(PC) Cruz v. Pfeiffer ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ, 1:20-cv-01825-AWI-GSA-PC 12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Plaintiff, RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF BE 13 DENIED LEAVE TO PROCEED IN vs. FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(g) AND THAT THIS CASE BE C. PFEIFFER, et al., DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO 15 REFILING WITH PAYMENT OF FILING Defendants. FEE 16 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE IN 14 DAYS 17 18 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Guillermo Trujillo Cruz (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil 21 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed the Complaint 22 commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not submit an application to proceed in 23 forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(g), or pay the $402.00 filing fee for this action. 24 II. THREE-STRIKES PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915 governs proceedings in forma pauperis. Section 1915(g) provides that 26 “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 27 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 28 1 in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, 2 or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent 3 danger of serious physical injury.” 4 “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” Andrews v. King, 5 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a 6 prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 7 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,1 “[p]risoners who 8 have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three 9 strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing 10 frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 11 1997). 12 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were 13 dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” Andrews, 14 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal 15 as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing 16 fee,” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated 17 three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal 18 court unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 19 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP 20 complaints which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of 21 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing”). 22 While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his 23 request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket 24 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under 25 § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 26 however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and 27 28 1 Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 1 other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was 2 frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike 3 under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 A review of the actions filed by Plaintiff reveals that Plaintiff is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 6 1915(g) and is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless Plaintiff was, at the time the 7 Complaint was filed, under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Plaintiff has filed 8 numerous unsuccessful cases in the Eastern District of California under the names “Guillermo 9 Trujillo Cruz,” “Guillermo Cruz Trujillo,” and “Guillermo Trujillo.” Court records reflect that 10 on at least three prior occasions, Plaintiff has brought actions while incarcerated that were 11 dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 12 The Court takes judicial notice of the following cases: 13 (1) Cruz v. Ruiz, No. 1:14-cv-00975-SAB (PC) (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for failure to 14 state a claim on January 6, 2016); 15 (2) Trujillo v. Sherman, No. 1:14-cv-01401-BAM (PC) (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for 16 failure to state a claim on April 24, 2015); 17 (3) Cruz v. Gomez, No. 1:15-cv-00859-EPG (PC) (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for failure 18 to state a claim on February 3, 2017); and 19 (4) Cruz v. Maldonado, No. 1:18-cv-00696-LJO-JLT (PC) (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed for 20 failure to state a claim on September 18, 2019). 21 The availability of the imminent danger exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced 22 at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 23 1053. “[A]ssertions of imminent danger of less obviously injurious practices may be rejected as 24 overly speculative or fanciful.” Id. at 1057 n.11. Imminent danger of serious physical injury 25 must be a real, present threat, not merely speculative or hypothetical. To meet his burden under 26 § 1915(g), an inmate must provide “specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, 27 or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” 28 Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). “Vague and utterly conclusory 1 assertions” of harm are insufficient. White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2 1998). That is, the “imminent danger” exception is available “for genuine emergencies,” where 3 “time is pressing” and “a threat . . . is real and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 4 (7th Cir. 2002). 5 Plaintiff has not satisfied the imminent danger exception to § 1915 by showing that he is 6 under a real, present threat. Plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of 7 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 8 1915(g)). 9 Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that on October 1, 2020 and October 5, 2020, when 10 Plaintiff was being transported for out-to-court proceedings, Transportation Officers employed 11 by Kern Valley State Prison told him that prison staff at Kern Valley State Prison were very upset 12 with him for filing lawsuits against them, and were delivering messages to North Kern State 13 Prison officials that they needed to have Plaintiff assaulted. On November 14, 2020, Plaintiff 14 was attacked at North Kern State Prison by inmates with inmate-manufactured weapons in 15 retaliation for Plaintiff filing lawsuits. 16 These allegations fail to meet § 1915(g)’s exception for imminent danger. See Cervantes, 17 493 F.3d at 1055-56 (plaintiff must allege to face a real, proximate and/or ongoing danger at the 18 time of filing); Prophet v. Clark, No. CV 1-08-00982-FJM, 2009 WL 1765197, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 19 June 22, 2009) (finding prisoner’s access to the courts, interference with legal mail, and 20 retaliation claims insufficient to satisfy § 1915(g) exception for cases of “imminent danger of 21 serious physical injury”). Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he faced a real, present 22 threat of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint on December 28, 2020. 23 Plaintiff’s assertions that he was injured by other inmates on November 14, 2020 at North Kern 24 State Prison are insufficient, without more, to show ongoing serious physical injury or a pattern 25 of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury. Plaintiff’s 26 contention that he is afraid that the past assault could happen again, without more, does not show 27 imminent danger under § 1915(g). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s broad allegations of danger are 28 insufficient to survive the dismissal of this action. 1 Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff should be precluded from proceeding in forma 2 pauperis with this action under § 1915(g), and this case should be dismissed without prejudice 3 to refiling the case accompanied by the appropriate filing fee. 4 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 5 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 6 1. Plaintiff be denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis with this case under 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 8 2. This case be dismissed, without prejudice to refiling the case accompanied by the 9 appropriate filing fee; and 10 3. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 12 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 13 (14) days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 14 written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 15 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 16 objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 17 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 18 (9th Cir. 1991)). 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 Dated: January 15, 2021 /s/ Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28