(PC) Kasianov v. Gamboa ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OLEKSANDR KASIANOV, No. 2:22-CV-1142-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MARTIN GAMBOA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Martin Gamboa, the warden of 7 Avenal State Prison (ASP); and (2) Robert Burton, the warden of the Deuel Vocational Institution 8 (DVI). See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1-2. Plaintiff alleges three claims related to interference with his 9 legal mail at ASP and DVI. See id. at 3-5. Throughout his complaint, Plaintiff refers generally to 10 “prison staff” and does not mention either defendant specifically. 11 Supervisory personnel such as Defendants Gamboa and Burton are generally not 12 liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 13 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor 14 is only liable for the constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or 15 directed the violations. See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory 16 defendant can be liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional 17 conduct because government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 18 1983 for his or her own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 19 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself 20 is a repudiation of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation 21 may, however, be liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. 22 See Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 23 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 24 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 25 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 26 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 27 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 28 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 1 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 2 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient as against Defendants Gamboa and Burton 3 because Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show either Defendants’ personal involvement, either by 4 way of their own actions or implementation of a constitutionally deficient policy. Plaintiff will be 5 provided an opportunity to amend. 6 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 7 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 8 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 9 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 10 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 11 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 12 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 13 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 14 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 15 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 16 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 17 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 18 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 19 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 20 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 21 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 22 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 23 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 24 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 25 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 26 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 | Dated: August 18, 2022 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28