(SS) Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LYNDA LYNN JONES, Case No. 1:17-cv-00846-SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 13 v. PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, (ECF Nos. 27, 29) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Petitioner Cyrus Safa (“Counsel”), attorney for Lynda Lynn Jones (“Plaintiff”), filed the 18 instant motion for attorney fees on December 2, 2020. Counsel requests fees in the amount of 19 $10,000.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Plaintiff has not objected to the request. On 20 December 15, 2020, Defendant Social Security Commissioner, as a de facto trustee for Plaintiff, 21 filed a response to Petitioner’s motion providing an analysis of the fee request. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiff filed the instant complaint challenging the denial of social security benefits on 25 June 22, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) On July 13, 2020, an order was filed granting Plaintiff’s Social 26 Security appeal and remanding for further proceedings.1 (ECF No. 20.) The Court entered 27 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge and this action was assigned to the undersigned for 1 judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. (ECF No. 21.) On October 15, 2018, Plaintiff was awarded 2 attorney fees of $2,950.00 at the stipulation of the parties. (ECF No. 23.) 3 On May 21, 2020, on remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled as of April 1, 4 2010. (EF No. 27-2.) Past benefits were awarded in the amount of $84,582.00. (ECF No. 27-3 5 at 3.) The Commissioner withheld $21,145.50 from the past-due benefit for attorney fees. (Id.) 6 This amount equals 25 percent of the retroactive benefit award. (Id.) Petitioner has previously 7 received payment of $2,950.00 in EAJA fees. (ECF No. 23.) In the instant motion, Petitioner 8 seeks $10,000.00 for work performed in this action. 9 II. 10 LEGAL STANDARD 11 In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 12 judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 13 court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 14 benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 15 award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 16 The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 17 406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 18 claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 19 Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 20 attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 21 it for reasonableness.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). The twenty- 22 five percent maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure that 23 the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808–09 (“§ 406(b) does not displace 24 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to 25 review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements”). Agreements seeking fees in 26 excess of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded are not enforceable. Crawford, 27 586 F.3d at 1148. The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the fees requested are 1 In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the 2 character of the representation and the results achieved. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately, 3 an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA. 4 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. 5 The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under 6 Gisbrecht in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met 7 his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the 8 standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney 9 exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation of 10 past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the 11 benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford, 586 12 F.3d at 1151. 13 III. 14 DISCUSSION 15 The Court has conducted an independent check to insure the reasonableness of the 16 requested fees in relation to this action. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Here, the fee agreement 17 between Plaintiff and Petitioner provides for a fee of “25% of the past due benefits awarded upon 18 reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the court.” (Social Security 19 Representation Agreement, ECF No. 27-1.) Plaintiff has been awarded benefits from June 2012 20 through May 2020 in the amount of $84,582.00. (ECF No. 27-3 at 3.) In determining the 21 reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court is to apply the test mandated by Gisbrecht. 22 There is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance. 23 Counsel is an experienced, competent attorney who secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 24 Although this action does involve eight years of backpay, there is no indication that Counsel was 25 responsible for any substantial delay in the court proceedings. Plaintiff agreed to a 25 percent 26 fee at the outset of the representation and Petitioner is seeking payment of $10,000.00 which is 27 11.8 % of the backpay award. The $10,000.00 fee is not excessively large in relation to the past- 1 nature of this case and Counsel’s assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. Hearn v. 2 Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 3 In support of the motion, Petitioner submits a log of the time spent in prosecuting this 4 action. (TECF No. 27-4.) The log demonstrates that Petitioner spent 15.4 hours and paralegals 5 spent 3.0 hours on this action . (Id.) When considering the total amount requested by Petitioner, 6 the fee request translates to $543.48 per hour for the services of Petitioner and the paralegals in 7 this action. In Crawford the appellate court found that a fee of $875 and $902 per hour, for time 8 of both attorneys and paralegals, was not excessive. Crawford, 486 F.3d at 1152 (dissenting 9 opinion). 10 Further, since Gisbrecht, courts note that reducing a fee request is dicey business and find 11 fee awards much higher than this to be reasonable. Williams v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 15-919- 12 KK, 2018 WL 6333695, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2018) (awarding fee request that provides an 13 hourly rate of $1,553.36 per hour); Coles v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 14-1488-KK, 2018 WL 14 3104502, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (effective hourly rate of $1,431.94 reasonable under 15 the circumstances); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 15-04261-DTB, 2016 WL 5110243, at *2 (C.D. 16 Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (fees sought translate to $1,546.39 per hour for attorney and paralegal 17 services); see also Villa v. Astrue, No. CIVS-06-0846 GGH, 2010 WL 118454, at *1, n.1 (E.D. 18 Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (“In practice, the more efficient counsel is in court, the higher will be the 19 hourly fee amount represented in a § 406 fee award.”) 20 The Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable when compared to the amount of 21 work Petitioner performed in representing Plaintiff in court. Petitioner’s representation of the 22 claimant resulted in the action being remanded for further proceedings and ultimately benefits 23 were awarded. Counsel also submitted a detailed billing statement which supports her request. 24 (ECF No. 27-4.) 25 The award of Section 406(b) fees is offset by any prior award of attorney fees granted 26 under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. In this instance, Petitioner has 27 previously been awarded $6,000.00 in EAJA fees and the award of fees under Section 406(b) 1 VI. 2 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 3 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to 4 | Section 406(b) are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 6 amount of $10,000.00 is GRANTED; 7 2. Pursuant to counsel’s request, this amount shall be paid directly to Petitioner 8 Cyrus Safa. The Commissioner is to remit to Plaintiff the remainder of his 9 withheld benefits; and 10 3. Petitioner is ordered to refund $2,950.00 of the Section 406(b) fees awarded to 11 Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 12 2412(d). 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAM Le 15 | Dated: _January 11, 2021 _ ef 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28