(PC) Anderson v. Kernan ( 2021 )

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HECTOR CLARENCE ANDERSON, Case No. 1:19-cv-255-JLT (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 v. 14 H. ANGLEA, (Doc. 98) 15 Defendant. Clerk of Court to close the case. 16 17 Hector Clarence Anderson has filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 18 injuries sustained during a prison riot. (Doc. 1.) This matter proceeds on Plaintiff’s Eighth 19 Amendment failure to protect claim against Warden Anglea as alleged in the complaint. (See 20 Doc. 24 at 6, 7; Doc. 26.) Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he 21 was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety, or in the alternative, Defendant is entitled to 22 qualified immunity. (Doc. 98.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to summary judgment 23 based on the existence of genuine issues of material fact. (Doc. 101.)1 Defendants filed a reply. 24 (Docs. 102.) The parties in this action have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction 25 for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 26 1 Plaintiff filed a motion to submit staff incident reports as exhibits in support of his opposition to summary 27 judgment. (Doc. 103.) Based on his representation that these documents were previously unavailable, (see Doc. 101 at 10, ⁋ 6), and their relevance to summary judgment issues, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 103.) See 28 also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant shows . . . it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may . . . allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or . . . issue any other appropriate order. 2 I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 3 At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate housed at the Sierra Conservation Center 4 (SCC). Defendant was the Chief Deputy Warden at SCC from between April 2017 to December 5 2017 and the Warden at SCC from December 2017 through December 2019. As the warden, 6 Defendant had overall responsibility for the operation of the institution, he was not involved in 7 making daily staff assignments at SCC.2 8 On May 17, 2018, an inmate riot started in the SCC Facility B dining hall during 9 breakfast. Plaintiff was inside the dining hall before the riot started, and he did not observe any 10 indications that a riot was about to occur. Plaintiff had no prior knowledge that a riot was going to 11 occur, and he is unaware of any prior fights that started in the dining hall. Plaintiff acknowledges 12 that the riot was a spontaneous event. He believes the riot started when a Hispanic inmate under 13 the influence of drugs punched a Black inmate in a dispute over a drug deal. 14 Correctional Officer Lupian-Hernandez observed the fighting begin and announced the 15 incident through institutional radio, requesting a Code 1 response. CO R. Petree attempted to 16 contain the riot by trying to secure the door and deploying a dispersion grenade, but he was 17 unsuccessful. Riot Sergeant, J. Fell, requested Code 2 and Code 3 responders come to the area 18 and an assembly area was designated with a skirmish line formed by responding staff. Tower 19 Officer McKnight heard the initial radio call and sounded the facility alarm. Ten to twelve 20 officers in protective gear responded to the alarm, deployed chemical agents, used pneumatic 21 weapons and less-lethal 40 mm weapons, and formed a skirmish line in two minutes. 22 When Plaintiff finished eating, he went from the dining hall to the basketball court on the 23 Facility B exercise yard. He was at the bleachers on the basketball court when he heard the alarm 24 sounded by McKnight. Plaintiff complied by getting down on the ground, consistent with SCC 25 riot procedures. Approximately one minute after the inmates came from the dining hall, a group 26 of inmates assaulted Plaintiff by punching and kicking him. Plaintiff returned to the bleachers and 27 28 2 Plaintiff disputes this fact and asserts that Defendant was involved in making staff assignments. However, Plaintiff’s citation to Anglea’s declaration does not support this proposition. (See Doc. 98-3 at 12; Doc. 101 at 13.) 2 To Defendant’s knowledge, on May 17, 2018, there were no unstaffed custody positions 3 at Facility B. Defendant was unaware of prior inmate fights that had started in the Facility B 4 dining hall. Defendant had no prior information that the May 17, 2018, riot would occur.3 5 A previous riot occurred at SCC on August 17, 2017 on the Facility B yard. Plaintiff was 6 present at that riot, which started near the phones concerning sign-ups for the use of phones 7 between Black and Hispanic inmates. Following the incident, Investigative Services Unit at SCC 8 investigated by conducting inmate interviews, reviewing video, and conducting threat 9 assessments. Officials conducted meetings with the Men’s Advisory Committee to discuss the 10 incident and how to avoid future incidents. Officials searched for weapons and contraband in the 11 dorms and on the yard. Approximately 320 inmates involved in the riot were issued Rules 12 Violation Reports and referrals were made to the Tuolumne County District Attorney’s Office for 13 possible prosecution. Consideration was given to transfer inmates likely to be involved in future 14 incidents. Inmate movement on Facility B was restricted through August 23, 2017. Authorization 15 was obtained to hire additional correctional staff. Ten additional video cameras were installed in 16 the yard. As the Chief Deputy Warden at SCC at the time, Defendant recommended to the warden 17 to stagger the release of inmates onto the Facility B yard to prevent future incidents. 18 Another incident occurred in June 2017 in front of Dorm 68. Three or four inmates were 19 fighting. Correctional staff responded by sounding an alarm and deploying blast grenades. The 20 fight stopped after about a minute. The incident did not escalate into a riot, as they did on May 21 17, 2018. 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A. Summary Judgment 24 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 25 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue 27 3 Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s assertion and states: “Anglea had the sufficient signal intelligence or clues, based on 28 the/his endless and deep prison’s politics.” (Doc. 101 at 21–22.) This assertion is vague, conclusory, and unsupported by the record. 2 accomplish this by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving 3 party’s case. Id. Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot 4 produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim that must be proven at trial. Id.; 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 6 non-moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 7 322–23. 8 If the moving party meets this initial showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party 9 to establish “specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 10 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The non-moving party cannot simply rely on the pleadings and 11 conclusory allegations in an affidavit. Lujan v. Nat’1 Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); 12 see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Instead, the opposing party is required to tender evidence of 13 specific facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 56(c)(1); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986). In 15 attempting to show a factual dispute, the opposing party need not prove a material fact 16 conclusively in her favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a 17 jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 18 F.2d at 631. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for 19 the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587. However, when deciding a 20 motion for summary judgment, the court must view any inferences drawn from the underlying 21 facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 22 The Ninth Circuit has “held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion 23 papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules 24 strictly.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thomas v. Ponder, 611 25 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)). While prisoners are relieved from strict compliance, they still 26 must “identify or submit some competent evidence” to support their claims. Soto, 882 F.3d at 27 872. Plaintiff’s verified complaint may serve as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment 28 if based on personal knowledge and specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 2 II. DISCUSSION 3 Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he was not deliberately 4 indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. In the alternative, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified 5 immunity. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition arguing that genuine issues of fact preclude 6 summary judgment. Defendant filed a reply that Plaintiff’s conclusory arguments are factually 7 unsupported and fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning deliberate indifference. 8 Plaintiff has also filed a “response to Defendant’s reply,” along with declarations and 9 exhibits in support. (Docs. 104–09.) Plaintiff has not sought leave to file the surreply. The court 10 has reviewed the submissions and finds that they are unnecessary for the Court’s determination 11 of summary judgment issues. Therefore, in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the 12 Court has not considered these exhibits. 13 A. Eighth Amendment 14 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. 15 Const. amend VIII. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of 16 punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 17 (1994); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “After incarceration, only 18 the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 19 forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Ingraham v. Write, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (quoting 20 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). 21 No matter where prisoners are housed, prison officials have a duty to ensure that 22 prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and 23 personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and 24 citations omitted). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable 25 steps to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. 26 However, “not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translate 27 into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. A 28 prison official is liable for an assault by one inmate on another only when the assaulted inmate can show that the official was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to his 2 safety. Id. 3 The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong. 4 Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). First, the alleged 5 deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing 6 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). A deprivation is sufficiently serious if a prison 7 official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 8 necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). For a claim based on a failure to 9 prevent harm, the inmate must show that the conditions of confinement pose a “substantial risk 10 of serious harm.” Id. at 824 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). 11 The second prong of this test is subjective and requires the prison official to have a 12 “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302– 13 04). In cases challenging conditions of confinement, the plaintiff must show that the prison 14 official acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 15 (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03). “Deliberate indifference” entails something more than 16 negligence but less than acts or omissions intended to cause harm or with knowledge that harm 17 will result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 979, 104 (1976). 18 [A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 19 denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must 20 both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. 21 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prove knowledge of the risk, the prisoner may rely on circumstantial 22 evidence, and the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish knowledge. See id. at 23 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). 24 Even if a prison official should have been aware of the risk but was not, there is no 25 Eighth Amendment violation, no matter how severe the risk. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 26 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1073 27 (2015). “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did 28 not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under [the Supreme Court’s] cases be condemned 2 as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. In addition, “prison officials who 3 actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if 4 they responded reasonably.” Id. at 844. 5 In this instance, Defendant does not appear to dispute that the alleged deprivation is 6 objectively, sufficiently serious, especially given Plaintiff’s injuries from the attack. Instead, 7 Defendant argues that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant was not subjectively, 8 deliberately indifferent to the need to protect Plaintiff from an attack by other inmates. In 9 response, Plaintiff argues that there was a substantial risk to his safety and the safety of everyone 10 at SCC Facility B and that Defendant knew of the risk. Plaintiff states that “[t]he defendant tried 11 to prevent or stop the violence, but defendant did not try as hard as he should’ve.” (Doc. 101 at 12 5.) From this, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s attempts to prevent constitutional injuries were 13 not reasonable, which he contends is a jury question. (Id.) 14 The undisputed evidence shows that on May 17, 2018, Plaintiff was in the dining hall 15 when fight broke out, and he did not observe indications that a riot was about to occur. Neither 16 the Plaintiff nor the Defendant was aware of any prior fight that began in that location, and they 17 had no prior knowledge that this riot would occur. The Facility B custody positions were filled 18 on the day of the incident, and correctional staff responded to and quelled the riot. Under these 19 circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant was aware of facts from which a 20 substantial risk of serious harm can be inferred or that he drew the inference. See Farmer, 511 21 U.S. at 837. Though Plaintiff argues that the official’s knowledge of the risk is a question of fact 22 for the jury to decide, he has not presented any conflicting evidence that would raise an issue of 23 fact. Plaintiff has even acknowledged that the riot was a spontaneous event. (Doc. 101 at 14.) 24 Because the Defendant was not aware of a risk to Plaintiff’s safety, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy 25 the subjective component of “deliberate indifference,” and summary judgment is appropriate on 26 these grounds. 27 Even if a plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant officer knew of a substantial risk 28 to an inmate’s safety, the defendant may be free from liability if he responded reasonably to the 2 risk. Here, Defendant was not present when the riot occurred, and officers quelled the riot in his 3 absence. Therefore, he did not have an opportunity to respond immediately to the May 17, 2018, 4 riot. 5 In the complaint, Plaintiff references the riot that occurred on August 17, 2017, to 6 demonstrate a “pattern of uncontrollable rioting and mass casualty violence at SCC.” (Doc. 1 at 7 11.) Defendant argues that his response to the August 17, 2017, riot demonstrates that he did not 8 ignore inmate safety and was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. He contends that 9 the following steps were taken to deter future incidents from occurring: ISU conducted an 10 investigation; threat assessments were made; staff met with the Men’s Advisory Committee 11 inmates; officers conducted searches for weapons and contraband; and inmates involved were 12 disciplined and referred to the district attorney for possible prosecution; staff considered 13 transferring inmates likely to be involved in future incidents; SCC obtained authorization to hire 14 additional correctional staff; additional video cameras were installed. Additionally, as the chief 15 deputy warden, he recommended the reduction of inmates on the Facility B yard by staggering 16 the release of inmates to the yard. (See Doc. 98-1 at 13.) 17 Plaintiff disputes that these efforts were sufficient to deter future incidents, particularly 18 given the occurrence of future incidents. “When the ‘ever-present potential for violent 19 confrontation and conflagration’ . . . ripens into actual unrest and conflict . . . ‘a prison's internal 20 security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.’” Whitley 21 v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 22 U.S. 119, 132 (1977); Rhodes, 452 U.S., at 349, n. 14. “Prison administrators . . . should be 23 accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in 24 their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional 25 security.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). The 26 deference extends to measures taken in response to an actual confrontation with rioting inmates 27 or preventative measures intended to reduce the occurrence of violent incidents. Whitley, 475 28 U.S. at 321. 2 Plaintiff characterizes Defendant’s post-riot measures as “weak and unreasonable.” (Doc. 3 101 at 19–20.) Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that these actions were taken, but he argues 4 that the reasonableness of the actions is a jury question. Other than his conclusory argument that 5 the post-riot measures were unreasonable, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant had a 6 “‘sufficiently state of mind’ to be guilty of deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s safety.” 7 Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 8 Viewing any inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the 9 non-moving party, Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiff is unable to prove deliberate 10 indifference toward Plaintiff’s safety, an essential element of his Eighth Amendment Claim. 11 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment must be granted. 12 B. Qualified Immunity 13 In the alternative, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified 14 immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless their conduct 15 violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 16 have known.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam); Harlow v. 17 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she 18 makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law 19 governing the circumstances she confronted.” Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (quoting 20 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). Although both the “clearly 21 established right” and “reasonableness” inquiries are questions of law, where there are factual 22 disputes as to the parties’ conduct or motives, the case cannot be resolved at summary judgment 23 on qualified immunity grounds. See Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 24 2011). 25 The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to balance two important and sometimes 26 competing interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 27 irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when 28 they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). This 2 doctrine recognizes that holding officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily 3 impede their ability to make difficult decisions in challenging situations and disrupt the effective 4 performance of their public duties. Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 5 omitted). Qualified immunity is intended to allow officials to act “swiftly and firmly” where the 6 rules governing their actions are unclear. See id. However, an official is not protected where a 7 reasonable official would understand that what he was doing violated a clearly established right. 8 Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 910 (quoting Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 1996)). 9 To determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, courts must 10 consider (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that 11 right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 12 194, 201 (2001); Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Although Saucier originally required courts to 13 proceed in that exact sequence, the Supreme Court later determined that courts may “exercise 14 their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis 15 should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 16 555 U.S. at 236. If the court decides that Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a constitutional 17 violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 18 533 U.S. at 201. On the other hand, if a court determines that the right at issue was not clearly 19 established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, the court need not determine “the 20 more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.” 21 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239. 22 “An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s 23 contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have 24 understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or 25 constitutional question beyond debate.” City & County of San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, 575 26 U.S. 600, 135 (2015) (alteration and omission in original; citation omitted). This is an “exacting 27 standard” that “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 28 judgments by protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 2 law.” Id. 3 Ordinarily, courts look to prior case law to determine whether the “contours” of the right 4 have been sufficiently defined with specificity. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th 5 Cir. 2000). Where the pre-existing law provides the defendant with “fair warning” that his 6 conduct was unconstitutional. However, the prior case law does not need to present the exact or 7 closely analogous factual situation to show that the law is clearly established. Id. at 1197–98 8 (citing Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lanier, 520 9 U.S. 259, 270–71 (1997)). The court must look to all available case law, including the decisions 10 of other circuits and district courts, and evaluate whether the Supreme Court would have reached 11 the same result. Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 936 (citing Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 12 1989)). Generally, the court will not look to post-incident cases to determine whether the law 13 was clearly established at the time of the incident. Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 936 (citing Baker v. 14 Racansky, 887 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1989)). 15 Under the circumstances of this case, the Court found it appropriate to address the first 16 Saucier prong, whether Defendant violated a constitutional right. Viewing the evidence in a light 17 most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party and liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se 18 pleadings, this Court determined that the factual allegations do not support an Eighth 19 Amendment claim that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. In other 20 words, Defendant’s conduct did not violate a constitutional right. Upon this finding, the Court 21 does not reach the second Saucier prong concerning qualified immunity, whether the right was 22 clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. 23 /// 24 // 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 2 The material facts concerning Defendant’s conduct and state of mind are not in dispute, 3 and Defendant has met his burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 4 law. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 5 (Doc. 98.) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 8 Dated: December 26, 2021 _ /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28