(PC) Looney v. Sutter County ( 2021 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY LOONEY, No. 2:20-CV-1575-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SUTTER COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Sutter County; and (2) the Sutter 9 County Sheriff’s Department. See ECF No. 1, pg. 1. Plaintiff also lists two “Doe” defendants, 10 John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, both of whom are alleged to be deputies. See id. at 1-2. According 11 to Plaintiff: 12 Sutter County Sheriff’s deputy’s [sic], including John Doe 1 & John Doe 2, used excessive force to extract me from my cell. John Doe 1 shot me 13 point blank with a block gun. I was beat up by all the deputies while the cameras were purposely turned off as ordered by the deputies. 14 ECF No. 1, pg. 3. 15 16 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 Plaintiff’s allegations as to the named defendants – Sutter County and the Sutter 19 County Sheriff’s Department – are insufficient.1 Municipalities and other local government 20 units, such as the named defendants here, are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability 21 applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal 22 government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also 23 Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government 24 unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a 25 respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 26 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the 27 28 1 Plaintiff cannot proceed against the Doe defendants unless he names them. 1 actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff 2 must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of 3 the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to withstand 4 dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual defendant’s 5 conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles 6 Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). 7 In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient because Plaintiff has not 8 alleged any custom, practice, or policy on the part of the municipal defendants that was the 9 moving force behind the constitutional violations alleged as against the unnamed deputies. 10 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 13 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 14 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 15 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 16 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 17 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 18 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 19 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 20 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 21 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 22 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 23 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 24 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 25 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 26 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 27 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 28 / / / 1 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 2 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 3 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 4 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 5 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 7 1. Plaintiffs original complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed with leave to 8 || amend; and 9 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 10 || service of this order. 11 12 | Dated: March 23, 2021 Ssvcqo_ 13 DENNIS M. COTA 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28