Beeman v. Cruz ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 LINDA BEEMAN, No. 2:21-cv-01774 WBS DB 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT 15 JOHN CRUZ, individually and as employee of the AMADOR COUNTY 16 SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; AMADOR COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 17 COUNTY OF AMADOR; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 Plaintiff Linda Beeman brought this action against 23 Amador County, the Amador County Sheriff’s Department (the 24 “Department”), Detective John Cruz, and unnamed Doe defendants 1- 25 25 (collectively “defendants”) seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 26 § 1983 for alleged violations of rights protected by the Fourth, 27 Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (See 28 Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiff challenges damage defendants 1 allegedly caused to her property during their execution of two 2 warrants at her home and challenges her arrest, which she 3 contends was pursuant to an improperly obtained warrant. (See 4 id. at ¶¶ 11-17.) Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s 5 complaint in its entirety. (See Mot. (Docket No. 4-1).) 6 I. Factual and Procedural Background 7 Plaintiff is the mother of Jerry Adams, whom the 8 Department and Cruz have suspected murdered Savannah Burger since 9 October of 2020. (Compl. at ¶ 9.) On November 5, 2020, Cruz and 10 the Department executed a search warrant at plaintiff’s 11 residence, causing $711.17 worth of damage to the premises and 12 plaintiff’s possessions. (Id. at ¶ 11.) On or about January 20, 13 2021, the Department returned to plaintiff’s residence to serve 14 an arrest warrant on Jerry Adams, who was not present, and in the 15 process caused an additional $3,650.88 worth of damage. (Id. at 16 ¶ 13.) On February 3, 2021, plaintiff submitted a claim to the 17 County for the damage caused on both occasions, which the County 18 rejected via letter on March 31, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 14.) 19 Plaintiff alleges that on March 12, 2021, defendants 20 caused the Amador County District Attorney’s Office to file a 21 criminal complaint against her. (Id. at ¶ 15.) That complaint 22 alleged she was guilty as an accessory after the fact for aiding 23 Jerry Adams by wiring him $200 on January 21, 2021, the day 24 before he was criminally charged. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 20.) Plaintiff 25 alleges that the resulting warrant for her arrest, which Cruz 26 executed, was based on Cruz’s false statements that plaintiff was 27 aware Jerry Adams was a fugitive when she wired him the money and 28 that she did so to help him avoid arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 20.) 1 Plaintiff was arrested on March 16, 2021 and was 2 released on March 29, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 17.) During that time, 3 she was terminated from her employment at the California 4 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, though she was 5 eventually reinstated without pay for the interim period. (Id. 6 at ¶¶ 18-19.) 7 Plaintiff alleges that at the time she wired the money, 8 “there were no known allegations about her son being a fugitive 9 or a defendant in a murder case.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Rather, she 10 alleges, she wired it “for the purpose of him returning to 11 Jackson, California to answer to the allegations which were being 12 made against him,” which Anthony Adams1 told Cruz on March 3, 13 2021. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 20) She alleges that Cruz knowingly 14 misrepresented this detail when seeking to have her charged as an 15 accessory and that Cruz had never been told she wired Jerry Adams 16 the money to facilitate his escape. (Id. at ¶ 24.) She further 17 alleges that at a preliminary hearing in her criminal case, Cruz 18 admitted there was a conflict between his initial report and 19 Anthony Adams’s statement, and that the District Attorney 20 dismissed the charge against her. (Id. at ¶¶ 22, 25.) She 21 alleges that this series of events shows that Cruz “intend[ed] to 22 ruin Plaintiff’s life by misstating the facts and getting her 23 arrested and terminated from her employment.” (Id. at ¶ 26.) 24 II. Discussion 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for 26 27 1 Although the complaint does not identify Anthony Adams, defendants’ motion states that he is Jerry Adams’s nephew. (Mot. 28 at 9.) 1 dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim 2 upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 3 “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 4 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The inquiry 5 before the court is whether, accepting the allegations in the 6 complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 7 plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has alleged “sufficient facts 8 . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” id., and thereby 9 stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell 10 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 11 In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of 12 the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable 13 inferences to be drawn from them. Id. Courts are not, however, 14 “required to accept as true allegations that are merely 15 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 16 inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 17 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. 18 Accordingly, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the 19 non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from 20 that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 21 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 22 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 662, 678 (2009)). Although legal conclusions “can provide the 24 framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 25 allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 26 A. Defendant Department 27 In their motion, defendants seek dismissal of the 28 Department as a defendant in this case, arguing that the 1 Department and Amador County are functionally indistinguishable 2 for purposes of this action and are therefore redundant. (See 3 Mot. at 11-12.) Plaintiff concedes this point and agrees that 4 the Department should be dismissed. (See Opp. at 8.) The court 5 will therefore grant defendants’ motion as to the County. 6 B. Municipal Liability 7 That Amador County is named as a defendant indicates, 8 and plaintiff’s opposition confirms, that plaintiff intends to 9 pursue a claim for municipal liability under Monell. (See 10 Compl.; Opp. at 9-11); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 11 N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, in her opposition, 12 plaintiff “acknowledges that the Complaint does not address the 13 County of Amador’s liability clearly” and seeks leave to amend to 14 allege facts showing that the County fails to enforce its own 15 policies. (See Opp. at 9-10.) She also states that “the 16 complaint fails to address how the facts fit a Monell failure to 17 supervise [claim]” and seeks leave to amend to allege same. (See 18 id. at 9-11.) The court agrees that, on the minimal facts 19 included in the complaint, these claims are not adequately 20 alleged.2 Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion 21 to dismiss the claims against Amador County. 22 C. Fourth Amendment Claims 23 1. Unreasonable Execution of Warrant 24 The complaint alleges that, on two occasions, 25 2 The court notes, however, that § 1983 claims for failure to supervise are distinct from claims for municipal 26 liability, and thus a Monell claim will not lie for failure to 27 supervise. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2011); Robertson v. Ferry Cnty., 697 F. App’x 500, 501 28 (9th Cir. 2017). 1 defendants damaged or destroyed plaintiff’s property while 2 executing warrants at her home. (Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 13.) The 3 Fourth Amendment protects individuals’ right to be free of 4 “unnecessarily destructive behavior, beyond that necessary to 5 execute a warrant effectively.” San Jose Charter of Hells Angels 6 Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 7 2005) (quoting Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 979 8 (9th Cir. 1997)). “When officers obtain a warrant to search an 9 individual’s home, they also receive certain limited rights to 10 occupy and control the property; however, the Fourth Amendment 11 binds the officers such that the right to search a home 12 concomitantly obliges the officers to do so in a reasonable 13 manner.” Id. (citation omitted). 14 In evaluating whether a warrant was executed in a 15 reasonable manner, courts “consider both the purpose disclosed in 16 the application for a warrant’s issuance and the manner of its 17 execution.” Id. (quoting United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 18 423 (9th Cir. 1978)). This is because “[t]he standard of 19 reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands that the 20 showing of justification match the degree of intrusion.” Id. 21 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (Stewart, J., 22 concurring)) (alteration in original); see also id. at 974 23 (significant property destruction during warrant execution 24 indicated manner of execution was unreasonable). 25 Although the complaint and documents attached thereto 26 suggest that the damage to plaintiff’s home and property during 27 the warrant executions was significant, and an attached letter 28 provides considerable detail about the extent of that damage, 1 (see Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 13, Exs. 1-2), the complaint fails to 2 allege which officers are responsible for such damage. This 3 omission is notable because plaintiff’s opposition, on the other 4 hand, does in fact identify the officers alleged to have been 5 present during the warrant executions. (See Opp. at 9 n.1.) 6 Because an element of § 1983 liability is that the 7 defendant personally caused the alleged deprivation of the 8 plaintiff’s constitutional rights, see Jones v. Williams, 297 9 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 10 743 (9th Cir. 1978), plaintiff must allege same to state a claim 11 under § 1983, see Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 12 2012). Here, however, the complaint merely states that Cruz and 13 the Department executed the first warrant, that the Department 14 executed the second warrant, and that plaintiff suffered 15 particular damage to her home and property as a result of each 16 execution. (Compl. at ¶¶ 11, 13.) It does not allege how, if at 17 all, Cruz or other individual officers were involved in the 18 property damage. It therefore fails to state a claim for 19 unreasonable execution under § 1983. 20 2. False Arrest / Malicious Prosecution 21 Where a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a 22 prosecutor’s independent decision to charge the plaintiff, that 23 decision is ordinarily considered “a superseding or intervening 24 cause of [the] constitutional tort plaintiff’s injury, precluding 25 suit against the officials who made an arrest or procured a 26 prosecution.” See Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th 27 Cir. 2008). In the Ninth Circuit, “there is a rebuttable 28 presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment 1 regarding the existence of probable cause in filing a complaint.” 2 Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 3 Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled 4 on other grounds, Beck, 527 F.3d at 865). 5 Circumstances in which this presumption will be 6 considered rebutted “include situations in which the prosecutor 7 was pressured by police or was given false information; the 8 police ‘act[ed] maliciously or with reckless disregard for the 9 rights of an arrested person’; the prosecutor ‘relied on the 10 police investigation and arrest when he filed the complaint 11 instead of making an independent judgment on the existence of 12 probable cause for the arrest’; or the officers ‘otherwise 13 engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was actively 14 instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.’” 15 Beck, 527 F.3d at 862-63 (quoting Smiddy, 803 F.2d at 266-67; 16 Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004)). 17 The complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations to 18 plausibly support an inference of any such circumstances here. 19 Plaintiff alleges that, before Cruz sought charges against her, 20 her grandnephew told Cruz her intentions in wiring the money were 21 innocent, and she insinuates that this statement was not relayed 22 to the prosecutor. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 15-17.) However, both 23 sides acknowledge that at the preliminary hearing the magistrate 24 found probable cause notwithstanding Cruz’s testimony about 25 Anthony Adams’s March 3, 2021 statement regarding plaintiff’s 26 intentions. 27 Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim for 28 false arrest or malicious prosecution. 1 D. Fifth Amendment Claims 2 With respect to alleged Fifth Amendment violations, 3 plaintiff’s opposition simply asserts that the Fifth Amendment is 4 implicated and quotes its Due Process and Takings Clauses before 5 offering the vague statement that “[h]ere, the Defendants have 6 engaged in a pattern of behavior to deny Plaintiff of her civil 7 rights without justification.” (Opp. at 11-12.) It offers no 8 explanation of how the facts alleged in the complaint demonstrate 9 a violation of either clause, nor citation to any authority 10 suggesting how a Fifth Amendment violation might be alleged. 11 The complaint fails to state a claim for violation of 12 plaintiff’s rights under the Fifth Amendment. 13 E. Fourteenth Amendment Claims 14 In challenging defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s 15 asserted Fourteenth Amendment claim, the opposition states only 16 that “[t]he pattern of conduct contrary to the Sheriff’s Manuel 17 [sic] Policy of due regard and respect for private property, 18 along with misstating facts and false arrest brings all the 19 Plaintiff’s civil rights into play.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff 20 offers no additional argument or authority to suggest how the 21 facts alleged might amount to a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 22 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “contains 23 a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful 24 government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures 25 used to implement them.’” See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 26 125-26 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 27 (1986)). Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that she believes the 28 damage to her property and her arrest were wrongful or arbitrary. ene enn een nO OEE IED eee 1 However, “[w]here government behavior is governed by a 2 specific constitutional amendment, claims under section 3 1983 alleging unlawful government action must be evaluated under 4 that specific constitutional provision, rather than under the 5 rubric of ‘substantive due process.’” Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 6 | 1:12-cv-428 LJO SKO, 2014 WL 204058, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 7 2014) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); 8 Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Picray v. Sealock, 9 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1998)). If “the more particular 10 | Amendment (in this case the Fourth) ‘provides an explicit textual 11 source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of 12 government behavior,’” then courts “evaluate that same conduct 13 - . - under the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth 14 | Amendment.” Id. (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 273). Because 15 | plaintiff’s relevant claims amount to claims of “unreasonable 16 searches and seizures,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, they are properly 17 assessed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. 18 Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim for 19 | violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 21 dismiss plaintiff’s complaint be, and the same hereby is, 22 GRANTED. 23 Plaintiff has twenty days from the date of this Order 24 to file an amended complaint, if she can do so consistent with 25 || this Order. . - 26 Dated: January 25, 2022 ob tle Ah fh bee WILLIAM B. SHUBB 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 10