(PC) Catchings v. Fletcher ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DENNIS DALE CATCHINGS, No. 2:21-cv-0879 DB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SHERRI FLETCHER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that defendants failed to provide adequate medical treatment in 19 violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion to 20 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) and his complaint for screening (ECF No. 1). For the 21 reasons set forth below the court will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss 22 the complaint with leave to amend. 23 IN FORMA PAUPERIS 24 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 25 1915(a). (ECF No. 5.) Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 26 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 27 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 28 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 1 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 2 forward it to the Clerk of the court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 3 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 4 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 5 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 6 1915(b)(2). SCREENING 7 I. Legal Standards 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 9 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 10 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 11 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 12 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 14 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 16 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 17 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 18 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 19 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 23 AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 24 (1957)). 25 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 26 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 27 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 28 1 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 2 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 3 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 4 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 5 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 6 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 7 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 8 or other proper proceeding for redress. 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, the defendants must act under color of federal law. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 10 389. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 11 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 12 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 13 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 14 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 15 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 16 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 17 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 18 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 19 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 20 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 21 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 22 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 23 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 II. Allegations in the Complaint 25 Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was incarcerated at 26 High Desert State Prison (HDSP). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) He has identified the following defendants: 27 (1) Sherri Fletcher, registered nurse at HDSP; (2) Tamara Taber, physician at HDSP; (3) K. 28 //// 1 Rueter, medical doctor at HDSP; and (4) S. Gates, Chief at California Correctional Health Care 2 Services (CCHCS). (Id. at 2.) 3 Plaintiff alleges that during the time he has been confined at HDSP he has submitted 4 health care services request forms to nurse Fletcher explaining that he has an itchy irritated scalp 5 and dandruff due to seborrheic dermatitis. (Id. at 3.) Doctors Taber and Rueter denied plaintiff’s 6 request to visit a dermatologist. (Id.) He further alleges that the CCHCS chief acted in concert 7 with Taber and Rueter by denying him the opportunity to visit a dermatologist. 8 Plaintiff alleges that Fletcher and Taber engaged in discriminatory practices based on his 9 race and social class by denying him the right to visit a dermatologist. (Id. at 4.) He further 10 alleges that Rueter and Gates acted in concert in to discriminate against him by denying him the 11 right to visit a dermatologist. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 6.) 12 III. Does Plaintiff State a § 1983 Claim? 13 A. Legal Standards under the Eighth Amendment 14 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 15 Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 16 punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 17 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 18 Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy 19 and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited 20 by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 21 Where a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of medical care, the 22 prisoner must allege and prove “act or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 23 indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An Eighth Amendment medical 24 claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the 25 defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), 26 overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 27 banc). 28 //// 1 A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 2 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 3 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include 4 “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities.” Id. 5 at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, a prisoner satisfies the 6 objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 7 825, 834 (1994). 8 If a prisoner establishes the existence of a serious medical need, he must then show that 9 prisoner officials responded to the serious medical need with deliberate indifference. See Id. at 10 834. In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or 11 intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or may be shown by the way in which prison 12 officials provide medical care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 13 1988). 14 Before it can be said that a prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged with regard to 15 medical care, “the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ 16 ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter 17 Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also 18 Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Mere negligence in 19 diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth 20 Amendment rights.”); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (same). Deliberate indifference is “a state of 21 mind more blameworthy than negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for 22 the prisoner’s interests or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 23 Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 24 at 104-05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in providing care, a 25 plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745-46 (9th 26 Cir. 2002); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059; 27 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 28 200 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1 1985). In this regard, “[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would 2 provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to 3 his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 Finally, mere differences of opinion between a prisoner and prison medical staff or 5 between medical professionals as to the proper course of treatment for a medical condition do not 6 give rise to a § 1983 claim. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 7 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 8 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 9 Plaintiff has named Rueter and Gates as defendants based on their denial of his grievance. 10 (ECF No. 1 at 4, 7-8, 10-11.) However, participation in the administrative review process or 11 denial of an inmate’s appeal does not give rise to a cause of action. See e.g., Mann v. Adams, 12 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (no constitutional right to an 13 inmate appeal or grievance process); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) 14 (prison official’s involvement in an administrative appeals process cannot serve as basis for 15 liability in a section 1983 action). Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim against Gates 16 Rueter based on their review of his health care grievance. 17 Additionally, plaintiff has alleged that the remaining defendants violated his rights by 18 denying his request for referral to a dermatologist. However, such an allegation, absent additional 19 facts, shows nothing more than that plaintiff has a disagreement with medical officials regarding 20 proper treatment. “[D]ifference of medical opinion is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 21 constitute deliberate indifference.” Sylvester v. Alameido, No. 2:10-cv-2389 KJN P, 2012 WL 22 4038421 at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012). Additionally, inmates do not have a constitutional 23 right to outside medical referrals upon request. Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 24 1986) (“A prison inmate has no independent constitutional right to outside medical care 25 additional and supplemental to the medical care provided by the prison staff within the 26 institution.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986). Plaintiff has not alleged 27 sufficient facts to show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in denying his request. 28 Accordingly, the complaint does not state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 1 B. Equal Protection 2 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 3 alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. Calif. 4 Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 5 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). State prison 6 inmates retain a right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 8 334 (1968)). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that defendants 9 intentionally discriminated against plaintiff based on his membership in a protected class, 10 Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123, or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 11 differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Dept. 12 of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008). 13 Plaintiff concludes that defendants discriminated against him based on his race and social 14 class. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, he has not provided any facts showing that he was treated 15 differently than other similar situated individuals or explaining how defendants’ denial of a 16 dermatology referral was because of plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. In any amended 17 complaint plaintiff must state facts establishing that defendants treated plaintiff differently based 18 on his status as a member of a protected class. 19 IV. Amending the Complaint 20 As set forth above, the complaint fails to state a claim. However, plaintiff will be given 21 the option to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he 22 must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated his 23 constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s 24 charging allegations are as to each named defendant. The charging allegations must be set forth 25 in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting. 26 That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff 27 should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 28 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought 1 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must 2 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who 3 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. 4 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation 5 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act 6 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 7 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. 8 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. 9 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or 10 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 11 The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 12 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any 13 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be 15 set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 16 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 17 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 18 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. 19 E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded. 20 Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If 21 plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended 22 complaint. 23 By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and 24 has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose 25 sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 26 //// 27 //// 28 CONCLUSION 1 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5) is granted. 3 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 4 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 5 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order 6 to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed 7 concurrently herewith. 8 3. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend. 9 4. Plaintiff □□ granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 10 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal 11 Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint 12 must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First 13 Amended Complaint.” 14 5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 15 dismissed. 16 || Dated: September 27, 2021 17 18 19 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 | pp.2 DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/catc0879 scr 27 28