care while 22 incarcerated. See Compl. ¶¶ 33–35. This claim is 23 essentially the same as Plaintiffs’ claim that Hinton was 24 denied medical care. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 21–23. The claim 25 that Hinton was denied medical care is itself derived from 26 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carnell 27 v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A pretrial 28 detainees’ rights to receive medical treatment arise under 1 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim that Hinton was denied 4 due process is dismissed without prejudice for the same 5 reasons their claim that he was denied medical care is 6 dismissed. 7 5. Damages 8 Plaintiffs allege that Hinton “suffered severe physical 9 pain, mental anguish, emotional distress, and bodily injury” 10 before he died. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 37. Plaintiffs’ claims are 11 brought exclusively under federal law. See id. ¶¶ 19–38. 12 Thus, California’s prohibition against pre-death emotional 13 distress damages, see Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 377.34, does 14 not apply here. See Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 15 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that California’s 16 prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages is 17 inconsistent with § 1983’s deterrence policy and, therefore, 18 does not apply to § 1983 claims where the decedent’s death 19 was caused by violations of federal law). Plaintiffs are 20 permitted to seek pre-death emotional distress damages to 21 the extent they are sought exclusively under federal law. 22 Plaintiffs also allege that they suffered “[their own] 23 severe emotional distress and loss” due to Hinton’s death. 24 Id. ¶ 17. However, Plaintiffs have not asserted a wrongful 25 death claim against Defendants. If Plaintiffs were to 26 assert a wrongful death claim, damages for their own 27 emotional distress would be legally precluded. Under 28 California law, a wrongful death plaintiff may not recover 1 “for such things as the grief or sorrow attendant upon the 2 death of a loved one, or for his sad emotions, or for the 3 sentimental value of the loss.” Nelson v. Cty. of L.A., 113 4 Cal.App.4th 783, 793 (2003); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.61. 5 Thus, Plaintiffs do not have a legally cognizable claim for 6 their own emotional distress damages. 7 C. Leave to Amend 8 Courts dismissing claims under Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 12(b)(6) have discretion to permit amendment, and there 10 is a strong presumption in favor of leave to amend. Eminence 11 Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 12 2003). “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is 13 not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could 14 not be saved by amendment.” Id. at 1052 (internal citation 15 omitted). Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the complaint. See 16 Opp’n at 8. Since it may be possible for Plaintiffs to cure the 17 above-described deficiencies, the Court will grant them an 18 opportunity to rectify the errors in their dismissed claims and 19 file a First Amended Complaint. 20 D. Sanctions 21 Defendants exceeded the Court’s 5-page limit on reply 22 memoranda. See Reply, ECF No. 18; see also Order re Filing 23 Requirements (Order), ECF No. 3-2. Violations of the Court’s 24 standing order require the offending counsel (not the client) to 25 pay $50.00 per page over the page limit to the Clerk of the 26 Court. Order at 1. Moreover, the Court will not consider 27 arguments made past the page limit. Id. In total, Defendants’ 28 reply memorandum exceeded the Court’s page limit by 1 page. □□□ 2 OUYYUUVPAINI ENN RU Oo POI PF AY AU VI AW 1 Defendants’ counsel must therefore send a check payable to the 2 Clerk for the Eastern District of California for $50.00 no later 3 than seven days from the date of this order. 4 5 Til. ORDER 6 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS WITH 7 LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. If Plaintiffs 8 amend their complaint, they shall file a First Amended Complaint 9 | within twenty days (20) of this order. Defendants’ responsive 10 pleading is due twenty days thereafter. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: August 17, 2020 13 kA 14 teiren staves odermacr 7008 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13