- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELIJAH LEE MILLER, No. 2:21-CV-0650-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 14. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Josef Daniel Miller; (2) Patricia 9 Miller; (3) Creg Marmont; (4) San Bernardino County; and (5) the State of California. See ECF 10 No. 14, pgs. 1, 2. In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges that Josef Miller is hateful towards transgender 11 people, homosexuals, and bisexuals. See id. at 3. Plaintiff appears to claim that Miller and his 12 mother, Defendant Patricia Miller, testified against him because Plaintiff is homosexual. See id. 13 According to Plaintiff, he and Defendant Josef Miller had consensual sex but Miller later accused 14 Plaintiff of raping him. See id. Plaintiff claims he was falsely accused of sex acts and that has 15 resulted in him being “labeled as a sex offender.” Id. In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that 16 Defendants San Bernardino County and the State of California are liable for false imprisonment 17 “with no actual facts.” Id. at 4. In Claim III, Plaintiff asserts that the “entire legal system” has 18 falsely convicted him. Id. at 5. The first amended complaint contains no allegations as to 19 Defendant Creg Marmont, who is named for the first time in the amended pleading. For relief, 20 Plaintiff seeks a trial to allow him to prove his innocence. See id. at 6. 21 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was filed following the Court’s June 11, 2021, 24 order addressing the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s original complaint. In that order, the Court found 25 that the original complaint, which named the State of California and the California Department of 26 Corrections and Rehabilitation as the only defendants, failed to state any cognizable claims. See 27 ECF No. 12. In particular, the Court noted that the only named defendants are immune under the 28 Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 5. More significantly, the Court also observed that Plaintiff’s 1 claims are barred under the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 2 (1994). See ECF No. 12, pgs. 3-4. Plaintiff was advised of these defects and provided an 3 opportunity to amend. 4 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint continues to set forth 5 claims which are not cognizable under Heck. Where a § 1983 action alleges claims which, if 6 successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s underlying conviction or 7 sentence, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first 8 been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck, 9 512 U.S. at 483-84 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 10 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 11 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 12 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 13 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 14 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 15 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 16 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 17 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 18 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures). 19 Here, Plaintiff claims all relate to his conviction for a sex crime. In Claim I, 20 Plaintiff alleges that the witnesses against him were biased. In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that he 21 was convicted in the absence of evidence. And in Claim III, Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully 22 convicted. Success on any of these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s 23 underlying criminal conviction for a sex crime. Despite being advised of this defect previously, 24 Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts in the first amended complaint to indicate the Heck bar 25 does not apply. Specifically, he has not alleged any facts to show he obtained a favorable 26 termination with respect to his underlying conviction such that the current civil rights claims 27 could proceed. 28 / / / 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 3 | cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 4 | the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 5 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed 6 | for failure to state a claim. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 8 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days 9 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 10 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 11 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 12 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 14 | Dated: August 30, 2021 Ssvcqo_ 15 DENNIS M. COTA 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Document Info
Docket Number: 2:21-cv-00650
Filed Date: 8/31/2021
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 6/19/2024