(PS) Jones v. Velocity Technology Solutions ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Garrison Jones, No. 2:19-cv-02374-KJM-JDP 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. Velocity Technology Solutions, et al., 1S Defendants. 16 17 Garrison Jones alleges his former employer, Velocity Technology Solutions, interfered 18 | with his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). He is not represented by counsel in 19 | this action. The matter has thus been referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge under this 20 | District’s Local Rules. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). Velocity moves to dismiss the complaint 21 | under Rule 41(b) and 12(b)(6), and the Magistrate Judge recommends granting the motion in part 22 | and denying it in part. Mr. Jones objects to the findings and recommendations. ECF No. 93. 23 | Velocity has not filed objections. The court has reviewed the matter de novo. 24 First, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying Velocity’s motion to dismiss under Rule 25 | 41(b). F&Rs at 3. The court adopts that recommendation, but for different reasons than those in 26 | the findings and recommendations. A defendant may move to dismiss under Rule 41(b) if a 27 | plaintiff “fails ...to comply with ...acourt order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Mr. Jones violated 28 | the Magistrate Judge’s order to choose whether he would amend his original complaint or 1 proceed with his FMLA interference claim: he first elected to proceed on the interference claim, 2 but he later also amended his complaint to reassert several other claims. See Order (July 31, 3 2020), ECF No. 29; Notice of Election, ECF No. 30; First Am. Compl., ECF No. 41. Before 4 dismissing a case under Rule 41(b), a district court must consider several factors, including “the 5 availability of less drastic alternatives” to dismissal. Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 6 913 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 7 1999)). Dismissal would be an unduly harsh sanction. It is more appropriate to hold Mr. Jones to 8 his original election and dismiss all claims but the FMLA interference claim. This court’s 9 previous order effectively imposes that sanction. See Order (Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 49. No 10 further sanction is necessary. 11 Second, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting Velocity’s motion to dismiss the 12 claim that it wrongly delayed approval of Mr. Jones’s FMLA leave until February 2018. F&Rs 13 at 4. The Magistrate Judge accurately summarized the legal standard that applies to that motion 14 under Rule 12(b)(6) rule and the elements of a claim for FMLA interference, and the court agrees 15 with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Mr. Jones cannot prevail on this claim. See F&Rs at 16 2–4. By his own allegations, he was not eligible for FMLA leave until February 2018. See id. 17 at 4. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss this claim with 18 prejudice. 19 Third, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying Velocity’s motion to dismiss Mr. 20 Jones’s remaining interference claim. See id. at 4–5. Mr. Jones alleges Velocity interfered with 21 his FMLA rights by firing him while he was on FMLA leave. See, e.g., First Am. Compl. at 26– 22 27. That claim is not plausible. In an email Mr. Jones reproduced in his complaint, Velocity 23 confirmed unambiguously that Mr. Jones had not been fired, that he had remained an employee 24 throughout his FMLA leave, and that he continued to receive medical, vision, dental, and other 25 benefits as well. Id. at 24. The court need not assume an allegation is true if it contradicts a 26 document attached to the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 27 Cir. 2001). The court therefore does not assume Velocity terminated Mr. Jones during his FMLA 28 leave. 1 The Magistrate Judge recommends denying the motion because Mr. Jones alleges an 2 administrative law judge in Arizona found that his employment had indeed been terminated. See 3 F&Rs at 5 (citing First Am. Compl. at 16). In the face of Velocity’s unambiguous email—which 4 Mr. Jones reproduced in his complaint—his allegations about the administrative law judge’s 5 decision are too vague and too confusing to make out a “claim to relief that is plausible on its 6 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 7 544, 570 (2007)). It is unclear what the administrative law judge or the Arizona administrative 8 agency found and why. 9 Although federal courts interpret pro se pleadings liberally, “[v]ague and conclusory 10 allegations . . . are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss,” and a court may not “supply 11 essential elements” when they have not been pleaded. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 12 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Pro se litigants are “not entitled to the benefit of every 13 conceivable doubt; the court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual inferences” in the 14 plaintiff’s favor. Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). The court therefore 15 dismisses the First Amended Complaint. 16 The court cannot exclude the possibility that Mr. Jones could clarify his allegations about 17 his termination and his correspondence with Velocity such that an interference claim would be 18 plausible. The First Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed with leave to amend. See 19 Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013). The 20 court has considered the prejudice Velocity may suffer if Mr. Jones continues to make vague, 21 disorganized, inflammatory, and confusing allegations. That potential prejudice does not outstrip 22 the liberal policy of amendment embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court 23 cautions Mr. Jones, however, that any further amended complaint may be subject to dismissal 24 under Rule 41(b) if it does not contain a “short and plain statement” of his claims, as required by 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), or if he reasserts claims this court has dismissed with 26 prejudice or without leave to amend. Nor does the court anticipate permitting any further 27 amendments. 28 ///// ] In conclusion, (1) the findings and recommendations at ECF No. 87 are adopted in part, 2 | (2) the motion to dismiss at ECF No. 43 is granted, (3) the First Amended Complaint is 3 | dismissed with leave to amend, and (4) Mr. Jones may file a Second Amended Complaint 4 | within thirty days after receiving a copy of this order. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 DATED: September 27, 2021. [\ (] 7 ( ti / { q_/ CHIEF NT] ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE