Pringle v. Cardall ( 2019 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 PAMELA DENISE PRINGLE, No. 2:18-cv-2035 WBS KJN 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS AND IMPROPER VENUE 15 BRENT CARDALL, COUNTY OF YOLO, YOLO COUNTY PROBATION 16 DEPARTMENT, ANTHONY PENNELLA, SANDY JONES, AMANDA GENTRY, NOEL 17 BARLOW-HUST, JUDY MESICK, CINDY McDONALD, MARK ALAN KUBINSKI, 18 ELISA SUE MAGNUSON, JOHN DOES 1- 20, and JANE DOES 1-20, 19 inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21 22 ----oo0oo---- 23 Plaintiff Pamela Pringle filed this action under 42 24 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that defendants violated her civil rights 25 during and after her incarceration in Idaho Department of 26 Correction (“IDOC") facilities. Defendants Sandy Jones, Amanda 27 Gentry, Noel Barlow-Hust, Judy Mesick, Cindy McDonald, Mark 28 1 Kubinski, and Elisa Magnuson (collectively “the Idaho 2 defendants”) move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. (Docket No. 3 53.) 4 I. Background 5 A. Factual Background 6 On May 25, 2016, plaintiff, then a prisoner at Idaho 7 Department of Correction Pocatello Women’s Correctional Center, 8 was informed that California had lodged a detainer against her 9 for an untried pending felony. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 26 10 (Docket No. 7).) The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 11 U.S.C. § APP. 2 § 1 et seq., provides a mechanism through which 12 prisoners incarcerated in one state may request a final 13 disposition on indictments lodged against them in a second state. 14 (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants Amanda Gentry, the 15 Warden at Pocatello Women’s Correctional Center, Cindy McDonald, 16 the Interstate Coordinator for the Idaho Department of Correction 17 Central Office, and Mark Alan Kubinski, a Deputy Attorney General 18 assigned to the Idaho Department of Correction, repeatedly 19 declined to process her request for a final disposition of her 20 California indictment. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30 & 45-48.) Plaintiff also 21 alleges that following her transfer to South Boise Women’s 22 Correction Center on July 14, 2016, defendant Noel Barlow-Hust, 23 the Warden at that facility, refused to process the same request 24 for a final disposition. (Id. ¶¶ 35-37.) She contends that, at 25 the direction of defendants Gentry and Kubinski, she was 26 threatened with punitive measures if she continued to seek 27 assistance in submitting a request for a final disposition on her 28 California detainer. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) 1 On November 1, 2016, immediately after she was released 2 from prison in Idaho and onto parole, plaintiff was taken into 3 custody by an IDOC officer and transported to Bannock County Jail 4 to await transportation to California. (Id. ¶¶ 59-66.) These 5 actions were allegedly taken pursuant to an illegal transport 6 order drafted by defendants McDonald and Kubinski. (Id. ¶ 65.) 7 Plaintiff claims that during the more than 48 hours she spent at 8 Bannock County Jail, as well as during the 13-hour trip from 9 Idaho to Yolo County, California, she endured substandard 10 conditions -- e.g., her jail cell was brightly lit and loud 24 11 hours a day and she was denied water during the 13-hour trip from 12 Idaho to California. (Id. ¶¶ 66-69.) 13 On December 30, 2016, plaintiff was released from the 14 Yolo County detention facility, but was ordered to wear an 15 electronic ankle monitor, remain in Yolo County, and to submit to 16 supervision by the Yolo County Probation Department until the 17 resolution of the California felony criminal case against her. 18 (Id. ¶ 70.) Around January 26, 2017, an IDOC employee contacted 19 her in California and directed her to apply for transfer of 20 supervision of her Idaho parole to California under the 21 Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (“ICAOS”). 22 (Id. ¶ 71.) Responding in writing, plaintiff declined to do so 23 and asserted that she was still under the jurisdiction of the 24 Yolo County detainer and therefore ineligible to apply for 25 transfer of supervision under the ICAOS. (Id. ¶ 72.) 26 On February 6, 2017, an IDOC employee allegedly ordered 27 plaintiff to report to Sylvia Diaz of the Yolo County Probation 28 Department for an Idaho parole check-in. (Id. ¶ 73.) Plaintiff 1 was told that defendant Kubinski, along with defendant Mesick, 2 the Deputy Interstate Compact Commissioner for Idaho (id. ¶ 12), 3 and defendant Jones, the Executive Director for the Idaho 4 Commission of Pardons and Parole (id. ¶ 11), had decided that 5 California would supervise plaintiff’s Idaho parole. (Id. ¶ 73.) 6 Plaintiff alleges that she contacted Sylvia Diaz on February 6, 7 2017 and learned that on February 2, 2017 the Yolo County 8 Probation Department had received an interstate compact 9 application to transfer plaintiff’s parole from Idaho to 10 California. (Id. ¶ 73.) Plaintiff maintains that she was not 11 eligible to apply for transfer of supervision under ICAOS. (Id. 12 ¶ 75.) She claims that she neither initiated nor signed this 13 application for an interstate compact (id. ¶ 81), and that it was 14 defendant Mesick who fraudulently submitted plaintiff’s 15 interstate compact application. (Id. ¶ 77.) According to 16 plaintiff, defendant Mesick forwarded plaintiff an email on 17 February 14, 2017, which stated that if plaintiff did not consent 18 to the transfer of her parole from Idaho to California, plaintiff 19 would receive a parole violation and be re-incarcerated. (Id. ¶ 20 84.) On March 8, 2017, plaintiff “reluctantly and belatedly” 21 signed the “fraudulent Interstate Compact Application.” (Id. ¶ 22 86.) 23 In October 2017, plaintiff brought Pringle v. Gentry, 24 2:17-cv-2206 (“Pringle I”), pro se against a variety of Idaho 25 correctional and parole officials, many of them also defendants 26 in the instant case. (Id. ¶¶ 91 & 93.) That case was assigned 27 to Judge Troy L. Nunley. Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation 28 for that suit, defendants Jones, Mesick, and Kubinski conspired 1 with defendants Cardall and Pennella, as well as with the Yolo 2 County Probation Department, to issue a groundless parole 3 violation against plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 102-04.) Plaintiff states 4 that at all times between May 4, 2017, and November 3, 2017, she 5 was in compliance with the terms of her Idaho parole. (Id. ¶¶ 6 89-90.) Plaintiff alleges that at some point between October 26, 7 2017, and November 3, 2017, her status in the IDOC Offender 8 Database was changed from “Released to [parole] supervision” to 9 “Fugitive.” (Id. ¶¶ 98-99.) Plaintiff contends that this change 10 occurred because of defendants’ allegedly conspiratorial and 11 baseless report that plaintiff had absconded from parole. (Id. 12 ¶¶ 100-104.) 13 On March 28, 2018, a hearing was held before Magistrate 14 Judge Allison Claire in Pringle I. (Id. ¶ 123.) Plaintiff 15 appeared telephonically. (Id.) She alleges, however, that 16 defendants Kubinski, Mesick, and Jones conspired with defendant 17 Magnuson, a Deputy Attorney General for the state of Idaho (id. ¶ 18 15), to arrange for plaintiff to be detained by a United States 19 Marshal working in the same building where the hearing was held. 20 (Id. ¶ 125.) Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Elisa 21 Magnuson, an Idaho Deputy Attorney General, engaged in ex parte 22 communications with Judge Claire. (Id. ¶ 127.) Eventually, 23 after the parties litigated various jurisdictional and venue- 24 related issues, Judge Nunley ordered the case transferred to the 25 District of Idaho under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Later that same 26 day, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without 27 prejudice of that action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28 Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) and the case was closed. 1 B. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, 2:18-cv- 3 02035 WBS KJN, (“Pringle II”) one week before Judge Nunley’s 4 ruling ordering Pringle I’s transfer to Idaho. Citing Pringle 5 I’s transfer to Idaho and the fact that the court had not reached 6 Pringle I’s merits, Judge Nunley declined to relate Pringle I and 7 Pringle II. (Minute Order (Docket No. 6).) 8 Plaintiff represented to the court that all of the 9 defendants in this case were properly served pursuant to Rule 10 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket Nos. 8- 11 19.) The Idaho defendants failed to respond or otherwise defend 12 themselves in the time allotted under Rule 12. Plaintiff then 13 requested and received an entry of default against the Idaho 14 defendants. (Docket Nos. 20 & 22.) On January 2, 2019, the 15 Idaho defendants moved to set aside the default and quash the 16 summons. (Docket No. 30.) That same day plaintiff moved for 17 default judgment against the Idaho defendants. (Docket No. 31.) 18 The court eventually granted the Idaho defendants’ motion to set 19 aside the default on the condition that they pay plaintiff $5,040 20 in attorney’s fees associated with the preparation of her motion 21 for entry of default judgment. (Docket Nos. 46, 56 & 65.) 22 Around the same time, defendants Brent Cardall and the 23 County of Yolo moved to dismiss two of plaintiff’s claims against 24 them, sever and transfer all claims against the Idaho defendants 25 to the District of Idaho, and stay proceedings. (Docket No. 21.) 26 The court dismissed plaintiff’s claims against defendants Cardall 27 and the County of Yolo for negligent hiring and supervision, and 28 negligent training. (Docket No. 37.) The court denied 1 defendants’ requests to sever, transfer, and stay this case. 2 The Idaho defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s 3 complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction,1 for failure to 4 state a claim, and for forum non conveniens. Plaintiff asserts 5 three separate causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim 6 under California Penal Code § 136.1(a), and a civil rights 7 conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against these defendants. 8 II. Discussion 9 A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 10 Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the court 11 has personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants. In re W. 12 States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741 13 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 14 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). Where the court does not hold an 15 evidentiary hearing and the motion is based on the written 16 1 In a prior order, the court stated that “[a]ny 17 impropriety of venue that may have existed was cured when the 18 Idaho defendants waived venue by failing to respond to the complaint.” (Docket No. 37 at 10 n.2 (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 19 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1960)). While Hoffman analogizes the waiver of venue to the waiver of personal jurisdiction, the two defenses 20 are waived in different ways. Defendants remain free to challenge personal jurisdiction after an entry of default. See 21 Am. Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 22 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). The only requirement is that the defense of lack personal jurisdiction be included in the first responsive 23 pleading. See id. Here, defendants complied with this requirement because they raised this challenge in their motion to 24 set aside default. (See Docket No. 30.) “This distinction between defects in venue and personal jurisdiction is due to 25 their respective effect on the court’s power: A judgment is void when a court enters it lacking subject matter jurisdiction or 26 jurisdiction over the parties. Defects in venue do not affect 27 the court’s power and a valid default judgment may be entered by a court notwithstanding the defect.” Williams v. Life Sav. & 28 Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1986). 1 materials, plaintiff need only establish a prima facie showing of 2 personal jurisdiction.2 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 3 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). In such a case, 4 “[u]ncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as 5 true” and “[c]onflicts between parties over statements contained 6 in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Id. 7 If there is no applicable federal statute governing 8 personal jurisdiction, the court applies the law of the state in 9 which it sits. Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 10 601, 608-09 (9th Cir. 2010). “California’s long-arm jurisdiction 11 statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements.” 12 Id. Due process requires that for nonresident defendants to be 13 subject to the court’s jurisdiction, defendants “have certain 14 minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance 15 of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 16 substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 17 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). The strength of contacts 18 required depends on which of the two categories of personal 19 jurisdiction a litigant invokes: general jurisdiction3 or 20 2 Where the pleadings and other submitted written materials “raise issues of credibility or disputed questions of 21 fact with regard to jurisdiction, the district court has the 22 discretion to take evidence at a preliminary hearing in order to resolve the contested issues.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 23 Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). If there is an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction 24 “plaintiff must establish the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence, just as he would have to do at 25 trial.” Id. 26 3 At the hearing on this motion, plaintiff’s counsel 27 conceded that he was not relying on general jurisdiction. Counsel made this concession for good reason. For individuals 28 like the Idaho defendants, “the paradigm forum for the exercise 1 specific jurisdiction. Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 2 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 3 (2014)). 4 1. Specific Jurisdiction 5 “[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 6 issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy 7 that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires 8 Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citations 9 and quotations omitted). The specific jurisdiction inquiry 10 “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and 11 the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 12 780 (1984) (citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he 13 relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant 14 himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 15 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (emphasis in original). The court must thus 16 “look[] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, 17 not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. 18 at 285. 19 The Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong test to analyze 20 claims of specific personal jurisdiction. This analysis requires 21 first that the non-resident defendant “purposefully direct his 22 activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 23 resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully 24 of general jurisdiction” would be their domiciles. Daimler, 571 25 U.S. at 137. All moving defendants are residents of Idaho. (See FAC ¶¶ 8-15.) None of these defendants have consented to the 26 exercise of personal jurisdiction in California, and there is no 27 evidence that their contacts with California have been so constant and pervasive as to establish constructive domicile in 28 this state. 1 avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 2 forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its 3 laws.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Lake v. Lake, 4 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). While courts sometimes use 5 the term “purposeful availment” to include both purposeful 6 availment and purposeful direction, they are two distinct 7 concepts. Id. “A purposeful availment analysis is most often 8 used in suits sounding in contract . . . [while] [a] purposeful 9 direction analysis . . . is most often used in suits sounding in 10 tort.” Id. (citations omitted). Because civil rights actions 11 sound in tort, courts typically use a purposeful direction 12 analysis in such cases. See Ziegler v. Indian River Cty., 64 13 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995). Purposeful direction is evaluated 14 under the “effects test” derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 15 783 (1984). Under the “effects test” the defendant must have: 16 “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 17 forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely 18 to be suffered in the forum state.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. 19 Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017). 20 The second factor of the Ninth Circuit’s three-part 21 test for evaluating specific personal jurisdiction requires that 22 the claim “be one which arises out of or relates to the 23 defendant’s forum-related activities.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 24 at 802. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing both of 25 these first two prongs. Id. (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 26 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). If the plaintiff satisfies the 27 first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a 28 compelling case that the third prong, which requires that the 1 exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial 2 justice, is not met. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 3 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)). Here, plaintiff’s allegations in 4 support of jurisdiction suffer from four major defects. 5 First, plaintiff cannot rely on the general agreements 6 between the states of Idaho and California that govern the 7 treatment of inmates and parolees to satisfy the requirements for 8 specific jurisdiction. Because the Idaho defendants are being 9 sued in their individual capacities (see FAC ¶¶ 8-15), “[e]ach 10 defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed 11 individually.” See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. There is no 12 authority under which this court can impute all contacts of the 13 state of Idaho and its agents to the Idaho defendants simply 14 because they are employees of the state. Cf. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 15 1072 (stating that there is “no binding authority applying the 16 alter ego test in reverse”). Indeed, the Supreme Court and Ninth 17 Circuit have rejected using such an expansive view of agency 18 relationships when determining whether jurisdiction exists. See 19 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134-35; Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 20 F.3d 1015, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Daimler’s rationale 21 also governs in the specific jurisdiction context). 22 Second, many of plaintiff’s allegations in support of 23 jurisdiction concern conduct that occurred only in Idaho. For 24 instance, defendants Gentry, Barlow-Hust, McDonald, and Kubinski 25 refused to process plaintiff’s request for relief related to her 26 California detainer while she was in custody in Idaho. (See FAC 27 ¶¶ 23-58.) Similarly, defendants McDonald, Jones, Mesick, and 28 Kubinski executed the allegedly unlawful transport order and 1 issued the false parole violation in Idaho, pursuant to their 2 responsibilities as Idaho officials, and related to plaintiff’s 3 Idaho conviction. (See id. ¶¶ 59-65 & 87-104.) Plaintiff cannot 4 rely on the mere fact that these actions had an effect on 5 plaintiff in California. “The proper question is not where the 6 plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether 7 the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful 8 way.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Because the above-mentioned 9 conduct had no relation to California, the court cannot rely on 10 it to exercise specific jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants. 11 Third, the alleged acts that do touch on California 12 were contacts with persons in California and not meaningful 13 contacts with the state itself. Plaintiff alleges that defendant 14 McDonald lied to Yolo County Assistant District Attorney Larry 15 Eichele and told him that plaintiff never had a detainer while 16 confined by the Idaho Department of Corrections. (See FAC ¶¶ 51- 17 57.) Plaintiff does not argue, however, that McDonald intended 18 to create a relationship with California by making this allegedly 19 false statement to Eichele. Instead, plaintiff claims that the 20 harm from the statement was both directed to her and felt by her 21 in California, as she resided here at the time. (See Decl. of 22 Pamela Pringle (“Pringle Decl.”) ¶ 90 (Docket No. 31-4).) 23 However, plaintiff’s contacts with the Idaho defendants and this 24 forum cannot be the basis for jurisdiction in California. See 25 Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation 26 omitted) (stating that plaintiff’s contacts cannot drive the 27 jurisdictional inquiry). 28 This same problem plagues plaintiff’s allegation that 1 defendants Mesick, Kubinski, and Jones conspired to and submitted 2 a fraudulent application to transfer plaintiff’s parole from 3 Idaho to California. (See FAC ¶¶ 75-79.) The allegation 4 concerns these defendants’ relationship with plaintiff as a 5 former Idaho inmate. These defendants allegedly submitted this 6 fraudulent transfer application simply because plaintiff had been 7 incarcerated in California after leaving Idaho. (See id. ¶ 71.) 8 Actions that are “only implicated by the happenstance of 9 plaintiff[’s] residence” cannot serve as the basis for 10 jurisdiction. See Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 11 1146 (9th Cir. 2017). Indeed, if plaintiff had been incarcerated 12 in a different state, her own allegations indicate that she would 13 have likely experienced the same allegedly tortious conduct -- an 14 observation that weighs against the exercise of jurisdiction. 15 See id. (citation omitted). These acts are therefore too 16 attenuated to California to make the exercise of jurisdiction in 17 this state proper. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. 18 Fourth, plaintiff’s own allegations indicate that the 19 remainder of the allegedly unlawful acts never even occurred, let 20 alone caused harm to plaintiff in California. Plaintiff alleges 21 that some defendants arranged for plaintiff to be detained by a 22 deputy United States Marshal before a hearing in Pringle I. She 23 concedes, however, that she was not arrested at that hearing 24 because she chose not to attend in person. (See Pringle Decl. ¶ 25 127.) Since plaintiff was not harmed by this alleged conspiracy, 26 this allegation fails to support the exercise of jurisdiction. 27 See Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1144 (“Harm suffered in the forum state 28 is a necessary element in establishing purposeful direction.”). 1 Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Magnuson had an 2 improper ex parte communication with the magistrate judge in 3 Pringle I.4 Even assuming that this dubious allegation is true, 4 plaintiff does not allege that any ex parte communications caused 5 Judge Claire to improperly recommend dismissal of her complaint 6 in that case. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 7 L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing 8 that the relevant harm must have been caused by the acts of 9 defendants). Plaintiff’s own description of the conversation she 10 overheard indicates that it had nothing to do with the substance 11 of her case. (See Pringle Decl. ¶ 124.)5 12 Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations do not establish 13 the requisite minimum contacts for this court to have specific 14 jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants. See also Trujillo v. 15 Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that 16 the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Virginia corrections 17 officials in New Mexico would offend traditional conceptions of 18 fair play and substantial justice).6 19 4 Plaintiff does not argue that Magnuson’s appearance at 20 a hearing in Pringle I by itself establishes specific jurisdiction. 21 22 5 Plaintiff argues that it would be unfair for this court to require her to try this action in Idaho because the state 23 would reincarcerate her on her outstanding parole violation. However, as Judge Nunley observed in transferring Pringle I to 24 Idaho, plaintiff’s counsel can represent plaintiff’s interests in her stead and most litigation can occur without plaintiff’s 25 presence such that she may never need to travel to Idaho. See Pringle v. Gentry, No. 2:17-cv-02206 TLN AC, 2018 WL 3702313, at 26 *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018). 27 6 Because the court concludes that it lacks personal 28 jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants, it does not reach the eee ee EE EI OE IE OE OS ED 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Idaho defendants’ 2 Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 53) be, and the same hereby is, 3 GRANTED. Accordingly, all of plaintiff’s claims against 4 defendants Sandy Jones, Amanda Gentry, Noel Barlow-Hust, Judy 5 | Mesick, Cindy McDonald, Mark Kubinski, and Elisa Magnuson are 6 | hereby DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. 7 Dated: August 27, 2019 dette Ah (hi. WILLIAMB.SHUBB | 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 other arguments put forth in the Idaho defendants’ motion to 28 | dismiss. 15