(PC) McCurdy v. Blanco ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES C. McCURDY, No. 2:21-CV-1764-JAM-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 P. BLANCO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff brings claims against the following defendants: (1) P. Blanco, a sergeant 9 at California State Prison – Sacramento (CSP-Sac.), (2) Earles, a sergeant at CSP-Sac., and (3) 10 Hougland, a lieutenant at CSP-Sac. See ECF No. 1, at 1. Plaintiff asserts two claims. 11 Claim I 12 Plaintiff asserts a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 13 Punishment Clause against Defendant Earles for grabbing Plaintiff’s arms and cuffing him during 14 an interview regarding a prior complaint. See ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that, on 15 November 13, 2017, Officer Brown escorted Plaintiff to the B-yard where Defendants Earles and 16 Blanco interviewed Plaintiff regarding a sexual assault allegation that occurred a year ago. See 17 id. Plaintiff asserts that he complained of abdominal pain during the interview, and Defendants 18 Earles and Blanco asked Plaintiff to remove his jumpsuit so they could document any injuries. 19 See id. Plaintiff mentioned to Defendants Earles and Blanco that he was previously sexually 20 assaulted. See id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Earles then “snapped and grabbed ahold of 21 my arms cuffed behind my back and wrenched them up over my head,” causing Plaintiff to 22 scream. Id. Next, Plaintiff contends Defendant Earles “jerked me up and wrestled me threw [sic] 23 the door. . . .” Id. Plaintiff states he was dragged kicking and screaming to his cell with his pants 24 still down around his legs. See id. at 3-4. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Claim II 2 Plaintiff also asserts a violation of his First Amendment rights. See id. at 5. 3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Earles destroyed his “legal work” in retaliation which denied his 4 access to the courts. See id. at 5. It appears that Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant did not want 5 to hear about the prior sexual assault complaint, and that is what prompted Defendant to "destroy" 6 Plaintiff's "legal work." Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Blanco was present and did 7 nothing. See id. 8 Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2017, he met with Defendant Hougland for 9 an interview to discuss his complaints. See id. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Hougland 10 “retaliated against me” by using “threats and intimidation” to attempt to cause Plaintiff to refuse 11 to go forward with the interview. Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Hougland said he would 12 use anything Plaintiff said in the interview to incriminate him in a pending criminal case against 13 Plaintiff arising from a charge of battery on a peace officer at a prior prison. See id. 14 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 The Court finds that Plaintiff states a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive 17 force claim and a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Earles. 18 Plaintiff has not, however, sufficiently pleaded any First Amendment claims – based either on 19 retaliation or denial of access to the courts – against Defendants Blanco or Hougland. Plaintiff 20 also has not sufficiently pleaded a First Amendment access to the courts claim against Defendant 21 Earles. 22 A. Retaliation 23 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the prisoner must 24 establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory 25 action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional 26 security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting 27 this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the 28 exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); 1 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also 2 show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by 3 the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also 4 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must 5 establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse 6 action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in 7 protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the 8 adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. 9 Here, Plaintiff appears to claim that Defendant Blanco is liable because he sat by 10 and did nothing while Defendant Earles destroyed his property in retaliation. Because Plaintiff 11 has not alleged any adverse action taken by Defendant Blanco, he has not stated a claim against 12 that defendant. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend his allegations against 13 Defendant Blanco to the extent he can allege retaliatory conduct taken by Blanco. 14 B. Access to the Courts 15 Prisoners have a First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. 16 Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 17 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance 18 procedures). This right includes petitioning the government through the prison grievance process. 19 See id. Prison officials are required to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful 20 legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from 21 persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right of access to the courts, however, 22 only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions 23 of confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous 24 criminal appeals, habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55. 25 Therefore, the right of access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the 26 court, and not a right to discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354- 27 55. 28 / / / 1 As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner 2 must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to 3 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non- 4 frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). Delays in 5 providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of constitutional 6 significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Lewis, 518 7 U.S. at 362. 8 Here, as to both Earles and Hougland, Plaintiff appears to allege denial of access 9 to the courts. Specifically, Plaintiff claims these defendants’ conduct were intended to thwart his 10 ability to exhaust his administrative remedies, either with respect to the current claim or other 11 claims Plaintiff has made. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged that he was actually prevented from 12 exhausting administrative remedies or that he was prejudiced thereby with respect to 13 contemplated or existing litigation. Again, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 14 15 III. CONCLUSION 16 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 17 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 18 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 19 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 20 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 21 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 22 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 23 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 24 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 25 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 26 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 27 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 28 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 1 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 2 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims. 5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 6 | complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order. 4 8 || Dated: December 2, 2021 Ssvcqo_ ? DENNIS M. COTA 10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28