(PC) Clark v. Cleveland ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANDRE JAMES CLARK, SR., No. 2:21-CV-1975-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CLEVELAND, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names Sacramento County Jail employees Deputy Cleveland, Sgt. Jamil, 9 Sgt. Haynes, and Lt. Baker as defendants. ECF No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff alleges the following: 10 Cleveland denied me to take with me a bible even though previous times I had done so. He further assaulted me by sweeping my legs 11 from under me. 12 Cleveland filed his report only after I wrote my complaint and Jamil and Sgt. Hanyes and Lt. Baker [] all are copable (sic)and share the 13 same guilt. 14 My ligament suffered even further damage be it they did not provide me shoe for 33 days after be assulted. 15 I have made it quite clear that I require protected from all sheriffs 16 deputies. 17 On 8-21 I suffered even further injuries when my leg restraints caught in the gear shift and took me to the ground and damaged and 18 scared my [] ancles. 19 I now must walk with a cain do to not be given shoe[.] 20 Id. at 3-5 (errors in original). 21 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege enough 24 facts to determine whether he states a cognizable claim under the First Amendment for Defendant 25 Cleveland denying Plaintiff a Bible. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to 26 determine whether Plaintiff has a cognizable excessive force claim. Further, Plaintiff fails to 27 allege an actual connection or link between a constitutional violation and the actions of 28 Defendants Jamil, Haynes, and Baker. Plaintiff will be granted an opportunity to amend. 1 A. Religious Practice 2 The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First 3 Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of 4 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus, 5 for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 6 health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 7 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities 8 where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 9 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state expense. 10 See id. Inmates also must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith comparable to 11 that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See Cruz v. Beto, 12 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 13 However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free 14 exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See 15 McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in a 16 simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish 17 inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 18 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting 19 inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 20 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison work rule). 21 While free exercise of religion claims originally arose under the First Amendment, 22 Congress has enacted various statutes in an effort to provide prisoners with heightened religious 23 protection. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Prior to these 24 congressional efforts, prison free exercise claims were analyzed under the “reasonableness test” 25 set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see e.g. O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. The 26 first effort to provide heightened protection was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 27 of 1993. However, the Supreme Court invalidated that act and restored the “reasonableness test.” 28 See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 1 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of 2 Boerne invalidated RFRA and restored the “reasonableness test” as the applicable standard in free 3 exercise challenges brought by prison inmates). 4 Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 5 (RLUIPA) in 2000 “. . . in response to the constitutional flaws with RFRA identified in City of 6 Boerne.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 7 2006). Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from imposing “substantial burdens” on 8 religious exercise unless there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the 9 least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986. RLUIPA has been upheld by the 10 Supreme Court, which held that RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible 11 with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates 12 exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 13 994 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal by 14 replacing the “reasonableness test” articulated in Turner with the “compelling government 15 interest” test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id. 16 It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise RLUIPA in order to have 17 his claim analyzed under the statute’s heightened standard. In Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit 18 held that, if a complaint contains “factual allegations establishing a ‘plausible’ entitlement to 19 relief under RLUIPA, [plaintiff has] satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); but see 21 Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion 22 about whether plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his claim under the 23 First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible for a prisoner’s complaint to raise both a First 24 Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In other words, 25 even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the heightened protections of RLUIPA, he may 26 nonetheless be entitled to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff’s claim may be limited 27 to the less stringent Turner “reasonableness test” if the plaintiff specifically brings the claim 28 under the First Amendment only. 1 Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial 2 burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by 3 preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 4 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d 5 at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what constitutes a 6 “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing cases defining 7 “substantial burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial burden on the 8 practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct “. . . burdens the 9 adherent’s practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by 10 the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious 11 experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 12 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the context of 13 claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to provide a 14 diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu prevented him 15 from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 16 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 17 Under the First Amendment “reasonableness test,” where the inmate shows a 18 substantial burden the prison regulation or restriction at issue is nonetheless valid if it is 19 reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 20 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). In applying this test, the court must weight four 21 factors: (1) whether there is a rational connection between the regulation or restriction and the 22 government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are available alternative means of 23 exercising the right; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted religious right will have a 24 detrimental impact on prison guards, other inmates, or the allocation of limited prison resources; 25 and (4) whether there exist ready alternatives to the regulation or restriction. See id.; see also 26 Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 27 Under RLUIPA, the government is required to “. . . meet the much stricter burden 28 of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is ‘in furtherance of a compelling 1 government interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 2 interest.’” Green v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 992, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. 3 § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) and 2(b)); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95. Prison security is an 4 example of a compelling governmental interest. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Cutter, 125 5 S.Ct. at 2113 n.13). In establishing that the regulation or restriction is the least restrictive means 6 to achieve a compelling governmental interest, prison officials must show that they actually 7 considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive means before adopting the challenged 8 practice. See Green, 513 F.3d at 989 (citing Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999). 9 Here, Plaintiff states that Defendant Cleveland deprived him of taking a Bible 10 somewhere. Plaintiff does not provide anything more surrounding this claim. Upon amending, 11 Plaintiff should consider, among other q questions similar to the following: how did the 12 deprivation of the Bible burden Plaintiff’s practice of religion, where was Plaintiff going, does 13 Plaintiff’s religion require him to have a Bible with him wherever he was going, why did 14 Defendant Cleveland deprive Plaintiff of the Bible, etc. 15 B. Excessive Force 16 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 17 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 18 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 19 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 20 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 21 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 22 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 23 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 24 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 25 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 26 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 27 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 28 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 1 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 2 When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial 3 inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 4 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); 5 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as 6 opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims, 7 is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect 8 on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475 9 U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following 10 factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship 11 between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably 12 perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 13 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force 14 was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 15 1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally, 16 because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining 17 security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley, 18 475 U.S. at 321-22. 19 Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cleveland assaulted Plaintiff by sweeping 20 Plaintiff’s legs out from under him. Upon amending, Plaintiff should provide the context of the 21 assault. A critical element of an excessive force claim is the defendant’s intent. Plaintiff should 22 provide facts showing Defendant Cleveland’s intent. Plaintiff should consider questions like 23 what led to the assault, were there any words exchanged, what was Plaintiff doing, what was 24 Defendant Cleveland doing, when did the assault occur, etc. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 2 C. Causal Link 3 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 4 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 5 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 6 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 7 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 8 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 9 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 10 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 11 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 12 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 13 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 14 Here, Plaintiff tries to raise a claim against Defendants Jamil, Haynes, and Baker 15 by saying they share the same guilt with Defendant Cleveland. Plaintiff does not provide any 16 facts as to what Jamil, Haynes, and Baker did to Plaintiff. Upon amending, Plaintiff should keep 17 in mind the following: as to each Defendant, Plaintiff must allege which Defendant took what 18 action that caused which specific constitutional violation. 19 20 III. CONCLUSION 21 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 22 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 23 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 24 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 25 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 26 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 27 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 28 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 1 | Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 2 | complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 3 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate 4 | how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional 5 | rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific 6 | terms how each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or 7 || connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 8 | 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 9 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file a first amended complaint within the 10 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 11 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 12 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 13 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 16 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 17 || service of this order. 18 19 | Dated: January 12, 2022 20 DENNIS M. COTA 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28