(PC)Meza v. Chaudhry ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRAYAN MEZA, No. 2:18-CV-3206-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 A. CHAUDHRY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 19 pleadings. See ECF No. 89. 20 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 58. 24 Plaintiff is a prisoner in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 25 (“CDCR”). Id. at 1. All the alleged violations occurred at the California Health Care Facility 26 (“CHCF”). Id. Defendant Chaudhry was a librarian at CHCF. Id. at 2. Defendant Harrison was 27 a librarian at CHCF. Id. Defendant Banks was a lieutenant at CHCF. Id. Defendant Martel was 28 a warden at CHCF. Id. 1 Before February 6, 2017, CHCF had housing facilities where Sensitive Needs 2 Yard (“SNY”) and General Population (“GP”) inmates were housed in different buildings, had 3 separate programming, and were able to use the library at separate times. See id. at 10. However, 4 on February 6, 2017, CDCR enforced state-wide transition protocols, where all CDCR medical 5 facilities were converted into non-designated programming facilities. Id. Inmates were informed 6 that the new policy was voluntary, and that inmates who chose not to participate had the option to 7 transfer to a different institution. Id. Plaintiff was a GP inmate and elected not to participate in 8 the new programming at CHCF. Id. As such, Plaintiff was placed in housing unit C2B pending 9 transfer to another institution. Id. 10 On September 22, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from the California Supreme 11 Court regarding his ongoing habeas corpus petition. See id. The letter stated that Plaintiff had 12 twenty days to reply to the Office of the Attorney General’s (“OAG”) informal response to the 13 court. See id. In response, on October 3, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR Form 22 to a 14 librarian, and Plaintiff told the librarian of his urgent need to access legal materials in anticipation 15 of his upcoming deadline. See id. at 10-11. Plaintiff informed the librarian that the Law Library 16 Electronic Delivery Service (“LLEDS”) in C2B did not have the proper legal materials and the 17 LLEDS needed to be updated. See id. 18 On October 9, 2017, Plaintiff completed a Priority Library User ("PLU") request 19 form, which was granted on October 17, 2017. See id. at 10. Thereafter, a response was issued to 20 the October 3, 2017, Form 22 indicating that Plaintiff was granted PLU status until October 29, 21 2017. See id. at 11. On October 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a CDCR 602 appeal stating that he 22 lacked physical access to the law library. Id. at 11. The record indicates that Plaintiff was able to 23 use the LLEDS (mobile computers) and could request legal materials through paging.1 Id. at 11, 24 37-38. On March 8, 2018, Plaintiff’s 602 Appeal was denied at the third level. See id. at 11. 25 1 Plaintiff was not allowed physical access to the library because he did not 26 participate in the non-designated Programming Facility. However, Plaintiff was designated as a Priority Legal User, and had access to the law library via “paging.” When unable to physically 27 access the law library, an inmate may request access to legal material through delivery of those materials to the inmate by library staff. This process is known as law library paging. See ECF No. 28 58 at 37-38. 1 Plaintiff alleges that Librarian Defendant A. Chaudhry and Defendant Harrison 2 discriminated against Plaintiff by barring him access to the law library. Plaintiff asserts that he 3 was barred access to the law library because he elected to remain a non-programming, “GP 4 inmate.” See id. at 2-4. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Warden Martel and 5 Defendant Lieutenant Banks also discriminated against Plaintiff because he elected not to 6 participate as a “programming inmate.” Plaintiff contends that his habeas petition was inadequate 7 because he did not have proper access to legal materials. See id. at 12. Because Plaintiff was 8 unable to gain physical access to the law library, he claims he could not set forth a sufficient legal 9 defense with respect to his habeas petition that were available to other inmates. See id. at 4. 10 Plaintiff asserts he suffered from psychological and emotion distress as a result of Defendants’ 11 actions. See id. at 3-4, 12. 12 B. Procedural History 13 Defendants Chaudry and Martel were properly served service of process. ECF No. 14 25; ECF No. 27. On May 29, 2019, California Health Care Facility was terminated as a 15 Defendant. ECF No. 54. On June 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his amended 16 complaint. ECF No. 55. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint adding 17 Defendants Harrison and Banks to his complaint. ECF No. 58. On August 14, 2019, Plaintiff’s 18 motion to amend the amended complaint was granted. ECF No. 62. Service of the second 19 amended complaint was found appropriate for Harrison and Banks and Defendants Chaudhry and 20 Martel were ordered to file a response to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Id. On 21 September 13, 2019, Defendants A. Chaudhry and Michael Martel filed their answer. ECF No. 22 66. On January 8, 2020, Defendant Banks waived service of summons. ECF No. 74. On 23 February 11, 2020, Defendant Banks filed his answer. ECF No. 77. However, the record 24 indicates that Defendant Harrison has not been served, and Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on 25 the Pleadings indicates that Harrison has not requested representation from the Office of the 26 Attorney General. See ECF No. 89-1 at 8. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 2 "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may 3 move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is 4 properly granted when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, there is no issue 5 of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 6 law." Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (brackets and internal 7 quotation marks omitted). Like a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion under Rule 8 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. See id. Indeed, 9 a Rule 12(c) motion is "functionally identical" to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and courts apply the 10 "same standard." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 11 1989) (explaining that the "principal difference" between Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) "is the 12 timing of filing"); see also U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 13 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). 14 Judgment on the pleadings should thus be entered when a complaint does not plead 15 "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 17 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is 19 not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 20 has acted unlawfully." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 21 12(c) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 22 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 23 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state any claims upon which relief can be 3 granted because Plaintiff failed to state cognizable claims under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 4 Amendments. See ECF No. 89-1 at 8. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified 5 immunity as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees. 6 A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim – Equal Protection 7 Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 8 individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 9 See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from 10 invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 11 Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security 12 and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also 13 protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 14 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial 15 and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 16 2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the 17 disabled do not constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 18 2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 19 where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069 20 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying intermediate scrutiny to claim of discrimination on the basis of gender). 21 In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 22 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 23 discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 24 such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 25 Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 26 of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 27 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 28 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). 1 Here, the Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on his designation as a GP or 2 general population inmate, which precluded him from proper access to legal materials in the 3 library. See ECF No. 58 at 3. Plaintiff does not allege racial discrimination within the prison, nor 4 any discrimination based on religion or gender. See id. Therefore, the Court will utilize a 5 balancing approach referred to as “minimal scrutiny,” wherein the government need only show a 6 legitimate or rational basis for the alleged violation. 7 The rational basis standard applied here is such that equal protection is deemed 8 denied only if the classification "rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the 9 state's legitimate objective." See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). In 10 applying the rational basis standard to CHCF’s programming policy, the Court finds that the 11 policy's purpose survives scrutiny. The purpose of the transition was to "provide a housing 12 environment for inmate-patients demonstrating positive programming efforts and a desire not to 13 get involved in the destructive cycles of violence." ECF No. 58 at 19. As the CHCF explained, 14 inmates are no longer classified as GP or SNY, but as programmers or non-programmers. During 15 inmate classification reviews, inmates could choose to stay, or if they can't live with certain 16 groups, they had the option to transfer. See id. at 21. Furthermore, CHCF explained that to 17 ensure the safety and security of all CHCF staff and inmates, interactions between the 18 programming and non-programming inmates must not take place. See id. To effectuate CHCF’s 19 policies and to provide Plaintiff with access to the library materials, Defendants did not give 20 Plaintiff physical access to the library, but Plaintiff was allowed access to library materials via 21 paging. See id. at 38. CDCR has a legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of all CHCF staff 22 and inmates and limiting interactions between programmers and non-programmers is appropriate 23 under the circumstances. Lastly, Plaintiff was not forced to be a non-programmer, was aware of 24 the limitations that accompanied non-programmer status, and had alternatives to access 25 institutional computers for his legal needs. 26 For these reasons, Plaintiff does not state a valid claim that his Equal Protection 27 rights under the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated. 28 / / / 1 B. First Amendment Claims 2 Plaintiff appears to allege to claims arising under the First Amendment – a claim 3 based on denial of access to the courts and a claim based on retaliation. Each is discussed below. 4 1. Access to the Courts 5 Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. 6 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 7 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance 8 procedures). This right includes petitioning the government through the prison grievance process. 9 See id. Prison officials are required to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 10 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 11 persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right of access to the courts, however, 12 only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions 13 of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous 14 criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55. 15 Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the 16 court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354- 17 55. 18 As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner 19 must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to 20 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 21 frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in 22 providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of constitutional 23 significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518 24 U.S. at 362. 25 Plaintiff claims that because he was barred physical access to the legal library, he 26 was unable to adequately litigate his ongoing habeas petition, which violated his right to access 27 the court. See ECF No. 58 at 3-4, 10-13. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that right 28 of access to the courts only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to 1 sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Consequently, 2 Plaintiff’s claim is flawed because not only was he capable—he did file his habeas petition. 3 Therefore, the right of access to the court is only a right to present claims to the court, and the 4 Plaintiff was afforded that right. The record indicates that Plaintiff filed his habeas petition and 5 reply brief, duly supported by a basis in fact and law. See ECF No. 89-2 at 323-330. 6 Furthermore, as mentioned, Plaintiff did have the right to access library materials via institutional 7 computers adequately. This right "guarantees no particular methodology,” rather it is the 8 capability requirement that underscores the right to access the courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 9 356-357. Plaintiff has not shown that the CHCF’s program hindered his efforts to pursue his 10 habeas petition. As mentioned, Plaintiff did timely file his habeas petition, and even though he 11 could not physically go to the library to get the materials, he still had access via the paging 12 system. See ECF No. 58 at 40. As such, CHCF’s program did not hinder Plaintiff’s effort to 13 assert his claim. 14 2. Retaliation 15 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must 16 establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory 17 action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional 18 security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting 19 this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the 20 exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); 21 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also 22 show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by 23 the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also 24 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must 25 establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse 26 action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in 27 protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the 28 adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. 1 Plaintiff mentions “retaliation,” but it is unclear as to Plaintiff’s basis for his 2 allegation. See ECF No. 58 at 3. However, even construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, the 3 Court finds Plaintiff retaliation claim is unfounded. Plaintiff seems to assert that Defendants’ 4 denied Plaintiff proper access to legal materials because Plaintiff elected to be a GP inmate. See 5 id. at 2. Yet, Plaintiff still had access to legal materials via institutional computers. See id. at 37- 6 38. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that denial of physical access to the library constitutes 7 an adverse action. Even if it is undisputed that denying Plaintiff physical access to the library is 8 an adverse action, Plaintiff still submitted a reply brief—so any chilling effect on Plaintiff’s First 9 Amendment rights is not well taken. Even more profound is CDCR’s legitimate penological 10 purpose for denying Plaintiff physical access to the library. See id. at 19-30, 33-42. The purpose 11 of keeping programmers and non-programmers separated was solely due to safety concerns 12 amongst the inmates. See id. This overriding concern is sufficient, and with a lack of facts 13 asserted by Plaintiff to the contrary, the Court has no basis to conclude the Defendants acted 14 unlawfully. 15 C. Sixth Amendment Claim – Right to Counsel 16 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives every criminal 17 defendant the right to have assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Yet, the 18 Supreme Court has declared that civil litigants do not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 19 even when the proceedings have dire consequences to the civil litigants. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of 20 Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 18 (1981) (holding that failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in 21 proceedings for termination of parental status did not deprive parent of due process). 22 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a party who elects to represent himself cannot 23 subsequently complain that the quality of his own defense is akin to a denial of effective 24 assistance of counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). 25 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to adequately litigate his habeas petition 26 because Defendants’ acts or omissions prevented his access to legal materials. See ECF No. 58 at 27 3. The Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable for two reasons. First, as mentioned, the Supreme 28 Court has held that the right to counsel does not extend to civil actions, which includes Plaintiff’s 1 habeas petition. Second, Plaintiff claims he was unable to effectively represent himself, which 2 does not equate to denial of access to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 4. 3 Plaintiff had access to institutional computers and managed to complete a reply brief in favor of 4 his position. See ECF No. 89-2 at 323-330. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Sixth 5 Amendment claim fails to plead an adequate basis for relief. 6 D. Qualified Immunity 7 “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [are entitled to] a 8 qualified immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could 9 reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have 10 violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted). “Qualified 11 immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when 12 they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, 13 and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 14 (2009); see also Ioane v. Hodges, 903 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has set 15 forth a two-part analysis for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity 16 claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 17 First, the Court must consider whether the facts “[t]aken in the light most 18 favorable to the party asserting the injury … show [that] the [defendant’s] conduct violated a 19 constitutional right[.]” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Second, the court must determine whether the 20 right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 21 744, 757; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that government 22 officials are immune so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional 23 rights of which a reasonable person would have known). 24 Here, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity based on 25 Plaintiff's claims because they violated no constitutional rights. See ECF No. 89-1 at 26. The 26 Court agrees. Although Plaintiff did not have physical access to the library, the facts indicate that 27 he had access to the court—evidenced by his timely filed reply brief. See ECF No. 89-2 at 323- 28 330. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim also is unfounded. The differential treatment between 1 programmers and non-programmers was supported by the CDRC’s need to keep prisoners and 2 staff, safe, thus clearly supported by a rational basis. Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment claim also is 3 insufficient. As mentioned, Plaintiff’s argument that he did not have adequate access to legal 4 materials needed for his defense does not equate to a denial of counsel. 5 As to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, Plaintiff filed his reply brief and any 6 argument that Defendants’ chilled Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment is insufficient. 7 Further, CDCR’s policy restricting non-programmers access to the library is supported by safety 8 and security interests among prisoners and staff. See id. at 19-30, 33-42. This Court takes 9 particular note that although Plaintiff was dissatisfied by Defendants' failure to respond to his 10 requests properly, Defendants still provided Plaintiff access to computers for his legal research. 11 As such, this Court has no basis for concluding that Defendants' actions precluded Plaintiff from 12 filing his habeas corpus petition. 13 In applying the second prong in Harlow, Plaintiff’s claim equal protection claim is 14 also barred. Plaintiff voluntarily elected non-programming status. Defendants enforced the 15 CHCF policies against all inmates. CDCR staff enforced the policies to ensure safety and 16 security amongst all prisoners and staff. As such, there is no basis to conclude that a reasonable 17 person in Defendants’ shoes could have believed their conduct violated Plaintiff’s equal 18 protection rights. 19 / / / 20 / / / 21 / / / 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendant’s motion for 3 | judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 89, be granted and this action be dismissed in its entirely 4 | with prejudice. 5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 6 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 7 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 8 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 9 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 10 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 11 12 || Dated: October 27, 2021 13 Sec DENNIS M. COTA 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12