Grafft v. GEA Farm Technologies, Inc. ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RONALD GRAFFT, et al., Case No. 1:20-cv-00804-DAD-SAB 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF DEADINE TO FILE 13 v. DISPOSITIVE DOCUMENTS 14 GEA FARM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al., (ECF No. 15) 15 Defendants. THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 16 17 Plaintiffs Ronald Grafft, David Moore, and Tony Domingos filed this action against 18 Defendants GEA Farm Technologies, Inc. and GEA North America, Inc. on June 8, 2020. (ECF 19 No. 1.) On July 30, 2020, a notice of settlement was filed and the parties were ordered to file 20 dispositive documents within forty-five days. (ECF No. 11.) On September 16, 2020, an order 21 to show cause why sanctions should not issue for the failure to comply with the July 30, 2020 22 order was filed. (ECF No. 12.) Defendant filed a response to the order to show cause and it was 23 discharged on September 18, 2020. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) The parties were ordered to file 24 dispositive documents within forty-five days. (ECF No. 14.) On October 22, 2020, a document 25 entitled “STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT” was filed which is 26 neither a stipulation nor does it seek dismissal. 27 Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ‘a plaintiff has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss his action prior to service by the defendant of an answer or a 1 motion for summary judgment.’ ” Commercial Space Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Boeing Co., Inc., 193 2 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 3 1997)). Here, Defendant has filed an answer, so this action cannot be dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 41(a)(1)(A)(i). 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) provides that a “plaintiff may dismiss an 6 action without a court order by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 7 appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). A party may also dismiss an action by filing a 8 motion requesting the Court to dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A motion for 9 voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. 10 Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 679 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982). 11 The notice of dismissal is defective under Rule 41(a) because it is not a signed stipulation 12 by all parties who have appeared and it is not a motion under Rule 41(a)(2). The document is 13 only signed by defense counsel so it is not a proper stipulation. 14 Additionally, the document does not seek dismissal of the action, but states that the 15 parties are stipulating to dismiss the eight cause of action that alleges claims under the Private 16 Attorney General Act. The Ninth Circuit has held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) 17 cannot be used to dismiss individual claims against defendants, and that Rule 15 is the proper 18 mechanism to do so. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 687 19 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In the specific context of Rule 41(a)(1), we have held that the Rule does not 20 allow for piecemeal dismissals. Instead, withdrawals of individual claims against a given 21 defendant are governed by [Rule 15].”); Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1392 22 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding a plaintiff cannot use Rule 41 “to dismiss, unilaterally, a single claim 23 from a multi-claim complaint.”); but see Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 24 1997) (“The Plaintiff may dismiss some or all of the defendants, or some or all of his claims, 25 through a Rule 41(a)(1) notice.”). Therefore, dismissal of a single claim from the complaint 26 would properly be filed as a motion for leave to amend under Rule 15. While the Court has 27 construed such stipulations as motions for leave to amend under Rule 15, as discussed above, the 1 | Rule 143(a). 2 Finally, the document does not request dismissal of the action, but states that the parties 3 | will seek dismissal of the balance of the case after certain additional obligations by the parties 4 | are fulfilled. (Decl. of William M. Woolman in Support of Settlement, {] 3, ECF No. 15-1.) The 5 | Court construes the document as a second motion for an extension of time to file dispositive 6 | documents. The parties have previously been provided with ninety days in which to finalize the 7 | settlement. The Court shall grant the parties an additional thirty days in which to file dispositive 8 | documents, and any further requests for an extension of time will be required to demonstrate 9 | good cause to further continue the deadline. 10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 11 1. The stipulation of dismissal is construed as a motion for an extension of time to 12 file dispositive documents; 13 2. The motion for an extension of time is GRANTED; 14 3. Dispositive documents shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of 15 this order; and 16 4. Any further requests to continue the deadline to file dispositive documents shall 17 be required to demonstrate good cause. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. nf ee 20 | Dated: _ October 23, 2020_ Oe UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28