Duquette v. 1987 Centurion Barefoot Warrior Style Ski Boat ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL JOHN DUQUETTE, No. 2:20–cv–2037–KJM–KJN 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 13 v. 14 DRU JACKSON, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Currently pending before the court is plaintiff Michael John Duquette’s amended motion 18 for default judgment, as against “Gregory David Erickson, Dante V. Lopez, Rodney W. Blake, 19 Kelly A. Blake, Kameron M. DuQuette, Breanna M. Harvey, Jessica A. Lopez, Rebekah M. 20 McKenzie, Kyle E. Robello, Vanessa A. Vanya, and all other possible claimants, known and 21 unknown, who did not file and serve claims in response to the Complaint by February 4, 2021.” 22 (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff filed the motion on May 13, 2021, ultimately setting the matter for a June 23 24, 2021 hearing. (See ECF No. 41.) Under Local Rule 230, “[o]pposition, if any, to the granting 24 of the motion shall be in writing and shall be filed and served not less than fourteen (14) days 25 preceding the noticed (or continued) hearing date.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). Further, Local Rule 26 230 states “[n]ot less than seven (7) days preceding the date of hearing, the moving party may 27 serve and file a reply to any opposition filed by a responding party.” As of this order, no party 28 responded to plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. L.R. 230(d). 1 Normally, the court would proceed to resolve plaintiff’s motion on the merits after a 2 hearing or, alternatively, after taking the matter under submission without a hearing. L.R. 230(g). 3 However, in reviewing the matter, the court has identified an issue that requires supplemental 4 briefing. 5 Plaintiff filed this action under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction, seeking exoneration 6 from, or limitation of, liability under 46 U.S.C. Sections 30501 et seq. (See ECF No. 1.) Under 7 this statute, “[t]he owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of United States for 8 limitation of liability under this chapter.” 46 U.S.C. § 30511; see also Supplemental Admiralty 9 Rule F (“Upon compliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision (1) of this rule all 10 claims and proceedings against the owner or the owner's property with respect to the matter in 11 question shall cease.”). As plaintiff is aware, courts have held that the term “owner” is an 12 “untechnical word” that should be liberally interpreted. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 63 (1929). 13 In Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, the Ninth Circuit described an owner as one whose 14 “relationship to the vessel is such as might reasonably afford grounds upon which a claim of 15 liability for damages might be asserted against him, a claim predicated on his status as the person 16 perhaps ultimately responsible for the vessel's maintenance and operation and a claim against 17 which the Limitation Act is designed to furnish protection.” 290 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1961); 18 see also, e.g., Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (“Title ownership 19 is not dispositive of the issue of who is an ‘owner’ for purposes of the Act. The word ‘owner’ in 20 the Limitation Act is accorded a liberal, common sense interpretation in order to effectuate the 21 intent of the act. Factors such as who pays for storage of the vessel and who skippers the vessel, 22 as well who has possession and control of the vessel, must be taken into account in determining 23 who is an owner for purposes of the Act.”). 24 Axiomatically, then, for plaintiff to be able to receive the protections of the Act, he must 25 fit the definition of ‘owner’ under the Act and relevant case law. However, plaintiff’s complaint 26 plainly states the following: “Plaintiff-in-Limitation expressly and vigorously denies and contests 27 any and all allegations that he owned the Vessel after gifting it to Kameron Michael Duquette, 28 since he did not retain any interest in, dominion over, or possession of the Vessel after 2016 or 1 2017.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11.) From the court’s reading of the complaint, it appears plaintiff 2 intends to argue at some point (possibly at summary judgment, if not at trial) that he has no 3 exposure for any injuries because he had no connection whatsoever to the boat at the time of the 4 accident. At this point in the litigation, plaintiff’s assertions appear permissible as arguments in 5 the alternative—that he has no liability because he had no ownership or control over the boat, but 6 if he is found to be an owner, he should be either fully exonerated, or his liability should be 7 limited, given his lack of connection to any of the events of September 2019. 8 However, it appears any entry of a default judgment on plaintiff’s Section 30511 claim 9 would require the court to rely on his assertion that he had some ownership interest in the boat— 10 or else he would not be entitled to any protections under the Act. See, e.g., Admiral Towing, 290 11 F.2d 641, 644 (“[O]nly an owner or charterer of a vessel may petition to limit liability arising 12 from its loss.”); see also, e.g., Complaint of Nobles, 842 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (noting situations 13 outside of title-ownership where an individual may be deemed an owner for purposes of the Act). 14 Such a ruling raises the possibility plaintiff would be judicially estopped from later arguing he has 15 no ownership in, say, his defense against appearing defendants. See, e.g., Admiral Towing, 290 16 F.2d 641, 644 (“Martinson originally sought in his complaint to place himself within the purview 17 of the statute; in this appeal he claims just the opposite. We think he is estopped from following 18 such a course.”) see also, e.g., Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 19 2001) (noting judicial estoppel is an “equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an 20 advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a clearly 21 inconsistent position,” and detailing factors to be applied by the court in determining whether 22 estoppel applies); see also Helton v. Factor 5, Inc., 2013 WL 5111861, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 23 (denying default judgment without prejudice where the judgment was “likely to be inconsistent 24 with a judgment on the merits as to any answering defendants”). 25 Given that no opposition briefing was filed, and that plaintiff did not discuss the effect of 26 any judicial-estoppel principles in his moving brief, the court orders supplemental briefing from 27 plaintiff. Should plaintiff believe the precepts of the Act allow him to obtain a default judgment 28 against the non-appearing defendants without prohibiting him from later denying an ownership 1 | interest in the boat as against any appearing defendants, he shall present his arguments supported 2 || by relevant law. Alternatively, should plaintiff share the undersigned’s concerns on the judicial- 3 || estoppel issue, he may withdraw his motion for default judgment, wait for the ownership issue to 4 || be settled, and refile his motion for default judgment later (if appropriate). However, if plaintiff 5 || wishes to argue for another course of action the undersigned has not considered, he may do so. 6 | Plaintiff's supplemental briefing is due by June 17, 2021. 7 ORDER 8 It is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff shall file his supplemental brief on the issues 9 || outlined above on or by June 17, 2021. 10 | Dated: June 11, 2021 Aectl Aharon 12 KENDALL J.NE duqu.2037 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28