(PC)Stevenson v. Holland ( 2021 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 DOUGLAS J. STEVENSON, CASE NO. 1:16-cv-01831-AWI-JLT 7 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON OUTSTANDING MOTIONS 8 v. IN LIMINE 9 K. HOLLAND, et al., (Doc. Nos. 113, 117, 121, 124, 127 & 129) 10 Defendants. 11 12 13 In this order, the Court will resolve all motions in limine and judicial notice requests that 14 were not already resolved through its previous orders on the parties’ motions in limine and 15 Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Doc. Nos. 180 & 203.1 16 17 LEGAL STANDARD 18 “A motion in limine is a procedural mechanism to limit in advance testimony or evidence 19 in a particular area.” United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009). Motions in 20 limine may be “made before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the 21 evidence is actually offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). “Although the 22 Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed 23 pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Id. at 4 n.4; 24 Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997); see also City of 25 Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining motions in limine 26 27 1 The rulings here were reserved in the Court’s previous order on motions in limine. Doc. No. 180 at 54. In response to that order, the parties filed supplemental briefing and submitted evidence for in camera review, after which another 28 hearing was held. Doc. Nos. 181–183, 187, 189 & 191. The Court’s previous order on motions in limine also 1 “are useful tools to resolve issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial” (quoted source 2 omitted)). 3 In Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the following 4 “standards applicable to motions in limine”: 5 Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. However, a motion in limine should not be used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. 6 To exclude evidence on a motion in limine, the evidence must be inadmissible on all potential grounds. Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings 7 should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context. This is because although 8 rulings on motions in limine may save time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of 9 evidence. 10 735 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Goodman v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 963 11 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (D. Nev. 2013), rev’d in part on other grounds by 613 F. App’x 610 (9th 12 Cir. 2015)); see also Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004); Jenkins v. 13 Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). By resolving a motion in limine, the 14 court may prevent the presentation of potentially prejudicial evidence to the jury, which also 15 eliminates the need to try to neutralize a prejudicial taint after the evidence has already been 16 presented. See Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding a 17 motion in limine ruling, a court may change course at trial in the event that testimony or other 18 evidence “bring[s] facts to the district court's attention that it did not anticipate at the time of its 19 initial ruling.” United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Luce, 469 20 U.S. at 41–42). 21 As to general admissibility standards, evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to 22 make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 23 consequence in determining the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. 24 Fed. R. Evid. 402. “Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists 25 only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.” 26 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 387 (2008) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401 27 advisory committee notes). Even if relevance is established, the court may exclude evidence “if 28 its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 1 prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 2 presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In general, “[e]vidence of a person’s character 3 or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 4 with the character or trait.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). Likewise, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other 5 act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 6 person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 7 8 DISCUSSION 9 The outstanding matters that the Court will resolve in this order are Defendants’ Motions 10 in Limine Nos. 2 and 14 and Stevenson’s Motion in Limine No. 13 and Requests for Judicial 11 Notice Nos. 1 and 2.2 12 13 A. Defendants’ Motion No. 2 concerning Defendant Crotty’s personnel records 14 Defendants seek an order excluding the discussion or introduction as evidence of 15 Defendant M. Crotty’s personnel records at trial. Doc. No. 113. 16 17 1. The parties’ arguments: 18 Defendants argue that Crotty’s records are not admissible. They first contend that the 19 records are not relevant to Stevenson’s claims and allegations that Crotty used excessive force. 20 They further argue that even if the records are relevant, they are not proportional to the needs of 21 the case and would instead unfairly prejudice Crotty, confuse the issues, mislead the jury, and 22 waste time. Finally, Defendants argue that Stevenson should not be allowed to use the records as 23 improper character evidence. 24 In opposition, Stevenson first agrees that the records may not be admitted to show that 25 Crotty acted in accordance with an earlier instance of bad character. Doc. No. 145 at 3. But he 26 contends the records and their contents are generally admissible as evidence bearing on Crotty’s 27 28 2 The Court’s resolution of Defendants’ partial summary judgment motion takes the place of its resolution of 1 credibility and truthfulness. Stevenson asserts that the records should be admissible upon cross- 2 examination for impeachment purposes, and also requests permission to question Crotty regarding 3 these subjects during his direct examination as an adverse party and an expected-to-be hostile 4 witness. 5 6 2. Analysis: 7 In response to the Court’s previous order on motions in limine, the parties submitted for in 8 camera review certain tangible evidence. At least some of this evidence appears to be related to 9 Crotty’s personnel records. And for at least some of that evidence, the parties have presented 10 general admissibility arguments in their original briefing on Defendants’ motion: once again, 11 Defendants seek a blanket bar of the evidence, while Stevenson argues he should be able to use the 12 evidence on cross-examination for impeachment and on direct-examination under expectation that 13 Crotty will be a hostile witness. Although the Court has now reviewed this evidence, there remain 14 unaddressed specifics as to how any particular evidence that this motion covers will be used at 15 trial. This in turn makes it difficult to assess whether any particular evidence is relevant or 16 whether introduction of such evidence would be unfairly prejudicial or constitute improper 17 character evidence. The same can be said for possible references to particular evidence coming 18 from the records. 19 Thus, at this stage, the Court will both deny Defendants’ motion for a blanket bar on 20 evidence regarding Crotty’s personnel records and defer further ruling as to the admissibility of 21 any specific evidence until that time.3 Any attempted use of such evidence at trial must be 22 preceded by an offer of proof made out of the presence of the jury.4 Recognizing that moment 23 3 In support of their motion, Defendants cite cases where discovery requests for production of personnel records have 24 been denied on relevance and character evidence grounds. See Wheeler v. Alison, No. 1:12CV00861-LJO DLB, 2014 WL 7157626, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 488 (9th Cir. 2019); Brown v. Williams, No. 1:09- 25 CV-00792-LJO, 2012 WL 1290801, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012). While dealing with comparable issues, these cases are inapt here in so far as Stevenson only seeks to use records that were in fact produced in discovery pursuant to court order. Cf. Shepard v. Quillen, No. 1:09-CV-00809-BAM PC, 2013 WL 978201, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 26 2013) (motion in limine denied because no production of records during discovery and sought for improper character evidence). 27 4 The Court will also defer ruling on the admissibility of the evidence submitted for in camera review that does not 28 pertain directly to Crotty’s personnel records. In so far as this evidence’s admissibility is still disputed at this stage 1 may come, the Court will also provide some preliminary guidance that should be accounted for in 2 any efforts to use this evidence at trial. First, it appears that at least some evidence within Crotty’s 3 personnel records could be relevant for impeachment purposes. On the other hand, doubtless 4 some evidence in those records is irrelevant and certain uses of the records would run afoul of 5 Rules 403 and 404. With this in mind, arguments for and against the admission of this evidence 6 should be made with a degree of specificity that enables the Court to promptly determine issues of 7 relevance and devise any measures to minimize potential prejudice. Second, Stevenson’s desired 8 use of the evidence—attacking Crotty’s truthfulness and credibility—is subject to the limitations 9 imposed by Federal Rules of Evidence 608(b) and Rule 611(b). Third, the Court possesses ample 10 authority under Rules 403 and 611(a) to impose measures that ensure potential distraction, 11 prejudice, and embarrassment are minimized. See, e.g., Castro v. County of Los Angeles, No. 12 2:13-cv-06631-CAS (SSx), 2015 WL 4694070, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2015) (limiting cross- 13 examination to a single on-point question to avoid distracting the jury from the facts at hand). 14 15 B. Defendants’ Motion No. 14 concerning Stevenson’s allegation that Defendant 16 Crotty called an attorney in another proceeding a “dick” 17 Defendants seek an order excluding references to or evidence of Stevenson’s allegation 18 that Defendant Crotty called an attorney in another proceeding a “dick.” Doc. Nos. 127 & 129. 19 20 1. The parties’ arguments: 21 At a preliminary hearing in Stevenson’s state court prosecution for battery on a custodial 22 officer, Deputy Public Defender Jacob Evans cross-examined Crotty. At the conclusion of the 23 hearing, Deputy Public Defender Andrew Blanco heard Crotty call Evans a “dick,” and 24 communicated as much to Evans. Evans later shared this information with Stevenson. Now, 25 Stevenson’s counsel declares that Evans is expected to testify that he shared having been called a 26 “dick” by Crotty with Stevenson. Doc. No. 145-1 at 3. Defendants contend that evidence related 27 28 above, if the issue arises at trial, substantive admissibility arguments for this evidence shall be made out of the 1 to this comment should be precluded as it is not relevant and instead unduly prejudicial. 2 Defendants argue that Stevenson’s only purpose in introducing this evidence would be to paint 3 Crotty in a negative light. 4 In opposition, Stevenson contends that Crotty’s statement is relevant to his own state of 5 mind. Doc. No. 145 at 13—14. Specifically, Stevenson asserts that he will testify that knowing 6 Crotty called his attorney a “dick” contributed to his decision to accept a guilty plea because he 7 feared for his ongoing safety. In greater detail, Stevenson explains that he 8 informed the Kern County Superior Court that he was pleading guilty because he feared for his ongoing safety. Plaintiff explained he feared that Defendant Crotty 9 and his co-workers would assault him as a reprisal if he were to go to trial. Plaintiff told the court that regardless of whether he won his trial, Plaintiff would 10 have to return to face the guards, and it simply was not safe for him to do so based on the continued harassment he was experiencing. 11 Crotty’s use of profanity to an officer of the court will not be offered to show Crotty’s lack of decorum or bad character, but to show that Plaintiff’s 12 attorney found the information relevant to share with him and that Crotty’s use of profanity against his attorney contributed to Plaintiff’s assessment that it was 13 unsafe for him to proceed to trial. 14 Doc. No. 145 at 14 (internal citation omitted). Stevenson offers that he would have no objection 15 to a limiting instruction that explains what the evidence may properly be used for—i.e., relevant to 16 his state of mind. 17 18 2. Analysis: 19 The outcome of this motion is governed by the Court’s disposition of the summary 20 judgment dispute. Namely, as briefed, Stevenson’s case for admission of this evidence is tied 21 exclusively to his causation theory for his intended pursuit of overincarceration damages for his 22 time imprisoned on the state felony conviction. With that causation theory playing no further role 23 in these proceedings in light of the summary judgment ruling in Defendants’ favor, the Court finds 24 this evidence without relevance. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion. 25 26 C. Stevenson’s Motion No. 13 concerning lifting the stipulated protective order 27 Stevenson seeks an order removing the confidential designation from documents covered 28 by the stipulated protective order or an order relieving the parties of the stipulated protective order 1 in full. Doc. No. 117 at 11–15. 2 3 1. The parties’ arguments: 4 During discovery, the Court entered a protective order to which the parties had previously 5 stipulated. Doc. No. 48. The protective order dictates that certain identified records shall only be 6 disclosed with designation of “Confidential Material” and subject to outlined confidentiality 7 procedures. It also states that “this protective order does not assure that any of the materials 8 protected [by the protective order] will be sealed by the Court in the event a party wishes to file 9 them,” and that any party may “apply to the Court for an order removing the Confidential Material 10 designation from any document.” The protective order enables disclosure of “Confidential 11 Material” to the jury, should the matter proceed to trial, but requires return of “all Confidential 12 Material received under the provision of this order (including any copies made)” to Defendants’ 13 counsel within sixty days after trial, any appeal, or any other termination of the litigation. 14 Now, with trial approaching, Stevenson moves to lift the confidential designation from all 15 matters bearing that designation—or, put otherwise, to be relieved of any further confidentiality 16 obligations pursuant to the stipulated protective order. Stevenson seeks to be able to freely use 17 confidential material at trial and thereafter without breaching the protective order. Alluding to the 18 Court’s earlier lifting of the protective order for purposes of litigating Defendants’ first motion for 19 summary judgment (Doc. No. 94), Stevenson asserts that Defendants cannot meet their burden to 20 show “compelling reasons” for continued confidentiality. He adds that even if it applies, 21 Defendants also cannot meet the lower burden of “good cause.” 22 In opposition, Defendants first argue that Stevenson has not fulfilled the protective order’s 23 meet-and-confer requirement, which this Court clarified was to apply to any future motion seeking 24 to lift the protective order as to materials previously designated as confidential. Doc. No. 152. 25 Second, Defendants argue that the Court should not grant Stevenson a blanket lift of the protective 26 order and that Stevenson has not identified the specific documents from which he seeks to have 27 the confidential designation removed. Third, Defendants assert the documents covered by the 28 protective order meet both the “compelling reasons” and the “good cause” standards to support 1 confidentiality. Anticipating Stevenson’s use of Crotty’s personnel records, Defendants contend 2 that the documents at issue warrant sealing because public disclosure of the documents will cause 3 a sufficient level of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense. They add 4 that the records are irrelevant and improper character evidence, and that Stevenson intends to 5 introduce the evidence to mislead the jury into believing that prior allegations of misconduct by 6 Crotty are indicative of his character or related to his actions during the alleged incidents in this 7 matter. Further, Defendants state that there is no public interest that outweighs the protected and 8 confidential nature of the disputed documents. 9 In reply, Stevenson disputes Defendants’ contention that he failed to satisfy the meet-and- 10 confer requirement, noting that for purposes of their motions in limine the parties agreed to 11 discuss matters by way of phone calls and letters and that his counsel provided Defendants with a 12 letter that signaled intent to request relief from the protective order and the confidential 13 designation. Doc. No. 157 at 6–7. Stevenson also objects to Defendants’ contention that he has 14 not made adequate showings of relevance and admissibility. He asserts that he is requesting relief 15 from the protective order in full because “he has no way of knowing in advance which documents 16 might be relevant.” He emphasizes that his need for relief could prove critical for purposes of an 17 interlocutory appeal or other post-trial proceedings, and once again asserts that Defendants have 18 not carried their burden to maintain the confidentiality of particular documents. 19 20 2. Analysis: 21 In federal court, all filed documents are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, 22 Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because “the courts of this 23 country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 24 judicial records and documents.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 25 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record 26 bears the burden of overcoming the strong public access presumption. Id. 27 Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents: the “compelling reasons” 28 standard for documents directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents 1 attached to summary judgment motions, and the lesser “good cause” standard for documents only 2 tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as some discovery documents and 3 documents attached to non-dispositive motions. Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 4 1172, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 5 The compelling reasons standard “derives from the common law right to inspect and copy 6 public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors 7 Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “To limit this common law right of 8 access, a party seeking to seal judicial records must show that compelling reasons supported by 9 specific factual findings outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring 10 disclosure.” Id. (citations omitted). In general, “compelling reasons” sufficient to outweigh the 11 public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such “court files might 12 have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 13 promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 14 F.3d at 1179 (citations omitted). However, “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may 15 lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without 16 more, compel the court to seal its records” under the compelling reasons standard. Id. 17 The good cause standard “comes from [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 26(c)(1), 18 which governs the issuance of protective orders in the discovery process.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 19 LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. Rule 26(c) states that the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to 20 protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 21 expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (stating that the good cause 22 standard under Rule 26(c) asks “whether ‘good cause’ exists to protect the information from being 23 disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality”). 24 The good cause standard “presents a lower burden for the party wishing to seal documents than the 25 ‘compelling reasons’ standard,” as the “cognizable public interest in judicial records that underlies 26 the ‘compelling reasons’ standard does not exist for documents produced between private 27 litigants.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678. 28 A ruling on the continuation of a protective order proceeds in two steps. First, the Court 1 “must determine whether ‘particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the 2 public.’” In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) 3 (quoted source omitted). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or 4 articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 5 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoted source omitted). “[T]he person seeking protection from 6 disclosure must ‘allege specific prejudice or harm.’” Roman Catholic, 661 F.3d at 424 (quoted 7 source omitted). Second, “if the court concludes that such harm will result from disclosure of the 8 discovery documents, then it must proceed to balance ‘the public and private interests to decide 9 whether [maintaining] a protective order is necessary.’” Id. (quoted source omitted) (directing 10 courts to engage in this balancing with consideration of the factors identified in Glenmede Trust 11 Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)). 12 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a stipulated blanket protective order generally does not by 13 itself demonstrate “good cause” for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 14 447 F.3d at 1183 (“Although the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective 15 order, the order contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify 16 reliance by the United States . . . .”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 17 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order 18 typically does not make the ‘good cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any 19 particular document.”); Beckman Indus., 966 F.2d at 476 (“Further, because the protective order 20 was a stipulated blanket order, International never had to make a ‘good cause’ showing under Fed. 21 R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the deposition transcripts in the first place.); see also 22 Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even if the parties 23 agree that a protective order should be entered, they still have the burden of showing that good 24 cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if 25 good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in question should not receive judicial 26 protection.” (citations omitted)). 27 Turning to the parties’ arguments, Defendants’ meet-and-confer theory does not go far. 28 The relevant provision of the protective order states that in applications to the Court for orders 1 removing the confidential designation from any document or permitting disclosure of confidential 2 materials beyond the terms of the protective order “[t]he party making the motion must comply 3 with all meet and confer requirements of the Court.” Eastern District of California Local Rule 4 251(b) sets forth the parties’ requirement of conferring for motions dealing with discovery matters. 5 It states that a motion will not be heard “unless (1) the parties have conferred and attempted to 6 resolve their differences, and (2) the parties have set forth their differences and the bases therefor 7 in a Joint Statement re Discovery Disagreement.” In granting Stevenson’s previous request to lift, 8 the Court found the protective order’s meet-and-confer requirement ambiguous and questioned its 9 application beyond discovery disputes. Doc. No. 94 at 5 n.1. But the Court also stated that all 10 future requests to lift the protective order would be subject to the requirement. Any trickiness 11 with possible nonapplication of the requirement in this specific context is relieved by the fact that 12 Stevenson complied with the requirement for purposes of this motion. The parties both represent 13 they met and conferred regarding their motions in limine. Stevenson represents that he informed 14 Defendants of his intention to file this particular motion. Generally, the parties’ filings related to 15 their motions in limine show that their process constituted an attempt at resolving their 16 differences. Moreover, although the parties have not submitted a joint statement as to their 17 discovery disagreement (which, again, is of questionable application here), they have submitted 18 their differences on the issues attendant to Stevenson’s motion in those separate filings. Under the 19 circumstances here—loose and minimal language in the protective order, questionable application 20 of a discovery dispute rule to a non-discovery dispute matter, and at least some effort from the 21 parties to address the disagreement before turning to the Court—this is enough. 22 Second, Defendants’ argument that Stevenson has not identified what documents he seeks 23 to have the confidential designation removed from is unavailing. As part of his request, Stevenson 24 moves to lift the protective order in its entirety. Nothing in the protective order prohibits this 25 action, nor does the protective order require that such a request be made with additional 26 specificity. 27 Third, for their case under the “compelling reasons” and “good cause” standards, 28 Defendants argue that the protective order should remain in full force because the underlying 1 evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded from trial as misleading under Rule 403 and 2 improper character evidence under Rule 404; public disclosure of the documents will cause a 3 sufficient level of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense; and there is 4 no public interest that outweighs the protected and confidential nature of the relevant documents. 5 For the most part, these statements are nothing more than bare recitations of applicable legal 6 standards. In its previous order lifting the protective order for summary judgment purposes, the 7 Court explained that Defendants had not carried their burden even assuming the lesser good cause 8 standard applied: 9 Defendants failed to demonstrate that the documents at issue warrant sealing under either the good cause standard or compelling reasons standard. Even if the Court 10 were to assume that the lesser good cause standard applies here, Defendants have nonetheless failed to demonstrate that the public disclosure of the documents will 11 cause a sufficient level of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense. In fact, Defendants did not even earnestly attempt to make this argument: 12 Defendants focused solely on the issue of relevance. [Defendants failed to convince the Court that the documents lack any relevance to the merits of this 13 lawsuit. In turn, Defendants also failed to convince the Court that the “only reason” for disclosing the documents is to “promote public scandal” and appease 14 Plaintiff’s spite towards Defendants.] The closest Defendants came to actually wrestling with the good cause standard was to baldly assert that Defendant M. 15 Crotty “is entitled to privacy with regard to his employment and personnel records.” But that assertion both misses the mark of Rule 26(c) and fails to offer 16 specific examples or articulated reasoning of specific harm or prejudice that will befall Defendant M. Crotty if the documents become public. Consequently, 17 because Defendants failed to provide the Court with a proper basis for sealing the documents from the public, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to lift the 18 protective order as to the documents. 19 Doc. No. 94 at 5−6 (citations omitted). This analysis and conclusion fit here as well. Under the 20 good cause standard (which again is the lesser of the two possible standards), Defendants are to 21 allege specific harm or prejudice that will occur absent the protective order. This they have not 22 done. At most, they focus on Crotty’s personnel records and contend such evidence should be 23 excluded from trial in its entirety because the records “are not relevant to the claims in this action 24 and are not proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake 25 in the action.” That is, at its most specific, Defendants’ argument offers broad and generic 26 allegations to go with bald recitations of law. Like this Court previously informed Defendants, 27 this effort does not satisfy the good cause standard, much less the compelling reasons standard. 28 Roman Catholic, 661 F.3d at 424; Beckman Indus., 966 F.2d at 476. 1 In many ways, Defendants’ arguments are entirely detached from the question of whether 2 the protective order should be lifted and instead aimed at issues of admissibility of the underlying 3 evidence at trial. To that point, the parties’ dispute parallels their dispute over Defendants’ motion 4 in limine concerning exclusion of Crotty’s personnel records. As explained above in the Court’s 5 denial of a blanket bar against the personnel records evidence, particulars as to how such evidence 6 might be introduced at trial remain uncertain. The same is true here with respect to how the 7 disputed evidence would cause particularized prejudice and harm upon disclosure. But this burden 8 is Defendants to carry for purposes of this motion. And arguments in favor of continuing a 9 protective order on grounds of evidence admissibility simply put the cart before the horse. If mere 10 inadmissibility at trial constituted good cause under Rule 26(c), unquantifiable amounts of 11 documents and materials produced in discovery in cases across the country could be ordered 12 sealed on account of their not being admissible at trial. This flips the applicable standard on its 13 head. 14 In sum, the Court will grant Stevenson’s Motion in Limine No. 13 to lift the protective 15 order. The magistrate judge entered the protective order based upon a stipulation of the parties, 16 not an explicit finding of good cause. Doc. No. 48 at 7. Defendants are seemingly content to 17 simply argue in favor of the status quo. But as Stevenson correctly points out, showing good 18 cause for continued confidentiality is Defendants’ burden. In their opposition to Stevenson’s 19 motion, Defendants do not carry that burden.5 20 21 D. Stevenson’s Request for Judicial Notice No. 1 22 Stevenson moves for the Court to take judicial notice of a state agency’s adverse action 23 notice and the report and exhibits of an official investigation. Doc. No. 121. Defendants did not 24 submit opposition. But Stevenson’s counsel stated in her declaration that Defendants object to this 25 5 Despite the ruling here, the Court notes that the separate ruling on Defendants’ motion in limine regarding Crotty’s 26 personnel records imposes independent procedural obligations that may be used to safeguard confidential information even in the absence of the protective order. Additionally, lifting the protective order does not affect other obligations 27 on the parties regarding their pre-trial disclosure of evidence they intend to use at trial, nor does it affect the general rules governing the admission or use of evidence at trial. With these measures in place, the parties still have the 28 ability and opportunities to raise any issue regarding potential disclosure of specific confidential information. If such 1 request. Doc. No. 121-1 at 2. 2 A trial court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it 3 either is generally known within the court’s territorial jurisdiction or can be accurately and readily 4 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 5 Under Rule 201, courts may take notice of public records, including records and reports of 6 administrative bodies. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003); Lundquist v. 7 Cont’l Cas. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1242−43 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 8 Through his briefing, Stevenson acknowledges these documents are portions of Defendant 9 Crotty’s personnel records and that this request pairs with his opposition to Defendants’ motion in 10 limine concerning the exclusion of those records and his own motion in limine concerning the 11 protective order. Across all of these disputes, Stevenson has made clear that he seeks to introduce 12 these specific documents at trial for purposes of impeaching Crotty on cross-examination or 13 directly examining him as a hostile witness. Given the Court’s rulings above, Stevenson can make 14 a case that evidence involving Crotty’s personnel records may be used at trial. But judicial notice 15 has its limits. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 16 judicial notice may be taken as to the existence of a public record, but not for the truth of the facts 17 recited therein); Schechter v. Smith, No. EDCV-09-1653 MJG, 2011 WL 13174954, at *8 (C.D. 18 Cal. Dec. 6, 2011) (explaining that “one of the major abuses of judicial notice, albeit perhaps 19 unwitting, is courts allowing the use of judicial notice of court records to evade the hearsay rule” 20 (quoted source omitted)). Without more information regarding how these documents will be used, 21 doubt lingers as to whether judicial notice here might be used in violation of these limits and as a 22 means of circumventing the normal process for seeking admission of documentary evidence. To 23 account for that concern—as well as those above regarding this particular evidence—the Court 24 will deny Stevenson’s request at this stage and note that the matter may revisited at trial out of the 25 jury’s presence. 26 27 E. Stevenson’s Request for Judicial Notice No. 2 28 Stevenson next moves for the Court to take judicial notice of (1) People v. Douglas J. 1 | Stevenson, No. F068170, 2015 WL 4554526, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5291 July 28, 2 12015); (2) California Penal Code § 4904 (recommending $140/day for overincarceration 3 recovery); and (3) the duration between December 14, 2013, and July 11, 2016, is 941 days 4 | (including the end date). Doc. No. 124. face of Stevenson’s briefing, it appears his request 5 aimed at and resolved by the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ partial summary judgment motion. 6 | Given that ruling, the Court will deny the request here as unnecessary. Should Stevenson seek to 7 these sources for other purposes at trial, a renewed request can be made. 8 9 ORDER 10 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1] 1. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 2 (Doc. No. 113) is DENIED; 12 2. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 14 (Doc. Nos. 127 & 129) is GRANTED; 13 3. Stevenson’s Motion in Limine No. 13 (Doc. No. 117) is GRANTED; 14 4, Stevenson’s Request for Judicial Notice No. 1 (Doc. No. 121) is DENIED; 15 5. Stevenson’s Request for Judicial Notice No. 2 (Doc. No. 124) is DENIED; and 16 6. A status conference shall be SET for Monday, October 4, 2021, at 1:30 p.m. 17 18 ITIS SO ORDERED. 19 | Dated: _ September 22, 2021 SE SISTRICI “UDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1a