Sifuentes v. Department of Child Support Services Kings County ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VICTOR ALVARADO SIFUENTES, Case No. 1:23-cv-00624-JLT- EPG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v. (Doc. 1) 14 DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES KINGS COUNTY, et al., 30-day Deadline 15 Defendants. 16 17 The plaintiff in this matter is proceeding pro se. The complaint names 22 defendants and 18 attempts to state numerous claims against each. (Doc. 1.) The defendants include several 19 Departments of Kings County, California, including its Department of Child Support Services, 20 Police Department, Superior Court, and District Attorney’s Office; several Kings County 21 Commissioners; Plaintiff’s former spouse; several attorneys and law firms; the California 22 Department of Motor Vehicles; the California Department of Fish and Game; the U.S. Social 23 Security Administration; and the U.S. Department of State, among others. (Id.) 24 Defendants have begun filing motions to dismiss. (See Doc. 33.) However, a review of 25 the complaint in this action has caused the Court to issue this order sua sponte. For the reasons 26 stated below, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND pursuant to Rules 8, 27 /// 28 1 12(b)(6), 18, and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff may file an amended 2 complaint within 30 days of the date of this order, but he is warned that any amended complaint 3 must comply with the legal standards set forth below. If any amendment fails to comply with 4 those standards, the Court may dismiss the complaint without further notice and without leave to 5 amend. 6 A. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates that a complaint include a “short and plain 8 statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that each allegation “be simple, concise, and 9 direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). As the Supreme Court has held, Rule 8(a) “requires a ‘showing,’ 10 rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 11 544, 555 n.3 (2007). Complaints that are “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and 12 largely irrelevant” and that “consist[ ] largely of immaterial background information” are subject 13 to dismissal under Rule 8. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 14 Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673–74 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming a dismissal 15 with prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8, finding that both the original complaint and an 16 amended complaint were “verbose, confusing and conclusory”). 17 The Court finds that the complaint does not comply with Rule 8. Under a section of the 18 complaint that has been titled “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff sets forth 22 paragraphs, one as to 19 each named defendant. (Doc. 1 at 17–23.) Elsewhere, the complaint provides a list of statutes that 20 Plaintiff asserts form the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over each set of claims against each 21 defendant. (Id. at 10–15.) Read together, these sections suggest Plaintiff is attempting to advance 22 well over a hundred statutory and constitutional claims in this case. For example, as to the “Child 23 Support Office in Hanford Kings County CA,” which the Court assumes is a reference to the 24 1 Even though Plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court retains the inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss a claim under 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Wright v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-03008-CRB, 2015 WL 3902798, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2015), aff’d (Dec. 8, 2015). In addition, the Court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure 26 to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361–62 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 at 593 (1969)). A case “fits within Wong” 27 when it “raises nearly indecipherable claims that, to the extent they are decipherable, are frivolous, do not give rise to federal court jurisdiction, or name parties who enjoy absolute immunity. Parker v. Arizona, No. CV-21-01143-PHX- 28 DJH, 2021 WL 3623148, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-16325, 2021 WL 6884870 (9th Cir. 1 Kings County Department of Child Support Services, the complaint alleges: 2 [A]ll staff members violated the color of law by trying to enforce a claim of a VA Disability Without a VA 21-0788 This 3 misinformation sent to state and Federal departments caused catastrophic damage in the loss of money time and Civil rights 4 many laws are currently willfully disregarded and are being violated by Negligence and Incompetence there is a conspiracy to 5 commit Racketeering, Extortion, and Blackmail all the Agents feel they are Exempt from the law I am seeking relief and compensation 6 for [] myself and my children who fear to speak to me because of the repercussions of violence from my ex wife Child Support 7 Attorneys and their Staff and the Court Attorneys assigned to the case refuse to follow the Law and need to be held accountable and 8 each need to pay damages and the Director and all Supervisors I am asking Incarceration and The Attorney’s assigned the staff Agents I 9 would request to be held accountable for such atrocities and for all other violations be fined for damages and QUI TAM for reporting 10 to the Gov’t Fraud ,and the following Social Security Dlsability, Passport, DMV, Fish & Game, CHP, Bank Fraud. Theft of 11 Montgomery GI Bill, C[oe]rcion, Cons[p]iracy to commit Fraud, Violations of the USC, Civil Rights, Amendment Rights. 12 13 (Id. at 17.) In relation to his claims against the Kings County Department of Child Support 14 Services, Plaintiff provides the following lists of statutory provisions: 15 10 USC 1408 (a)(4)(iii) Payments of Retired or Retainer pay in Compliance of Court. 16 18 USC 241 Conspiracy against rights 17 18 USC 242 Deprivation of rights under color of law 18 18 USC 287 False fictitious or fraudulent claims 19 18 USC 371 Conspiracy to defraud the United States 20 18 USC 1031 Major fraud against the United States 21 18 USC 1035A(2) sec 2332b (g)(5)(B) Terrorism offense 22 18 USC 1951(a)(b)(2) Interference with comm by threats of 23 violence 24 18 USC 1961(1)(A)(B)(2)(3)(4)(5) Racketeering activity 25 18 USC 2382 Misprision of Treason 26 18 USC 1002 Possession of false papers to defraud the United States 27 18 USC 1017 Government seals wrongfully used and instruments 28 wrongful sealed 1 22 USC ch 1 part 51.60 (a)(2)(b) Denial and restriction of passport 2 28 USC 455 Disqualification of justice judge or magistrate judge 3 31 USC 3729 (a)(l)(A)(B)(E) False claims 4 38 USC 3319 allocation of post 9/11 benefits in a divorce 5 38 USC 5301 Non assignability and exempt status of benefits 6 42 USC 652 (k)(31)(A)(B) Competent Authority / Passport denial 7 42 USC 658 Title IV-D sec 458 Social Security Act Incentive payments to states 8 42 USC 658 (4)(8) Support order 9 42 USC 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights 10 42 USC 1985 Invidious gender discrimination 11 RICO Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, First Amendment, 12 Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, Tenth Amendment, Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment 13 14 (Id. at 10.) Absent, however, are factual allegations explaining why and how this defendant 15 violated any of these statutes or constitutional provisions, committed any of the listed torts, or 16 otherwise violated any law. Indeed, all the other claims in the case are similarly defective because 17 Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts that explain the nature of the violation(s) alleged. 18 The court is cognizant of the fact that the plaintiff is acting in pro per. However, although 19 liberally construed, pro per pleadings “must meet some minimum threshold in providing a 20 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. United States Dept. of 21 Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Defendants have not been given fair notice of the 22 claims against them. In any amended complaint Plaintiff must specify which defendants are liable 23 under which statutes and provide some factual bases for those assertions. 24 Plaintiff is also directed to review Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 54, along with 25 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Rule 11 authorizes the court to impose sanctions when a complaint is frivolous, 26 legally unreasonable, without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose. Rule 11 27 applies explicitly to parties not represented by attorneys. See Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 28 1390 (9th Cir. 1994). Rule 54 provides that costs are awarded to the prevailing party in civil 1 actions as a matter of course absent express statutory provision, “unless the court otherwise 2 directs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); see also Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 944–45 3 (9th Cir. 2003). 4 B. Misjoinder 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18 allows a party asserting a claim for relief to “join, as 6 independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. 7 Civ. P. 18(a). A plaintiff may also bring claims against more than one defendant if: (1) the claims 8 arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” and (2) 9 there is a “question of law or fact common to all defendants.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 10 “The ‘same transaction’ requirement of Rule 20 refers to ‘similarity in the factual 11 background of a claim; claims that arise out of a systematic pattern of events’ and have a ‘very 12 definite logical relationship.’” Hubbard v. Hougland, 2010 WL 1416691, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 13 2010) (quoting Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 842–843 (9th Cir. 2000)). In 14 addition, “the mere fact that all [of a plaintiff’s] claims arise under the same general law does not 15 necessarily establish a common question of law or fact.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 16 1351 (9th Cir. 1997). However, “even once [the Rule 20(a)] requirements are met, a district court 17 must examine whether permissive joinder would ‘comport with the principles of fundamental 18 fairness’ or would result in prejudice to either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 19 1296 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th 20 Cir. 1980) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it severed certain plaintiff’s 21 claims without finding improper joinder)). 22 Under Rule 20(b), the district court may sever claims or parties to avoid prejudice. Fed. R. 23 Civ. P. 20(b). Courts have also exercised the discretion to sever where “[i]nstead of making the 24 resolution of [the] case more efficient . . . joinder would instead confuse and complicate the 25 issues for all parties involved.” Wynn v. National Broadcasting Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1088 26 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that even where Rule 20 requirements for joinder are satisfied, the 27 Court may exercise its discretion “to sever for at least two reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion 28 and judicial inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to the [defendants]”). 1 In addition, “[o]n a motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or 2 drop a party” and “sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. However, “[m]isjoinder of 3 parties is not a ground for dismissing an action.” Id. The proper remedy for misjoinder is to sever 4 misjoined parties and dismiss claims against them, provided that “no substantial right will be 5 prejudiced by the severance.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350. 6 It is totally unclear how the numerous claims in the complaint are related to one another, 7 though several of them concern family law matters and/or possibly administrative problems 8 Plaintiff experienced because of his child support obligations. Even if all the issues Plaintiff 9 complains about were triggered in some way by his family law disputes, this does not mean the 10 claims are part of the “same transaction.” Rather, Rule 20 requires that the claims have “similarity 11 in the[ir] factual background” or, put another way” that the claims “arise out of a systematic 12 pattern of events’ and have a ‘very definite logical relationship.’” Hubbard, 2010 WL 1416691, at 13 *7. Absent a showing that the claims included in any amended complaint are properly joined, the 14 Court will sever all but the first claim from the case before evaluating further that claim and any 15 properly joined claims. 16 C. The First Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim 17 The complaint suffers from numerous other obvious defects. By way of example, the 18 Court focuses this portion of its analysis only on the first claim against the Kings County 19 Department of Child Support Services.2 20 1. No Private Right of Action to Bring Civil Claims Premised Upon Criminal Statutes 21 The first claim lists numerous statutes that are part of Title 18 of the United States Code. 22 Generally, a member of the public is unable to bring civil actions premised upon federal criminal 23 statutes set forth in Title 18. See, e.g., Hunley v. Orbital Scis. Corp., No. C-05-1879-PHXDGC, 24 2007 WL 977384, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2007) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C 25 26 2 This should not be taken as an indication that the other claims in this case are free from defects. Rather, the Court is not evaluating these other claims in detail at this time because they appear to be misjoined as explained above. 27 Misjoinder burdens judicial resources because “the increased work resulting from mass joinder requires no additional payment beyond the one-time . . . filing fee. Plaintiffs therefore in no way compensate financially for [their] 28 significant drain on judicial resources.” Corley v. Google, Inc., 316 F.R.D. 277, 292 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (internal 1 § 1031); Markley v. City of Seattle, No. C22-5038-RSL, 2022 WL 374415, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2 Feb. 8, 2022) (same as to 18 U.S.C. § 241); McKoby v. Biden, No. C22-1461JLR, 2022 WL 3 11777168, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2022) (same as to 18 U.S.C. § 2382).3 There are some 4 narrow exceptions to this general rule, such as the civil cause of action created by the Racketeer 5 Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. Though that statute is 6 mentioned in the complaint, Plaintiff fails to explain how it applies or provide any facts that 7 would give proper notice to Defendants under that statute. 8 2. Other Federal Statutes 9 The first claim for relief against the Kings County Department of Child Support Services 10 lists other statutes and constitutional provisions. Most of these provisions appear inapplicable to 11 this defendant. 12 • Plaintiff cites “22 USC ch 1 part 51.60 (a)(2)(b) Denial and restriction of 13 passport.” This appears to be a reference to 22 C.F.R. § 51.60(a)(2), which allows 14 the U.S. Department of State to deny a U.S. Passport to someone who is in arrears 15 for child support. Even if the Kings County Department of Child Support Services 16 was involved with the implementation of child support orders applicable to 17 Plaintiff, it does not appear possible for this defendant to violate 22 C.F.R. 18 § 51.60. The same problem arises in connection with Plaintiff’s citation to 42 19 U.S.C. § 652(k), which also relates to the Department of State’s authority to deny 20 a passport to a person who is in arrears for child support. 21 • 28 U.S.C. § 455, pertains to the disqualification of a federal judge. No federal 22 judge is named in this suit and there are no allegations related to federal judicial 23 action. It is therefore unclear how this statute relates to this claim or any other. 24 • 31 U.S.C. § 3729 pertains to false claims for payment made against the U.S. 25 Government. It is unclear how this statute is implicated by this defendant’s alleged 26 conduct. 27 3 Again, the Court offers only a few examples of the criminal statutes cited by Plaintiff. Just because the Court has 28 not included a citation to a case about each criminal statute does not mean that a private action exists as to that 1 • 38 U.S.C. § 3319 and § 5301 concern the authority of the Department of Veterans 2 Affairs to allocate benefits and the non-assignability of certain of those benefits. 3 Again, it is unclear how this defendant could violate these statutes, even if a 4 private right of action exists under them. 5 • 42 U.S.C. § 658 is a statute that has been repealed. It is therefore unclear why it is 6 relied upon in the complaint. 7 3. Civil Rights Statutes 8 Plaintiff also mentions 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, along with various constitutional 9 provisions, as potential sources of liability for the Kings County Department of Child Support 10 Services. 11 a. Section 1983 12 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action may be maintained “against any person 13 acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 14 by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 15 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (emphasis added). To state a claim 16 under section 1983, Plaintiff must show (1) that he has been deprived of a right secured by the 17 United States Constitution or a federal law, and (2) that the defendant causing the deprivation was 18 acting “under color of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). 19 Local governments and their entities, such as the Kings County Department of Child 20 Support Services are “persons” subject to suit for “constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 21 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978)). However, a local government’s 22 liability is limited. Although a local government entity may be held liable for its official policies 23 or customs, it cannot be held liable for an employee’s actions outside the scope of these policies 24 or customs. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To state a civil rights claim against a local government 25 entity under Monell, a plaintiff must set forth facts alleging the following: (1) the local 26 government official(s) must have intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (2) the 27 violation must be a part of policy or custom and may not be an isolated incident, and (3) there 28 must be a link between the specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell, 436 1 U.S. at 690–92. 2 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to explain how any individual employee of the Kings County 3 Department of Child Protective Services violated any federal right Plaintiff possesses, let alone 4 how that violation was a part of a policy or custom. The list of constitutional provisions provided 5 is entirely conclusory. The Court therefore finds that the complaint fails to state a claim under 6 Section 1983 against the Kings County Department of Child Support Services. 7 b. Section 1985 8 Plaintiff also lists Section 1985 next to the words “invidious gender discrimination.” The 9 Court presumes this is a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), as the other parts of Section 1985, 10 which pertain to preventing an officer of the United States from performing their official duties 11 and obstructing justice and intimidating witnesses or jurors, appear inapplicable. To state a cause 12 of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or a 13 class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 14 laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal 15 injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United 16 States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 17 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . 18 means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 19 discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. 20 The amended complaint does not set forth any facts sufficient to support its conclusions 21 that any employee of the Kings County Department of Child Protective Services (or, for that 22 matter, any other defendant) engaged in a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s rights based on his 23 membership in any class. Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 24 against the Kings County Department of Child Protective Services. 25 4. Other Defects in the complaint 26 To provide Plaintiff additional guidance, the Court notes the following obvious issues 27 with other claims in the case. 28 /// 1 a. Absolute Prosecutorial and Judicial Immunity 2 The complaint names several individuals who appear to be protected by absolute 3 immunity. 4 i. Judicial Immunity 5 “It has long been established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for acts 6 done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 7 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “A judge will not be deprived of 8 immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his 9 authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all 10 jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (internal quotation and citation 11 omitted). Here, the allegations in the complaint against the named County Commissioners fail to 12 indicate how that they acted outside their judicial functions and/or in the clear absence of all 13 jurisdiction. 14 ii. Prosecutorial Immunity 15 A prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for 16 damages “when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 17 118, 131 (1997) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 18 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). A prosecutor’s advocacy functions are those activities that are 19 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . .” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 20 430. Such activities typically include, among other things, “initiating a prosecution and [ ] 21 presenting the State’s case” at trial (even if such activities include the knowing use of false 22 testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory evidence, and malicious prosecution), Imbler, 23 424 U.S. at 431; Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted), as 24 well as “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or 25 for trial, and which occur in the course of [the prosecutor’s] role as an advocate for the State,” 26 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Here, the claims brought against the District Attorney’s office appear to 27 be subject to dismissal based upon absolute immunity. 28 /// 1 b. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 2 The complaint sets forth claims for damages against several Departments of the State of 3 California and officials employed by those Departments. The Eleventh Amendment to the United 4 States Constitution bars federal lawsuits against a state by its own citizens, citizens of another 5 state, or citizens or subjects of any foreign state. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 6 234, 237–38 (1985), abrogated on other grounds as noted in Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 7 (1996). Unless a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden 8 it, a state cannot be sued regardless of the relief sought. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 9 n.14 (1985). Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to suits against a state agency, Brown v. 10 Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009), and to suits for damages against state 11 officials sued in their official capacities, Graham, 473 U.S. at 169–70. To the extent relevant 12 here, California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought 13 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 14 1999). Therefore, it appears that all the claims in the complaint brought against California 15 agencies and officials are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 16 D. Federal Defendants 17 Finally, some of the claims seek monetary damages from federal agencies and officials. 18 Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the “United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit 19 save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). In addition, 20 the government can define the terms under which it may be sued. Id. The Federal Tort Claims Act 21 (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The 22 FTCA is the exclusive remedy for monetary damages from the federal government for “personal 23 injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 24 employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 25 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides: “A tort claim against the United States shall 26 be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two 27 years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of 28 mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to 1 | which it was presented.” The claim-presentation requirement is “‘jurisdictional in nature and may 2 || not be waived.” Vacek v. United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). 3 On the face of his complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that any of his claims against any 4 | federal defendant have been presented to the appropriate agencies, nor suggest that any of these 5 | claims have reached a final administrative adjudication. Therefore, they are barred by the doctrine 6 | of sovereign immunity and must be dismissed. 7 CONCLUSION 8 For all the reasons set forth above, the Court sua sponte dismisses the complaint in its 9 | entirety for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 18, and 20, and for failure 10 | to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This ruling moots the 11 || pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. 33.) 12 Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within thirty days of the date of this order, but 13 | any such amended complaint must comport with the legal standards set forth above. Among other 14 | things, Plaintiff may not join unrelated claims together, may not rely on criminal statutes that do 15 | not provide a civil private right of action, and must not advance claims that are frivolous, legally 16 || unreasonable, or without factual foundation. Failure to timely file an amended complaint that 17 | abides by these instructions may result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend 18 | and without further notice. 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ June 1, 2023 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12