Gurrola v. Duncan ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DARIO GURROLA, et al., No. 2:20-cv-01238-JAM-DMC 8 Plaintiffs, 9 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS 10 DAVID DUNCAN, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 California regulations preclude those with recent, or two or 14 more, felony convictions from becoming certified as an Emergency 15 Medical Technician (“EMT”). Plaintiffs are two individuals who 16 wish to become EMT certified but are precluded because of their 17 felony records. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 18 these regulations under the Equal Protection, Due Process, and 19 Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 All three Defendants have moved to dismiss these claims. Because 21 the Court finds the regulations are rationally related to the 22 government’s legitimate interest in ensuring public safety and 23 related to the fitness of being an EMT, these regulations do not 24 violate these clauses. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to 25 Dismiss all three claims are GRANTED.1 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for December 8, 2020. 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 California Emergency Medical Services Authority (“EMSA”) is 3 the state agency that regulates EMT certification in California. 4 First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 10, ECF No. 22. 22 Cal. Code Regs. 5 § 100214.3, promulgated by the EMSA, bars persons convicted of 6 two or more felonies from obtaining EMT certification, as well as 7 persons who have been convicted and released from incarceration 8 within ten years for any offense punishable as a felony. See 22 9 Cal. Code Regs. § 100214.3(c)(3) (“The medical director shall 10 deny or revoke an EMT [certificate] if . . . the applicant . . . 11 [h]as been convicted of two (2) or more felonies”); id. 12 § 100214.3(c)(6) (“The medical director shall deny or revoke an 13 EMT [certificate] if , . . . the applicant . . . [h]as been 14 convicted and released from incarceration for said offense during 15 the preceding ten years for any offense punishable as a felony.”) 16 Plaintiffs are two individuals who wish to obtain EMT 17 certification but are prevented from doing so because of their 18 prior felony convictions. FAC ¶¶ 42, 64. Plaintiff, Dario 19 Gurrola, was convicted of possessing a concealed dagger, a 20 felony, at age twenty-two after a police officer stopped him and 21 found the kitchen knife he carried for protection. Id. ¶ 15. 22 About two years later, he was convicted of another felony, 23 assault, after an altercation with a security guard. Id. ¶ 16. 24 As Gurrola grew up he realized he needed to change. Id. ¶ 18. 25 He returned to school and focused on becoming a firefighter. Id. 26 ¶¶ 20, 22. A career in firefighting made sense, as Gurrola had 27 served in a fire camp and fought a major fire while in custody. 28 Id. ¶ 23. To realize this dream, he completed a 212-hour EMT 1 basic training course, worked as a certified medical transport 2 driver, completed firefighter training at San Pasqual Reservation 3 Fire Academy, and took courses in firefighting, fire behavior, 4 risk assessment, and airway and defibrillation rescue, earning 5 dozens of certificates. Id. ¶ 26-29. Gurrola also served as a 6 seasonal firefighter for the U.S. Forest Service in 2013 and 7 2015, as well as in 2019 with the Cal Pines Fire Department in 8 Alturas. Id. ¶ 25, 30. Eventually, he took and passed a test 9 with the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians and 10 applied to the Northern California EMS for EMT certification. 11 Id. ¶¶ 31-32. His application was denied, and he appealed. Id. 12 ¶ 33-34. A hearing was held before an administrative law judge 13 (“ALJ”) where Gurrola presented evidence of his rehabilitation. 14 Id. ¶ 35. However, the ALJ explained that Nor-Cal EMS was 15 prohibited from granting him EMT certification based on his two 16 felony convictions. Id. ¶ 36. Gurrola continues to serve as a 17 seasonal firefighter, however, without EMT certification he has 18 been unable to realize his dream of becoming a career 19 firefighter, as certification is required for most career 20 positions. Id. ¶¶ 38,42. 21 Plaintiff, Fernando Herrera, also wishes to become EMT 22 certified so that he can become a career firefighter. Id. ¶ 61. 23 However, he has two recent felonies, one for assault with a 24 deadly weapon and another for witness tampering. Id. ¶¶ 52, 58. 25 These convictions arose from incidents when Herrera was a 26 juvenile. Id. ¶¶ 45-52. Since his release in 2018, Herrera has 27 been committed to turning his life around. He now works as a 28 supervisor at the California Conservation Corps, where he helped 1 battle the deadliest wildfire in California history, the Camp 2 Fire. Id. ¶ 59-60. In 2020, Herrera, took and passed an EMT 3 training class. Id. ¶ 62. He would like to become certified as 4 an EMT but knows he is ineligible under both 22 Cal. Code Regs. 5 § 100214.3(c)(3) and (c)(6), because he has two felonies and it 6 has been less than ten years since he was released from 7 incarceration. Id. ¶ 61-65. 8 Plaintiffs’ stories are not unique. Many inmates help 9 battle fires through the California Department of Corrections and 10 Rehabilitation’s Conservation Camp Program. A.B. No. 2147 § 1 11 (Cal. 2020). For example, in 2017, 650 incarcerated individuals 12 assisted in suppressing the Pocket, Tubbs, and Atlas Fires. A.B. 13 No. 2147 § 1(c). In 2018, close to 800 incarcerated individuals 14 assisted with the Camp Fire in Butte County. Id. § 1(d). And, 15 in 2019, over 400 incarcerated individuals helped battle the 16 Kincade Fire. Id. § 1(e). The fact that inmates are often 17 relied upon to help battle California’s fires but then prevented 18 from later working as career firefighters due to the EMT 19 restrictions, has been subject to public critique. See e.g. 20 Adesuwa Agbonile, Inmates help battle California’s wildfires. 21 But when freed, many can’t get firefighting jobs, Sacramento Bee, 22 Sept. 7, 2018; Editorial: Inmates risking their lives to fight 23 California’s wildfires deserve a chance at full-time jobs, L.A. 24 Times, Nov. 1, 2019. 25 Plaintiffs filed this action on June 19, 2020 challenging 26 the constitutionality of these regulations under the Fourteenth 27 Amendment’s Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and 28 Immunities Clauses. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs 1 sued David Duncan, in his official capacity as the director of 2 the California Emergency Medical Services Authority; Jeffrey 3 Kepple, in his official capacity as the medical director of 4 Northern California EMS; and later added Troy Falck, in his 5 official capacity as the medical director of Sierra-Sacramento 6 Valley Emergency Medical Services Agency (collectively 7 “Defendants”). Id. ¶¶ 8-9; FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiffs seek (1) a 8 judgment declaring 22 Cal. Code Regs. § 100214.3(c)(3) and (c)(6) 9 are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied to 10 Plaintiffs; (2) a permanent injunction preventing Defendants from 11 enforcing those regulations and (3) an award of attorney’s fees, 12 costs, and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. FAC at 26. 13 On September 11, 2020, a few months after Plaintiffs filed 14 their initial complaint, California enacted Assembly Bill 2147. 15 A.B. No. 2147. Recognizing inmate firefighter’s “service to the 16 state of California in protecting lives and property” and that 17 “[a]fter receiving valuable training and placing themselves in 18 danger assisting firefighters to defend the life and property of 19 Californians, incarcerated individual hand crew members face 20 difficulty and obstacles in achieving employment due to their 21 past criminal record”, A.B. 2147 aimed to eliminate some of the 22 barriers to EMT certification and permanent firefighting 23 employment. See A.B. 2147 § 1(i)-(j). Specifically, A.B. 2147 24 permits a court, in its discretion, to set aside a guilty verdict 25 for those who have successfully participated in the California 26 Conservation Camp program or a county incarcerated individual 27 hand crew (subject to various exceptions), allowing them to be 28 eligible for EMT certification. See A.B. 2147 § 2(c)(1). 1 Plaintiffs amended their complaint to account for this 2 change in the law, maintaining that the regulations violate the 3 Fourteenth Amendment. See generally FAC. Plaintiffs claim AB 4 2147 has not remedied their injury, as Gurrola is allegedly not 5 eligible for relief and Herrera’s petition could be denied 6 according to the judges’ discretion. Id. ¶¶ 87-88. 7 All three Defendants filed motions to dismiss on various 8 grounds. Duncan Mot. to Dismiss (“Duncan Mot.”), ECF No. 33; 9 Falck Mot. to Dismiss (“Falck Mot.”), ECF No. 35; Kepple Mot. to 10 Dismiss (“Kepple Mot.”), ECF No. 36. Plaintiffs opposed these 11 motions, Opp’n, ECF No. 38, to which Defendants replied. Duncan 12 Reply, ECF No. 39; Falck Reply, ECF No. 40; Kepple Reply, ECF No. 13 41. After consideration of the parties’ written arguments on the 14 motions and relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS 15 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss all three claims for the reasons 16 discussed below. 17 II. OPINION 18 A. Judicial Notice 19 District courts may take judicial notice of “a fact that is 20 not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally 21 known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or 22 (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 23 accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 24 201(b). 25 Defendants request the court take judicial notice of 26 several documents and sources of information. Defendant Duncan’s 27 Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 33; Defendant Falck’s 28 Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 35. Plaintiffs do not 1 oppose these requests and all the documents are proper subjects 2 of judicial notice. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ 3 requests. In doing so, the Court judicially notices only “the 4 contents of the documents, not the truth of those contents.” 5 Gish v. Newsom, No. EDCV 20-755 JGB (KKx), 2020 WL 1979970, at 6 *2 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2020). 7 B. Legal Standard 8 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss tests whether a complaint 9 alleges grounds for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. 10 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the plaintiff lacks standing under 11 Article III of the United States Constitution then the court 12 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and the case must be 13 dismissed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens of a Better Env’t, 523 14 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998). Once a party has moved to dismiss for 15 lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the 16 opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court’s 17 jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 18 375, 377 (1994). 19 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the complaint as not 20 alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. F. R. 21 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 22 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 23 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible 24 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 25 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While 26 “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the complaint 27 must allege more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 28 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 1 Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, 2 the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inference 3 from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim 4 entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 5 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 6 C. Analysis 7 1. Standing 8 “The Constitution grants Article III courts the power to 9 decide ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Carney v. Adams, 141 S.Ct. 10 493, 497 (2020). This requires plaintiffs show they have 11 suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly 12 traceable to the challenged conduct, and likely to be redressed 13 by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of 14 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 15 Here, the injury Plaintiffs have suffered is the inability 16 to be considered for EMT certification based on their prior 17 felony convictions. This desire to receive a benefit from the 18 state, which the law proscribes them from receiving, is a 19 sufficient injury under Article III. See Hollingsworth v. 20 Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705 (2013) (recognizing plaintiffs had 21 standing where they desired to marry but were proscribed by law 22 from doing so). 23 Defendants, however, argue that because Plaintiffs would be 24 prevented from becoming EMTs on other grounds, they cannot show 25 their injury was caused by the regulations or that it would be 26 redressed by a favorable decision. Duncan Mot. at 7-9. 27 Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs would be denied 28 EMT certification under Cal. Health & Safety Code 1 § 1798.200(c)(6), which allows for the denial of certification 2 based on the conviction of any crime which is substantially 3 related to the qualifications, functions, and duties of EMTs. 4 See Duncan Mot. at 7; Cal. Health & Safety Code 5 § 1798.200(c)(6). But Plaintiffs do not have to show they would 6 ultimately receive EMT certification without the challenged 7 regulations. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003). 8 “The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection case of this nature 9 is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition 10 of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the 11 benefit.” Ne. Fla. Chapter Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America 12 v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). Gurrola and Herrera 13 seek meaningful declaratory relief in this case that they cannot 14 be categorically barred from certification based on their prior 15 felonies. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1982). 16 The fact that in the end, the injury of not receiving 17 certification may not be avoided, is not controlling as “a 18 Plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows 19 that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to 20 himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will 21 relieve his every injury.” Id. at 243 n.15. 22 Nor was Herrera required to apply for and be denied EMT 23 certification, or seek relief under A.B. 2147, to demonstrate an 24 injury in fact. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 261 (noting that whether 25 plaintiff actually applied is not determinative of his ability 26 to seek injunctive relief); Real v. City of Long Beach, 852 F.3d 27 929, 932-34 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding plaintiff did not need to 28 apply for a conditional use permit which would cost time, money 1 and may not be approved to have standing). It is enough that he 2 was “able and ready” to apply if he were not barred based on his 3 felonies. See Carney, 141 S.Ct. at 500. Herrera has made this 4 showing. Herrera currently is a supervisor at the California 5 Conservation Corps where he has helped battle fires. FAC ¶¶ 59, 6 60. He recently took and passed an EMT training class. Id. ¶ 7 62. The Court is convinced that if California did not bar him 8 from obtaining certification, Herrera would apply for EMT 9 certification so that he may be considered for more firefighting 10 positions. For these same reasons his claims are ripe for 11 review. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 12 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that in many cases, ripeness 13 coincides with standing’s injury in fact prong). 14 Defendant Falck contends he is not a proper defendant, as 15 Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is not traceable to him. Falk Mot. 16 at 4. He argues that medical directors such as himself must 17 follow the challenged regulations, so Plaintiffs’ injuries are 18 caused by the regulations, not him. Id. However, as an 19 official charged with enforcing the regulations — denying EMT 20 certification to persons with recent or more than one felony — 21 Plaintiffs’ injuries are fairly traceable to Falk. See Planned 22 Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 920 (9th Cir. 23 2004). Plaintiff Herrera has alleged he desires to become EMT 24 certified but is prevented from doing so because of his 25 felonies. FAC ¶¶ 61, 63. Falck, as the medical director of the 26 local EMS agency where Herrera lives, would be required to deny 27 Herrera certification under the regulations. FAC ¶¶ 12, 46. 28 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff Herrera’s injury is 1 fairly traceable to Falck and would be redressed by a favorable 2 decision from this Court preventing Falk from enforcing the 3 regulations. 4 In sum, Plaintiffs have alleged a valid injury — that they 5 are prevented from receiving EMT certification based on their 6 prior felony convictions because of 22 Cal. Code Regs. 7 § 100214.3(c)(3) and (c)(6). This injury would be redressed by 8 a favorable decision by the Court — finding the law 9 unconstitutional — as they would then be able to be considered 10 for certification. The Court, therefore, finds Plaintiffs have 11 standing to bring their claims. 12 2. Res Judicata/ Collateral Estoppel 13 Defendant Kepple also argues that Gurrola’s action is 14 precluded by a prior administrative proceeding under the 15 doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral 16 estoppel (issue preclusion). Kepple Mot. at 6-10. Under the 17 Full Faith and Credit Act, federal courts must give state 18 judicial proceedings “the same full faith and credit… as they 19 have by law or usage in the court of [the] state… from which 20 they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Parsons Steel, Inc. v. 21 First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986). This requires 22 federal courts apply the preclusion rules of a particular state 23 to judgments issued by courts of that state. Id. at 523. 24 Accordingly, California law applies in determining the 25 preclusive effect of the California judgement. Robi v. Five 26 Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988). 27 In California res judicata applies and bars a subsequent 28 suit if (1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on 1 the merits; (2) the present proceeding is on the same cause of 2 action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the 3 present proceeding, or parties in privity with them, were 4 parties to the prior proceeding. Busick v. Workmen’s Comp. 5 Appeals Bd., 7 Cal.3d 967, 974 (1972). To determine whether 6 prior proceedings involve the same claim or cause of action 7 “California has consistently applied the ‘primary rights’ 8 theory, under which the invasion of one primary right gives rise 9 to a single cause of action.” Kay v. City of Rancho Palos 10 Verdes, 504 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 11 marks and citation omitted). “[I]f two actions involve the same 12 injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then 13 the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit 14 the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks 15 different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting 16 recovery. San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City 17 Employees’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1174 (1983)). 19 Here the relevant facts are as follows. In 2019, Gurrola 20 filed an application for EMT certification from Nor-Cal EMS. 21 FAC ¶ 32. His application was denied, and he appealed. Id. 22 ¶¶ 33, 34. A hearing was held before an ALJ, where Gurrola 23 presented evidence of his rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 35. The ALJ 24 upheld the denial both because he had two felony convictions and 25 because his convictions were substantially related to the 26 qualifications, functions, and duties of prehospital personnel. 27 Duncan Mot. Ex. 1. This decision was then adopted by the 28 Northern California EMS, on the authority of the medical 1 director, Defendant Kepple. Id. Kepple argues this final 2 decision by the agency bars Gurrola’s current action, as both 3 claims involve the same primary right – his right to EMT 4 certification. Kepple Mot. at 9. 5 However, Gurrola in this action is not challenging the 6 denial of his previous application. Opp’n at 8. Instead, he is 7 challenging the constitutionality of California’s prohibition on 8 him ever being considered in the future. Id. The Court finds a 9 different primary right is at stake in the current proceeding 10 than the one at issue in the administrative decision. The 11 administrative decision involved Gurrola’s right to 12 certification at that particular point in time. Here, in 13 contrast, the primary right at stake is much broader. It 14 involves Gurrola’s right not to be discriminatorily precluded 15 from consideration in the future. See Henderson v. Newport-Mesa 16 Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 4th 478, 502 (Ct. App. 2013) 17 (recognizing that wrongful suspension is a different primary 18 right than the right to be free from discrimination). 19 Similarly, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 20 issues argued and decided in a prior proceeding cannot be 21 relitigated in a subsequent proceeding when (1) the issue is 22 identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the 23 issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily 24 decided; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate 25 the issue in the former proceeding; (5) the prior decision was 26 final and on the merits; and (6) the party against whom 27 preclusion is sought is the same as, or in privity with, a party 28 in the former proceeding. Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 1 335, 341 (1990). Here, the ALJ did not consider or decide the 2 constitutionality of the regulations. Duncan Mot. Ex. 1. 3 Accordingly, this Court is not precluded from considering the 4 issue. 5 3. Exhaustion of State Law Remedies 6 Relatedly, Falck argues that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 actions are 7 barred because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their state 8 remedies. Falck Mot. at 5. Falck argues that Gurrola could 9 have sought judicial review of the administrative decision under 10 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 and had to do so 11 before seeking relief through a federal § 1983 action. Id. 12 Falck relies on Doe v. Regents of University of California, 891 13 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2018), to support his position. Id. 14 However, this reliance is misplaced. 15 Doe involved the University of California’s decision to 16 suspend a student for sexual misconduct. Doe, 891 F.3d at 1150. 17 Doe challenged this decision in federal court, bringing, among 18 others, a § 1983 action for violation of his procedural due 19 process rights. Id. at 1150-52. The Ninth Circuit found this 20 claim was precluded because he had failed to exhaust his 21 judicial remedies by filing a § 1094.5 writ petition in state 22 court. Id. at 1154. Doe’s failure to exhaust made the 23 administrative decision binding, and under California law would 24 have preclusive effect. Id. at 1155. Accordingly, the 25 administrative decision was a preclusive bar to any § 1983 claim 26 seeking to overturn the suspension. Id. 27 By contrast here, Plaintiffs are not challenging any 28 administrative decision. See generally FAC. While there was an 1 administrative decision finding the denial of Gurrola’s 2019 2 application was warranted, Gurrola is not challenging this 3 decision. Id. ¶ 127. As explained above, this prior decision 4 does not bar the present action under res judicata, because they 5 involve different causes of action. Although Gurrola may have 6 been able to challenge the constitutionality of the regulations 7 in state proceedings, he was not required to do so before 8 seeking relief in federal court. See King v. Massarweh, 782 9 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[W]here plaintiffs allege 10 violation of substantive constitutional rights apart from due 11 process rights, availability of state remedies is immaterial.”) 12 4. Equal Protection 13 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 14 commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its 15 jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 16 essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 17 should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 18 Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). If a law neither burdens 19 a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it will be 20 upheld so long as it bears a rational relation to some 21 legitimate end. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 22 Here, the challenged regulation distinguishes between those 23 with two or more felonies and those without. Those with two or 24 more felonies are ineligible for EMT certification. The 25 regulation also distinguishes between those who have been 26 released from incarceration within the last ten years for an 27 offense punishable as a felony, and those who have not. It is 28 worth noting that these are not the only situations that bar EMT 1 certification, just the ones at issue here. See 22 Cal. Code 2 Regs. § 100214.3. Because ex-felons are not a suspect class, 3 U.S. v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998), and EMT 4 certification is not a fundamental right, see New Orleans v. 5 Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1976), the regulation is 6 constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a 7 legitimate governmental interest. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 8 Plaintiffs argue that there is no rational basis for a 9 categorical rule prohibiting all persons with two or more felony 10 convictions from becoming EMT certified. Opp’n at 12-15. They 11 point out that felonies encompass a wide variety of crimes, not 12 all of which are relevant to EMT work. Opp’n at 13. But 13 Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that the very act of committing a 14 felony more than once, regardless of the underlying offense, can 15 be relevant. As the government argues, “[t]hose applicants with 16 a judicial record of two or more felony convictions have a 17 proven unwillingness to conform to the social norm to ‘do no 18 harm’ to others.” Duncan’s Mot. at 14. Barring such persons 19 from becoming EMT certified advances the government’s legitimate 20 interest in ensuring public safety, as EMTs often deal with 21 vulnerable persons in responding to emergencies. Duncan Mot. at 22 14; Kepple Mot. at 14. 23 One could argue that this categorical ban is overinclusive 24 since not every person convicted of two or more felonies is 25 dangerous. But “courts are compelled under rational-basis 26 review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there 27 is an imperfect fit between means and ends. A classification 28 does not fail rational basis review because it ‘is not made with 1 mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some 2 inequality.’” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) 3 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). It 4 is not irrational for the government to believe that those with 5 two or more felonies or recent convictions, are more likely to 6 harm others in the future. The wisdom, fairness, or logic of 7 this legislative choice is not for the Court to decide. Heller, 8 509 U.S. at 319. Because these regulations are rationally 9 related to the government’s legitimate interest in ensuring 10 public safety, even if tenuous, it does not violate the Equal 11 Protection Clause. See Romer, 517 U.S at 632. 12 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ 13 Equal Protection Claims are granted. This claim is dismissed 14 with prejudice. 15 5. Due Process 16 Relatedly, under the Due Process Clause, regulations on the 17 entry into a profession must “have a rational connection with 18 the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice” the profession. 19 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’r of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 20 (1957). 21 Plaintiffs argue that these EMT restrictions are irrational 22 because California trains and uses prisoners with felony records 23 to fight wildfires and allows people with felony records to 24 serve as seasonal or volunteer firefighters. FAC ¶ 1. However, 25 because full-time firefighting usually requires EMT 26 certification, the state effectively prohibits many of these 27 same people from pursuing firefighting careers. Id. But not 28 all EMTs are firefighters and not all firefighters are EMTs. 1 Plaintiffs have not challenged any law mandating firefighters be 2 EMT certified but have merely alleged it is something most full- 3 time positions require. FAC ¶ 42. Accordingly, the Court 4 limits its analysis to the question before it: whether the 5 regulations have a rational connection to an applicant’s fitness 6 or capacity to be an EMT? For the same reasons described above, 7 the Court finds they do. 8 Plaintiffs point out that EMT certifications can already be 9 denied if the applicant is convicted of any crime which is 10 substantially related to the qualifications, functions and 11 duties of emergency personnel. Opp’n at 15 (quoting Cal. Health 12 & Safety Code § 1798.200(c)(6)). Therefore, Plaintiffs conclude 13 the challenged regulations do nothing but exclude people whose 14 felony records are unrelated to EMT work, in violation of the 15 Due Process Clause. Id. Again, this ignores the fact that the 16 mere fact of committing a felony more than once, or recently, 17 can be relevant, regardless of the underlying crime. As 18 mentioned, it is not illogical for the government to conclude 19 that those individuals with multiple or recent felony 20 convictions are more likely to harm persons than those without. 21 This relates to one’s fitness to being an EMT, as EMTs are 22 entrusted with rendering basic life support and emergency 23 medical care to vulnerable persons. 22 Cal. Code. Regs. 24 § 100063(a)(2). The wisdom of this requirement is not for the 25 Court to judge. Dittman v. California, 181 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th 26 Cir. 1999). “For in the end, ‘it is the legislature, not the 27 courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of … new 28 requirement[s].’” Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., nee een nnn en ne nnn nN I NE OED EE 1 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). For these reasons, Defendants’ 2 Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim are granted. 3 | This claim is dismissed with prejudice. 4 6. Privileges and Immunities 5 Plaintiffs also bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 6 Privileges or Immunities Clause, contending that the regulations 7 violate the clause by irrationally restricting their right to 8 earn a living. FAC @ 209. Plaintiffs, however, recognize this 9 claim is precluded by the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 39 10 (1872). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim 11 is also granted with prejudice as the Court finds further 12 amendment of any of the claims in the FAC would be futile. See 13 Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Serv., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 14 (9th Cir. 2006). 15 IIl. ORDER 16 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to 17 Dismiss all three of Plaintiffs’ claims are GRANTED WITH 18 PREJUDICE. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: February 9, 2021 21 Me 29 HN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 23 24 25 26 2 Defendants also make the argument that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims should be dismissed. Duncan Mot. at 12-13. 27 Because Plaintiffs do not appear to have brought a procedural due process claim, the Court does need not address this argument. 28 | See FAC FI 184-207; Opp’n at 10-15. 19