(HC) Coleman v. Covello ( 2020 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND NELSON COLEMAN, No. 2:20-cv-0974 JAM AC P 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 P. COVELLO, Warden, 15 Respondent. 16 17 I. Introduction 18 Petitioner Raymond Nelson Coleman is a California state prisoner who proceeds pro se 19 and in forma pauperis with this habeas corpus action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 20 ECF No. 1. Petitioner challenges, on equal protection grounds, the refusal of the California 21 courts to recall his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP) based 22 on his age when the underlying offenses were committed. 23 Respondent has moved to dismiss this action on the ground it fails to state a cognizable 24 federal claim and because untimely filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period 25 established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 26 ECF No. 15. Petitioner opposes the motion, ECF No. 19, and respondent has filed a reply, ECF 27 No. 20. 28 //// 1 This matter is referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 2 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the following reasons, the undersigned 3 recommends that respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and this action be dismissed for 4 failure to state a cognizable federal habeas claim. 5 II. Failure to State a Cognizable Federal Habeas Claim 6 A. Background 7 On June 16, 2006, at the age of 23, petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Sacramento 8 County Superior Court of first-degree murder and robbery, with two sentencing enhancement 9 allegations found true. The underlying offenses were committed on December 12, 2004, when 10 petitioner was 21 years of age. See Lodged Documents (Lodg. Docs.) 1-2. On September 15, 11 2006, petitioner was sentenced to LWOP for the murder conviction and twenty-five years to life 12 for a firearm enhancement. On July 24, 2008, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the 13 judgment in all respects except for striking previously imposed restitution fines. Id. The 14 California Supreme Court denied review on October 28, 2008.1 Lodg. Docs. 3-5. 15 On May 23, 2016, petitioner filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court a “Petition for 16 Recall of Sentence Pursuant to [California] Penal Code Section 3051” which was denied on June 17 24, 2016. Lodg. Docs. 8-9. Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for recall of sentence on 18 August 1, 2016, which was denied by the California Court of Appeal on December 7, 2018. 19 Lodg. Doc. 10. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on January 20 8, 2019, Lodg. Doc. 11, which was summarily denied on February 13, 2019, Lodg. Doc. 12. 21 On May 20, 2020, petitioner filed the instant federal petition, in which he asks this court 22 “[to] remedy the equal protection violation by ordering that youth offenders under the age of 23 23 be permitted to recall their LWOP sentences.” ECF No. 1 at 15. 24 1 Mr. Coleman pursued a prior federal habeas action challenging the September 15, 2006 25 judgment of conviction. That action was denied on the merits by this court on September 15, 26 2010, in Coleman v. Martel, Case No. 2:09-cv-0638 GEB GGH P, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 23, 2011 in Coleman v. Knipp, Case No. 10-17219. See 27 Lodg. Docs. 14-17. The instant petition does not constitute a prohibited second or successive petition because it attacks a different judgment, the 2016 denial of Mr. Coleman’s petition for 28 recall of sentence. See Morales v. Sherman, 949 F.3d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2020). 1 B. State Statutory Framework 2 In 2012, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment is violated by 3 mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders under the age of 18 at the time of 4 their crimes. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). In the wake of Miller, and in light of 5 the concerns it raised about the culpability and appropriate punishment of juveniles, the 6 California legislature enacted the two provisions of the Penal Code that are at issue here. 7 The first, California Penal Code § 1170(d)(2)(2)(A)(i), is specific to youthful offenders 8 sentenced to LWOP. It provides as follows: 9 When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to 10 imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the 11 sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing. 12 A different statute governs parole suitability hearings for all youthful offenders sentenced 13 as adults. Section 3051, as originally enacted in 2013, mandated the convening of periodic 14 “youth offender parole hearings” to review “the parole suitability of any prisoner who was under 15 18 years of age at the time of his or her controlling offense.” Cal. Penal Code § 3051(b) (Stats 16 2013, ch. 312, § 4 (S.B. 260), effective January 1, 2014). In 2016, the state legislature amended 17 Section 3051 to extend the youthful offender parole suitability regime to non-LWOP inmates who 18 were under 23 at the time of their commitment offenses. Section 3051(b) (Stats 2015 ch. 471 § 1 19 (SB 261), effective January 1, 2016)). The age of commission threshold for non-LWOP cases has 20 since been raised to “25 years of age or younger.” Cal. Penal Code § 3051(b) (Stats 2017 ch. 684 21 § 1.5 (SB 394), effective January 1, 2018)). With regard to offenders sentenced to LWOP, 22 however, Section 3051 has always been limited in its application to those who were under 18 at 23 the time of the offense(s)—and thus eligible to seek resentencing to a parole-eligible term 24 pursuant to Section 1170. See Cal. Penal Code § 3051(h) (“This section shall not apply to cases 25 in which . . . an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a 26 controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”). Because 27 this is a statute about parole suitability determinations, it otherwise can have no applicability to 28 those sentenced to LWOP. 1 C. Petitioner’s Claim 2 Petitioner contends, as a matter of equal protection, that he should be entitled to obtain 3 recall of his LWOP sentence. Petitioner was 21 years old at the time of his commitment offense, 4 and is therefore ineligible for recall and resentencing under the plain terms of Section 5 1170(d)(2)(2)(A)(i). Petitioner argues nonetheless that the scientific and social policy reasons 6 supporting the expansion of Section 3051, which now mandates parole hearings for youthful 7 offenders who were under 25 at the time of their commitment offenses, apply equally to the recall 8 and resentencing provisions of Section 1170 and therefore should be read into the recall statute.2 9 He alleges in essence that the discrepancy between the age thresholds in Sections 1170 and 3051 10 violates equal protection, and that he is constitutionally entitled to consideration for resentencing 11 in light of Section 3051.3 12 2 In support of his claim, petitioner relies on the memorandum submitted to the California Court 13 of Appeal in which he makes the following argument: 14 The neuroscience of brain development shows that young adults, not just juveniles, lack the cognitive capabilities of a more mature adult 15 and thus show greater potential for rehabilitation as they mature. All youth offenders are similarly situated by virtue of their still 16 developing brains, regardless of the crimes they commit or the statutes under which they are punished. When the Legislature first 17 enacted sections 1170, subdivision (d)(2) and 3051, it created separate pathways that otherwise treated juvenile offenders equally 18 with regard to their brain development by giving both LWOP and de facto LWOP offenders under 18 at the time of their crimes the 19 opportunity to demonstrate their maturity and rehabilitation over time and to possibly obtain release from prison. 20 When the Legislature most recently extended the age limit in section 21 3051 for youth offenders under age 23 [now 25] who were sentenced to extremely lengthy non-LWOP sentences, it treated similarly 22 situated LWOP youth offenders in the same age category differently by failing to provide them with similar relief under section 1170, 23 subdivision (d)(2). It is this unequal treatment, despite the fact both groups suffer from the same cognitive and emotional developmental 24 issues at the time of their offenses, that violates the equal protection of the laws. 25 26 ECF No. 1 at 30-1. 27 3 The petition for recall and resentencing that petitioner filed in superior court in 2016 was styled as a petition under Section 3051, which at that time applied to offenders who were under 28 23 at the time of their crimes, although Section 3051 does not govern recall and resentencing. 1 D. Legal Standards 2 A respondent’s motion to dismiss, after the court has ordered a response, is reviewed 3 pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 4 Courts. See O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing White v. Lewis, 874 5 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989)). Pursuant to Rule 4, this court must summarily dismiss a 6 petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 7 entitled to relief in the district court.” 8 A state prisoner may pursue habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “only on the 9 ground he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 10 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether 11 a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 12 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). 13 E. Analysis 14 Petitioner’s claim is limited to alleged inconsistencies in two California penal statutes. 15 Discrepancies in state law do not, standing alone, give rise to a federal claim. See e.g. Langford 16 v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner may not transform a state law issue into a 17 federal one merely by asserting a constitutional violation); see also Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 18 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (absent a conflict with federal law, federal courts are 19 “bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes”). 20 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons who are 21 similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 22 432, 439 (1985). However, where “a state policy does not adversely affect a suspect class or 23 impinge upon a fundamental right, all that is constitutionally required of the state’s program is 24 that it be rationally related to a legitimate state objective.” Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218, 25 1221–22 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (state policy “is valid 26 if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”). The distinctions petitioner makes 27 28 See Lodg. Doc. 8. 1 here do not impact a suspect class or impinge on a fundamental right. Rather, the statutes 2 petitioner challenges reflect the reasoned assessment of the California legislature and are 3 consistent with Supreme Court authority. 4 The Equal Protection Clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to 5 all persons, or require things which are different in fact to be treated in law as though they were 6 the same. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). That is 7 precisely what petitioner seeks – that an LWOP-sentenced offender who committed his crime at 8 21 years of age be treated the same as an offender who committed his crime while under the age 9 of 18. As emphasized by the Supreme Court, “children are constitutionally different from adults 10 for purposes of sentencing [] [b]ecause juveniles have diminished culpability and greater 11 prospects for reform[.]” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Although the California legislature has relied 12 on related policy considerations to provide early parole hearings for many young adult offenders, 13 this expansion was not constitutionally mandated. 14 Moreover, there is nothing irrational about having different age-based standards for the 15 recall of LWOP sentences—which are intended for only the most serious crimes—and for 16 provision of early parole hearings to those who are parole-eligible to begin with. A legislative 17 distinction between LWOP and parole-eligible offenders is no more constitutionally suspect that 18 the distinction between 18 year old and 25 year old offenders. 19 The California legislature’s decision to deny parole consideration and petitions for recall 20 and resentencing to LWOP-sentenced prisoners whose crimes were committed after the age of 18 21 is consistent with Miller and is rationally related to the state’s legitimate goal of identifying 22 prisoners who may be most receptive to rehabilitative efforts. Petitioner’s challenge to these 23 California statutes fails to state a prima facie equal protection claim. 24 “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations 25 on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 26 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (habeas relief “is unavailable for alleged error in the 27 interpretation or application of state law”). This includes the interpretation or application of state 28 sentencing laws. See, e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989). Because 1 || petitioner’s disagreement with California law does not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas 2 || relief, his petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also 3 | Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The court need not reach respondent’s alternate 4 | argument that the petition was untimely filed. 5 iI. Conclusion 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 15, be GRANTED; and 8 2. This action be dismissed for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction. 9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 10 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days 11 | after service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 12 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 13 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 14 | filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 15 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 16 | Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 17 If petitioner files objections, he may also address whether a certificate of appealability 18 || should issue and, if so, why and as to which issues. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 19 || Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 20 || enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability may issue only “if the 21 || applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 22 || 2253(c)(2). 23 || DATED: December 18, 2020 ~ 24 Mten—lhinee ALLISON CLAIRE 25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 26 27 28