(PC) Bland v. Clark ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSHUA DAVIS BLAND, Case No. 1:20-cv-01624-SKO (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK 13 v. OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 14 KEN CLARK, 21-DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendant. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Joshua Davis Bland is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 19 this action. At the time he filed his complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at California State 20 Prison, Corcoran (“CSP-Cor”). (Doc. 1 at 1.) In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that prison 21 officials at CSP-Cor planned to transfer him to Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), where he 22 would be subject to “harassment, . . . batteries, abuses, and retaliation[ ]” by other inmates and 23 correctional officers. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff states that the anticipated transfer caused him “extreme 24 emotional distress and severe mental anguish,” and he seeks an injunction providing that he be 25 transferred to Mule Creek State Prison or to a protective housing unit. (Id. at 2-4.) 26 After filing his complaint, Plaintiff was transferred to the Substance Abuse Treatment 27 Facility and State Prison, Corcoran (“SATF”). (Doc. 10.) He was then transferred to R.J. 28 Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California, where is now confined. (Doc. 11.) 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 2 claims, and his claim for emotional or mental injuries is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform 3 Act (“PLRA”). Therefore, Plaintiff must show cause why this action should not be dismissed. 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 A. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief against imminent harm is moot 6 A moot claim “is one where the issues are no longer live or the parties lack a legally 7 cognizable interest in the outcome.” Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) 8 (citation omitted). “Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot [claims] because their 9 constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Id. (citing Iron Arrow 10 Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983)). “[I]f an inmate is seeking injunctive relief with 11 respect to conditions of confinement, the prisoner’s transfer to another prison renders the request 12 for injunctive relief moot, unless there is some evidence of an expectation of being transferred 13 back.” Rodriguez v. Moore, No. 2:19-cv-00226-MCE-DMC, 2019 WL 2284892, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 14 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3714510 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (citations 15 omitted); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 16 This lawsuit is based on Plaintiff’s allegation that officials at CSP-Cor plan to transfer him 17 to KVSP, which would place him in imminent danger of being attacked, harassed, and/or 18 retaliated against by other inmates and correctional officers. (See Doc. 1 at 3.) However, after 19 Plaintiff initiated this action, officials at CSP-Cor actually transferred him to SATF; and he is 20 now incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. (Docs. 10-11.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claim 21 that CSP-Cor officials were about to place him in imminent danger of physical and other harm by 22 transferring him to KVSP—and Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief against such danger—is 23 now moot. That is, the applicable “issues are no longer live.” Sample, 771 F.2d at 1338. 24 B. Plaintiff fails to show that he suffered an injury in fact 25 To have standing, a plaintiff “must show that [he] has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ that 26 [his] injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the [defendant’s] actions, and that [his] injury will likely be 27 ‘redressed’ by this” action. Gospel Missions of Am. v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 554 (9th 28 Cir. 2003) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Injury in fact—the 1 “[f]irst and foremost of standing’s three elements”—is a constitutional requirement. Spokeo, Inc. 2 v. Robins, 578 U.S. 856 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish 3 injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected 4 interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 5 hypothetical.’” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 6 Plaintiff fails to show that he has suffered an injury in fact. As explained above, Plaintiff 7 contends that officials at CSP-Cor were about to cause him injury by transferring him to KVSP. 8 (See Doc. 1 at 3.) This allegation fails to show that Plaintiff suffered actual, concrete harm. As 9 explained above, Plaintiff is also now confined at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. Thus, any 10 claim that harm was “imminent” is moot. 11 C. Plaintiff’s claim for emotional harm is barred by the PLRA 12 Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim that he suffered mental or emotional harm is prohibited by the 13 Prison Litigation Reform Act. The statute provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought 14 by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing 15 of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Plaintiff does not 16 contend that he suffered any physical injury, and he does not allege the commission of a sexual 17 act. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for emotional or mental injury is barred by the PLRA. 18 III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 19 For the reasons set forth above, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, and his 20 claim for mental or emotional injuries is barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Therefore, 21 the Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to show cause in writing, within 21 days of the date of service of 22 this order, why this action should not be dismissed. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 Dated: September 2, 2021 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28