(PC) Hatcher v. Junes ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUSTIN HATCHER, A.K.A. LEXI No. 2:19-cv-0793 AC P HATCHER, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 G. JUNES, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil 19 rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States 20 Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Before the court is 21 defendants’ motion to stay these proceedings pending the resolution of plaintiff’s criminal case. 22 ECF No. 29. 23 I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 24 Plaintiff alleges that defendants Brazil, Benevides, Vina, Perez and Junes, correctional 25 officers at Mule Creek State Prison, used excessive force against her and that she was subjected to 26 sexually inappropriate touching. The allegations arise from an incident that occurred on 27 December 13, 2018. ECF No. 10 (First Amended Complaint). On April 2, 2021, the court found 28 that the First Amended Complaint stated cognizable claims for relief. ECF No. 14. 1 After service was accomplished and defendants opted out of participation in the court’s 2 Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, they were ordered to respond to the complaint. ECF 3 Nos. 27, 28. Instead of an answer or a motion under Rule 12, Fed. R. Civ. P., defendants filed the 4 instant motion for a stay. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition within the time permitted, nor has 5 she requested additional time to do so. Accordingly, pursuant to Local Rule 230(1), the motion is 6 deemed submitted. 7 II. MOTION TO STAY 8 Defendants seek a stay of these proceedings pending plaintiff’s prosecution for felony 9 aggravated battery and battery on a non-prisoner. Plaintiff was charged in Amador County Case 10 No. 19-CR-29057 with committing these offenses against Correctional Officer Brazil, one of the 11 defendants in the civil rights case, on December 13, 2018. Defendants represent that the criminal 12 charges arise from the same incident as plaintiff’s civil rights claims; the date of the alleged 13 criminal offenses and civil rights violations is the same. When the stay motion was filed on 14 August 4, 2021, plaintiff’s criminal case was awaiting arraignment on the Information following 15 multiple continuances. See ECF No. 30 (criminal case docket report).1 16 Defendants contend that abstention and a corresponding stay are appropriate “where—as 17 here—the claims raised in a civil action overlap with pending criminal proceedings.” ECF No. 29 18 at 2. First, relying primarily on Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th 19 Cir. 1995), they argue that this action should be stayed because the pending criminal prosecution 20 involves the same “nucleus of facts” as this civil rights action. ECF No. 29 at 3. Second, they 21 invoke the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). ECF No. 29 22 at 5-6. Below, the court addresses these issues in reverse order. 23 III. STANDARDS 24 “In the main, federal courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal 25 jurisdiction. Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves 26 1 The court grants defendants’ request for judicial notice (ECF No. 30) of the docket report and 27 the criminal complaint in Amador County Case No. 19-CR-29057. See Rule 201, Fed. R. Evid.; Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1982). 1 the same subject matter.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). 2 Certain “exceptional” classes of cases do support abstention, however. New Orleans Public 3 Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367 (1998). The paradigmatic 4 example is Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which “exemplifies one class of cases in 5 which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal 6 proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 7 72. Younger abstention “remains an extraordinary and narrow exception to the general rule” 8 obligating federal courts to decide federal questions that have been presented to them. Cook v. 9 Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. 10 Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Younger principles apply in an action for damages 12 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the federal plaintiff brings a constitutional challenge to a 13 state proceeding when that proceeding is ongoing; the state proceeding is of a judicial nature, 14 implicating important state interests; and the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating his 15 federal constitutional issues in that proceeding.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th 16 Cir. 2004). Younger thus prohibits federal courts from directly enjoining state prosecutions, 401 17 U.S. at 45, and also from substantially interfering with ongoing state prosecutions by entertaining 18 claims that seek to enforce the rights of the criminal defendant in the state forum. See Mann v. 19 Jett, 781 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (abstention appropriate where § 1983 plaintiff sought damages 20 for denial of right to counsel in ongoing state criminal case). 21 In sum, Younger abstention is appropriate if four requirements are met: (1) a state- 22 initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is 23 an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, and (4) the 24 requested relief either seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state 25 judicial proceeding. See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018). All four 26 elements must be satisfied to warrant abstention. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 27 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). 28 //// 1 Absent abstention, the decision whether to stay proceedings is within the court’s 2 discretion. See Securities & Exchange Comm’n. v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 3 1980) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 27 (1970)). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 The Younger abstention doctrine prevents a state criminal defendant from seeking federal 6 court relief from an ongoing state prosecution or federal court adjudication or enforcement of 7 rights applicable in the state forum. It does not apply where the criminal defendant (and federal 8 plaintiff) seeks civil remedies in federal court that are independent of the state proceeding, even 9 when the facts underlying the prosecution and the civil suit overlap. See Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72 10 (common subject matter does not support abstention). Defendants provide no authority for their 11 broad assertion that factual “overlap” is enough to support Younger abstention, and the court is 12 aware of no such authority. The dispositive question is not whether the facts overlap, but whether 13 the requested relief “seek[s] to enjoin” or has “the practical effect of enjoining” the ongoing state 14 judicial proceeding. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 15 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 765. 16 Here, plaintiff does not come to federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 17 ongoing state proceeding. See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 984. Nor does she seek intervention of 18 any kind in the state criminal case. Defendants, who have the burden on this motion, have not 19 identified a single concrete way that litigation of this civil case would substantially interfere with 20 the state court criminal proceeding.2 Absent such interference, there is no basis for a finding that 21 this court’s exercise of its jurisdiction would have the “practical effect of enjoining” plaintiff’s 22 prosecution. See ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 758; see also Mann, 781 F.2d at 1449 (Younger bars 23 civil action that “would have a substantially disruptive effect upon ongoing state criminal 24 //// 25 //// 26 27 2 Defendants do argue that abstention would benefit “the integrity and order of this [civil] lawsuit by resolving issues in the criminal matter that will ultimately have an effect on this suit[.]” ECF 28 No. 29 at 6. Such considerations are not relevant to Younger abstention. 1 proceedings.”).3 For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Younger abstention does not 2 apply. 3 In the alternative to Younger abstention, defendants seek a discretionary stay based on the 4 asserted practical benefits of achieving a result in the criminal case prior to substantive litigation 5 in the civil case. The asserted benefits all accrue to defendants. For example, if plaintiff is 6 convicted of battery on Officer Brazil, defendants may assert the Heck bar,4 seek the benefit of 7 issue preclusion, or raise other defenses based on the conviction. ECF No. 29 at 5. Defendants 8 also contend that a stay is appropriate because parallel state and federal proceedings might create 9 a conflict between the orderly progress of civil discovery and plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights. 10 Id. The court is unpersuaded by these arguments. 11 None of the cases that defendants cite in support of a stay are on point; indeed, to the 12 extent they are relevant at all, they fail to support defendants’ position. In Keating v. Office of 13 Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals held that due process was 14 not violated by denial of a stay of a civil enforcement action pending criminal proceedings. 15 Keating, who faced simultaneous criminal prosecution and civil enforcement action, 16 unsuccessfully claimed that he was entitled to a stay because the pendency of criminal 17 proceedings forced him to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege during the administrative 18 hearing, thus depriving him of an opportunity to testify on his own behalf. Keating, 45 F.3d at 19 324. Here, the prospect that plaintiff may invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege at deposition (or 20 otherwise in discovery) because of the ongoing prosecution, while not unrealistic, remains 21 speculative. Defendants have not yet answered the complaint, discovery has not commenced, and 22 3 Moreover, Younger abstention is appropriate only where the civil plaintiff can litigate her 23 constitutional issues in the context of the state court criminal proceeding. See Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 765. That is obviously the case when a criminal defendant challenges the constitutionality of 24 the statute under which she has been charged, or seeks to vindicate her Sixth Amendment or due process rights in relation to the criminal case. Plaintiff’s prosecution, on the other hand, does not 25 provide a forum for litigating the questions whether her constitutional rights were violated by any 26 of the five civil defendants. Even as to Officer Brazil, and even assuming arguendo that plaintiff were to affirmatively raise self-defense or otherwise challenge Brazil’s actions, the relevant facts 27 and legal standards would be distinct from the constitutional issues presented here. 4 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (barring claims for damages under § 1983 if a 28 favorable judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of prisoner’s conviction or sentence). 1 plaintiff may take any number of positions on any common issues of fact in the two cases. In any 2 event, “[a] defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil 3 matter and asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. at 326. Accordingly, a purely 4 hypothetical Fifth Amendment issue, which the holder of the privilege has not even presented, 5 does not support a stay. 6 Fed. Saving & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 1989), and 7 Securities & Exchange Comm’n. v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980), like 8 Keating, both affirmed the district court’s denial of stays that had been requested by persons 9 subjected to simultaneous criminal and civil proceedings arising from the same alleged 10 misconduct. In all three of these cases, unlike the matter before this court, the civil party who 11 was the criminal defendant sought the stay in reliance on his own rights—and stays were rejected 12 in all three of those cases despite that party’s actual (rather than speculative and future) 13 conflicting interests in the two proceedings. 14 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), which defendants cite for the broad proposition 15 that civil cases should be stayed during the pendency of related criminal cases, involved yet 16 another issue unrelated to this case: the timeliness of § 1983 claims which imply the invalidity of 17 criminal charges. After Wallace’s murder conviction was overturned based on a lack of probable 18 cause for arrest, he sued the arresting police officers under § 1983 for false imprisonment. 19 Because a false imprisonment or false arrest claim depends on the illegality of the arrest, it 20 necessarily implies the invalidity of a subsequent conviction and therefore is barred by Heck v. 21 Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), unless and until the conviction is overturned.5 Accordingly, 22 Wallace could not bring suit until after his conviction was vacated. The timeliness-related 23 question, on which certiorari was granted, was whether plaintiff’s cause of action accrued at the 24 time of his arrest or when his conviction was overturned and the claim was no longer Heck- 25 barred. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 386, 387. The Court held that the statute of limitations for a Fourth 26 Amendment false arrest claim, when the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run 27 28 5 See n.4, supra. 1 at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. Id. at 391. None of this is 2 relevant to the case at bar. 3 Defendants rely on dicta in Wallace noting that when a civil claim is filed before 4 competition of criminal proceedings that would result in a Heck bar, a stay of the civil action may 5 be imposed. In the course of discussing Heck, and declining to adopt its favorable termination 6 rule as a measure of claim accrual, the Court stated: 7 If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made 8 in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the 9 civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. 10 11 Id. at 393-394. 12 That a discretionary stay might be appropriate in a Heck-type situation does not mean that 13 such a stay is appropriate here. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims—unlike the claims for false arrest or 14 malicious prosecution discussed in Heck and Wallace—will not necessarily be extinguished or 15 barred by a conviction in state court. Excessive force claims are not inherently inconsistent with 16 convictions for resisting arrest or battery against an officer, because a single altercation may 17 involve acts of the accused that support a criminal conviction and distinct acts of the officer that 18 support civil liability. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 698-99 (9th Cir.) (en banc) 19 (Heck does not bar excessive force claims arising from conduct distinguishable from the facts 20 giving rise to plaintiff’s conviction), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1128 (2005).6 Where Heck would not 21 necessarily bar a claim after conviction, the reasoning of Wallace does not support a stay pending 22 prosecution. 23 //// 24 6 See also, Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (police 25 excessive force claim not Heck-barred if “distinct temporally or spatially from the factual basis 26 for the person’s conviction”); Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (excessive force used after arrest is made does not destroy the lawfulness of the arrest, so § 1983 claim not 27 barred by conviction); Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (Heck does not bar an excessive force claim based on allegations that the force used was 28 unreasonable in relation to the degree of resistance to arrest). ] The undersigned is well aware that parallel civil and criminal proceedings may lead to 2 || tricky preclusion issues depending on which case reaches resolution first, and how it is resolved. 3 || Butif that were enough to support a stay, stays would be the rule rather than the exception. The 4 | general rule is that civil proceedings may be, as they frequently are, conducted at the same time as 5 | related criminal proceedings. See Keating, 45 F.3d at 324. On the present record, the court finds 6 || astay unwarranted.’ 7 CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons explained above, the court concludes that Younger abstention does not 9 || apply and that the court’s duty to exercise its jurisdiction is not overcome by any countervailing 10 || considerations. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1] 1. Defendant’s motion for a stay, ECF No. 29, is DENIED; 12 2. Defendants shall file their answer or other response contemplated by Rule 12, Fed. R. 13 Civ. P., within 30 days. 14 | DATED: September 22, 2021 ~ 15 Ctttt0n— Lane 16 ALLISON CLAIRE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 || 7 This ruling is without prejudice to any party seeking future relief from any scheduling order, bringing any discovery-related motion, or seeking a temporary discretionary stay based on 25 changed circumstances. In particular, plaintiff is not precluded from raising in this case any 26 || issues than may arise regarding a possible conflict between her Fifth Amendment rights and her civil discovery obligations. Because the criminal case is ongoing and plaintiff is represented in 27 || that case, defense counsel are obligated to notify plaintiffs criminal defense attorney of any notice of plaintiff’s deposition or discovery served on plaintiff prior to the conclusion of the 28 | criminal matter.