Juarez v. Henley ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUBEN JUAREZ, No. 1:22-cv-01004-DAD-SKO 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING CASE TO SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SUPERIOR 14 LISA M. HENLEY, COURT AND DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS MOOT 15 Defendant. (Doc. No. 2) 16 17 This is an unlawful detainer action brought under California state law by plaintiff Ruben 18 Juarez against defendant Lisa M. Henley. On August 11, 2022, defendant, proceeding pro se, 19 removed this case to this federal court from the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 20 1.) According to defendant, removal is proper because “the complaint presents federal questions” 21 and a “[f]ederal question exists because Defendant’s Answer, a pleading depend [sic] on the 22 determination of Defendant’s rights and Plaintiff’s duties under federal law.” (Id. at 2.) Also on 23 August 11, 2022, defendant filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No 2.) 24 A district court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action 25 sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell 26 & Reed, Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, is 27 strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 28 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). It is presumed that a case lies outside the limited 1 jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 2 asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 1106–07. In addition, “the existence of federal jurisdiction depends 3 solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO 4 Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 5 2000). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction” means that “the court resolves all 6 ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 7 (9th Cir. 2009). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case “must be rejected if there is any 8 doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107. 9 “If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 10 the case shall be remanded,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and such remand “is mandatory, not 11 discretionary.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997); see also California ex. rel. 12 Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). Where it appears, as it does here, that 13 the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, “the case shall be 14 remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 15 “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 16 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 17 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” California v. United States, 18 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838. Under the well-pleaded 19 complaint rule, courts look to what “necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own 20 claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of avoidance of defenses 21 which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” California, 215 F.3d at 1014. Accordingly, “a 22 case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in 23 the plaintiff’s complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question 24 truly at issue.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Vaden v. 25 Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009) (“It does not suffice to show that a federal question lurks 26 somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under 27 federal law.”). 28 ///// 1 Here, defendant has not shown that removal of this action to this federal court is 2 || appropriate. Plaintiff's complaint in this case is a straight-forward unlawful detainer action that is 3 || based entirely on state law. Moreover, as stated above, defendant contends that her answer 4 || somehow raises rights and duties under federal law, but her notice of removal reveals that her 5 || answer “was based on a defective Notice to quit” that violated “[California] Code of Civil 6 | Procedure § 1161(2).” (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Thus, there are no federal issues raised in defendant’s 7 || answer. Even assuming defendant could assert some federal law defense, she cannot use that 8 || anticipated defense as the basis for removal because the defensive invocation of federal law 9 || cannot form the basis of this court’s jurisdiction. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 70; Caterpillar, 482 10 | U.S. at 392; California, 215 F.3d at 1014. 11 Because there is no federal question appearing in plaintiff's complaint in this case, 12 | defendant has failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Remand of this case to the San 13 || Joaquin County Superior Court is appropriate and mandatory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); 14 | Geographic Expeditions, 559 F.3d at 1107; Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257. 15 Accordingly, 16 1. This action is remanded to the San Joaquin County Superior Court, pursuant to 28 17 U.S.C. § 1447(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; 18 2. Defendant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is denied as having 19 been rendered moot by this order; and 20 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 21 | ITIS SO ORDERED. me □ Dated: _ August 14, 2022 J al, Al 5 a 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28