Hernandez v. Welcome Sacramento LLC ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Gerardo Hernandez, No. 2:20-cv-2061-KJM-JDP 1] Plaintiff, ORDER 12 v. 13 Welcome Sacramento, LLC dba Courtyard by 14 Marriott Sacramento Cal-Expo, Hotel Circle GL, LLC, 15 16 Defendants. 17 Plaintiff Gerardo Hernandez brings this lawsuit against defendants, Welcome Sacramento, 18 | LLC dba Courtyard by Marriot Sacramento Cal-Expo and Hotel Circle GL, LLC for violations of 19 | the Americans with Disabilities Act and two state law claims. Defendants moves to dismiss. The 20 | motion is denied. 21 | I. BACKGROUND 22 Mr. Hernandez is “physically disabled.” Compl. § 8, ECF 1. He is “substantially limited 23 | in his ability to walk” and requires a wheelchair for mobility. Jd. Defendants own the Courtyard 24 | by Marriott Sacramento Cal-Expo, id. § 7, where Hernandez and his girlfriend stayed on May 9, 25 | 2020, id. § 10. In his declaration, Hernandez explains the couple checked in under his girlfriend’s 26 | name. Hernandez Decl. ¥ 10, ECF No. 12. During his stay, Hernandez and his girlfriend 27 | requested a wheelchair-accessible room and were told they would have one. Compl. § 10(a). But 28 | once in the room, Hernandez encountered several barriers: he found the bathroom was not 1 accessible, and the sink did not have proper knee clearance, which made it hard for Hernandez to 2 reach the faucet. Id. Also, the toilet was short and lacked grab bars, which made it difficult for 3 Hernandez to use. Id. Additionally, the hotel’s check-in counter was too high for Hernandez to 4 properly check-in and pay. Id. ¶ 10(b). 5 Mr. Hernandez travels to the Sacramento area regularly. Id. ¶ 10. In his declaration he 6 specifies that he visits “multiple times per month and usually weekly” and the Courtyard by 7 Marriott Sacramento Cal-Expo hotel is close to his cousin’s house. Hernandez Decl. ¶ 4. The 8 barriers at the hotel have deterred Hernandez from visiting again, but he will return once the 9 barriers are removed. Compl. ¶ 12. 10 Mr. Hernandez brought this complaint alleging violations of the Americans with 11 Disabilities Act (ADA), the Unruh Act, and the California Health and Safety Code § 19955 & 12 19959. Defendants now move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), Mot., ECF 13 No. 8; P. & A., ECF No. 8-1, and plaintiff opposes, Opp’n, ECF No. 12. Defendants did not 14 reply, and the court submitted the matter on the papers. Min. Order, ECF No. 16. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) a motion to dismiss contests the court’s 17 subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039– 18 40 (9th Cir. 2003). Standing to sue is a necessary component of the court’s subject matter 19 jurisdiction. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, if a 20 plaintiff lacks standing, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. To demonstrate standing, 21 a plaintiff must (1) have suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, which is actual or 22 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a causal connection between the 23 injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a 24 favorable decision. Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2001). “The 25 party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden” of demonstrating he has standing at every 26 stage of litigation. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010). 27 A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack on standing grounds may be facial or factual. Safe 28 Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations 2 contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. “[I]n a 3 factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would 4 otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the 5 district court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations, id, and may review 6 evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 7 summary judgment. Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2 (citation omitted). “Once the moving party 8 has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other 9 evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits 10 or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.; 11 Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. “Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question 12 jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 13 678 (1946).” Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir.1983). 14 Under Bell, jurisdictional dismissals are warranted “where the alleged claim under the 15 constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of 16 obtaining jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 327 U.S. at 17 682–83. 18 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) a motion to dismiss argues the complaint 19 “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion 20 may be granted only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations 21 do not support a cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 22 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes 23 “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San 24 Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly 25 give rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 26 679 (2009). 27 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 28 pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. 1 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned 2 accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 3 at 678. A claim must include facts sufficient to raise it to this level, not just a recitation of the 4 elements of the cause of action. Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th 5 Cir. 2021); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This evaluation of 6 plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 7 at 679. 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 Defendants move to dismiss, arguing Hernandez does not have standing and did not state 10 a plausible claim. Under the ADA, no individual should be discriminated against based on their 11 disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Discrimination occurs when existing facilities fail “to remove 12 architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. 13 § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); Chapman v. Pier Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) 14 (interpreting the scope of the ADA in public accommodation matters). The ADA requires 15 facilities constructed after July 26, 1990 to be “readily accessible” where “architectural features 16 must not impede disabled individuals’ full and equal enjoyment of accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. 17 § 12183(a)(1); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. 18 A plaintiff establishes standing by demonstrating that “he has suffered an injury-in-fact, 19 the injury is traceable to the [defendant]’s actions, and the injury can be redressed by a favorable 20 decision.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946. Further, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “real and 21 immediate threat of repeated injury” in the future. Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 22 496 (1974)). When the plaintiff “seeks injunctive relief, ‘past exposure to illegal conduct does 23 not in itself show a present case or controversy.’” C.R. Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Properties 24 Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 25 102(1983)). The plaintiff must allege “continuing, present adverse effects,” id., in the form of 26 “deterrence, or . . . injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return to a noncompliant facility,” 27 Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. 28 ///// 1 Defendants contend that even if Hernandez requested an ADA accessible room and was 2 given the key to a non-accessible room, he could have been moved to an accessible room had he 3 asked. Defendants argue Hernandez did not suffer an injury-in-fact because ADA accessible 4 rooms were available at the hotel the night he stayed there. P. & A. at 6. To allege an injury-in- 5 fact, a plaintiff must have encountered at least one barrier related to his disability that affected 6 him. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947−48 (marks omitted). A barrier need not “completely preclude 7 the plaintiff from entering or from using a facility.” Id. at 947. The plaintiff only needs to allege 8 the barrier interfered with the plaintiff’s “full and equal enjoyment” of the facility. Id. (citing 9 Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Here, 10 Hernandez encountered three barriers that prevented his full use and enjoyment of the hotel. 11 First, the sink in his bathroom did not have proper knee clearance for him to access it in his 12 wheelchair. Compl. ¶ 10(a); see Hernandez v. BMV Hotels, LP, No. 18-7511, 2021 WL 229237, 13 at *3−4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2021) (ordering defendant to remove a wet bar sink counter that did 14 not provide proper knee and toe clearances for wheelchair accessibility). Second, he had a 15 difficult time using the toilet in the room because it lacked grab bars. Compl. ¶ 10(a); see 16 Barajas v. Ashford TRS Walnut Creek LLC, No. 20-1676, 2021 WL 2711734, at *1−5 (N.D. Cal. 17 July 1, 2021) (plaintiff that required a wheelchair alleged an injury-in-fact by showing that there 18 were no grab bars at the toilet). Lastly, he had difficulty checking-in and paying because the 19 hotel’s check-in counter was too high for him to access in his wheelchair. Compl.¶ 10(b); 20 Barajas, 2021 WL 2711734, at *1−5 (plaintiff established an injury-in-fact because she required 21 a wheelchair and could not access the check-in counter). Here, Hernandez has sufficiently 22 alleged an injury-in-fact. 23 As defendants themselves note, their argument that Hernandez does not have standing 24 because he could have been moved to an accessible room had he asked, is a factual attack on 25 jurisdiction. On a motion to dismiss, a “[j]urisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is 26 inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the 27 question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits of an 28 action.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (citation and marks omitted). “[W]hen a statute provides the 1 basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiffs’ substantive 2 claim for relief, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to 3 state a claim is proper only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.” Id. at 1039–40 4 (quoting Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 594 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir.1979)). Defendants’ 5 assertion that Hernandez caused his own injury by continuing to use the inaccessible room 6 without informing the hotel, P. & A. at 5–6, is a factual attack that is intertwined with the merits 7 of this action and not appropriately addressed at this stage. See Barajas, 2021 WL 2711734, at *5 8 (finding same). Because Hernandez has established standing, the court has jurisdiction over his 9 ADA claims. 10 Defendants also assert Hernandez does not establish standing because he has not 11 adequately pled his intent to return to the hotel. P. & A. at 7. A plaintiff’s nonspecific allegations 12 of intent to visit a facility, deterrence by the facility’s non-compliance, and desire to visit when 13 the non-compliance is cured is sufficient to establish standing. See Brooke v. Suites LP, No. 20- 14 1217, 2020 WL 6149963, at *3−5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (plaintiff established intent to return 15 by alleging frequent travel to California and intent to travel to the facility’s area for leisure and 16 ADA testing once the barrier was removed). Mr. Hernandez frequently travels to the area 17 surrounding the hotel but is deterred from staying at the hotel because of the barriers he 18 encountered. Compl. ¶¶ 10 & 12. Once barriers are removed, he intends to return to the hotel. 19 Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Hernandez sufficiently alleges an intent to return. 20 Defendants further seek dismissal for failure to state a claim, arguing Hernandez has not 21 adequately pled “an injury in fact coupled with an intent to return to the hotel.” P. & A. at 10 22 (arguing injury in fact and intent to return are requirements “to state a cause of action” and 23 “establish standing under the ADA”). As the court has explained above, Hernandez adequately 24 pled his injury and intent to return to the hotel. The complaint states plausible ADA claims. 25 Defendants argue the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 26 one state law claim in the interest of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 27 P. & A. at 13. “[D]istrict courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are 28 so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 1 | case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under § 1367(c), courts have the discretion to decline 2 | to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if one of the conditions of § 1367(c) exists. 28 U.S.C. 3 | § 1367(c)(1)+4) (courts may decline jurisdiction if: 1) “the claim raises a novel or complex issue 4 | of State law,” 2) “the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 5 | district court has original jurisdiction,” 3) “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 6 | has original jurisdiction,” or 4) “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons 7 | for declining jurisdiction”); Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 8 | “Because the Unruh Act is coextensive with the ADA and allows for monetary damages, litigants 9 | in federal court in California often pair state Unruh Act claims with federal ADA claims.” Molski 10 | v. M.S. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Additionally, the 11 | relevant sections of the California Health and Safety Code concern ensuring “public 12 | accommodations or facilities constructed in this state” are accessible to individuals with 13 | disabilities. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955(a) (citing Cal. Gov't Code § 4450). Here the 14 | court finds the claims are so related as to form the basis of the same case or controversy. The 15 | court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Hernandez’s state law claims. 16 | IV. CONCLUSION 17 The defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied. 18 This order resolves ECF No. 8. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 | DATED: September 23, 2021. 21 CHIEF ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE