Wood v. City of Sacramento ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 BRANDY WOOD, an individual, No. 2:20-cv-00497 WBS DB 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 15 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, a municipal corporation; LEAH ANTONETTI, in 16 her individual capacity as a police officer for the 17 Sacramento Police Department; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 ----oo0oo---- 21 22 Plaintiff Brandy Wood brought this action under 42 23 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Sacramento and individual 24 Sacramento police officers alleging violations of her federal 25 civil rights and of state law based on defendants’ alleged 26 conduct during a 2019 protest. These include a claim for 27 municipal liability based on officers’ alleged mass arrest of 28 plaintiff and other protesters despite their alleged compliance 1 with a dispersal order officers gave. (Fourth Amended Complaint 2 (“4AC”) at ¶¶ 32-43 (Docket No. 46).) Defendants now move to 3 dismiss plaintiff’s municipal liability claim. (Mot. (Docket No. 4 49-1).)1 5 I. Discussion 6 In its prior Order, the court dismissed plaintiff’s 7 claim for municipal liability for failure to state a claim based 8 on theories of (1) unlawful policy or custom, (2) ratification or 9 decision by an official with final policymaking authority, and 10 (3) failure to train. (See Order re: Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. 11 Compl. (“Order”) at 4-11 (Docket No. 45).) The court explained 12 that plaintiff had not adequately alleged the existence of an 13 unlawful policy or custom because she had not pled facts showing 14 the challenged conduct had occurred repeatedly in the past, such 15 as was necessary to show it was “so permanent and well settled as 16 to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” (See id. 17 at 4-9 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 18 127 (1988) (plurality opinion)).) Plaintiff also had not alleged 19 unconstitutional action or ratification by a final policymaker 20 because although she alleged her arrest was pursuant to “orders 21 from high-ranking supervisors” and “high-ranking policymakers 22 within the police department,” she provided no additional 23 information about those individuals’ identities, nor did she 24 allege they had “authority to make final policy.” (See id. at 9- 25 1 Because the facts alleged in the Fourth Amended Complaint are largely identical to those in the Third Amended 26 Complaint (Docket No. 36), which was the subject of the court’s 27 Order addressing defendants’ previous motion to dismiss (see Docket No. 45), the court will omit recitation of the facts 28 alleged except as is necessary to resolve the instant motion. 1 11 (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127).) Finally, plaintiff 2 failed to state a claim based on failure to train because she 3 “d[id] not identify how training that police officers received 4 was inadequate.” (See id. at 8 n.3 (citing Anakin v. Contra 5 Costa Reg’l Med. Ctr., 16-cv-161 MEJ, 2016 WL 2893257, at *5 6 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2016)).) 7 Plaintiff has since amended her complaint to include 8 the following new allegations relevant to her municipal liability 9 claim, under the heading “Monell Allegations”: 10 Sacramento police officers, supervisors and Chief of Police were aware that a protest would occur on 11 March 4, 2019. They organized, planned and prepared for the lawful assembly of protestors to exercise 12 their First Amendment rights. 13 During the peaceful protest, there were no reports of violence or serious crimes. Dozens of 14 protestors merely chanted and walked the streets in protest of police brutality. Officers cleared the 15 paths of the streets for the safety of the public. As the protests continued into the evening and 16 night hours, high-ranking Sacramento Police Department supervisors decided to abruptly end the lawful 17 assembly of people by issuing dispersal orders. 18 When supervisors and officers issued the dispersal orders they gave instructions to protestors 19 on how to properly exit the protest without being subject to arrest. When the protestors followed those 20 directions, including Plaintiff, they were funneled into another area and arrested without probable cause. 21 When Plaintiff and other protestors, including pastors, confronted Defendant Antonetti and higher- 22 ranking officers telling them that they had followed the officers’ dispersal order and been led to this 23 location – Defendant and other supervisors told them that it did not matter that they had tried to follow 24 the dispersal orders and everyone would be arrest[ed] with or without probable cause for violation of the 25 dispersal order. 26 (4AC at ¶¶ 15-19.) The Fourth Amended Complaint also includes 27 the new allegation: “High-ranking officials directed and should 28 have known that the instructions in the dispersal order would 1 exonerate any protestors that followed them yet they instructed 2 their subordinates to arrest anyone without discrimination or 3 probable cause.” (Id. at ¶ 33.) 4 Although these amendments appear intended to support 5 plaintiff’s municipal liability claim based on a theory of action 6 or ratification by a final policymaker, they fail to cure the 7 problems identified in the court’s prior Order. Although they 8 allege the challenged decisions were made by “high-ranking 9 Sacramento Police Department supervisors,” “higher-ranking 10 officers,” and “[h]igh-ranking officials,” (id. at ¶¶ 17, 19, 11 33), the Fourth Amended Complaint still does not identify these 12 officials or allege they possess the authority to make final 13 policy. (See Order at 10 & n.5 (“Plaintiff has not alleged that 14 her alleged unlawful arrest was performed at the direction of 15 . . . an official whose policymaking decisions are not subject to 16 review or constraint by more senior officials . . . .”) (citing 17 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123; Pembaur v. Cincinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 18 483 (1986)).) Although the Fourth Amended Complaint refers to 19 the “Chief of Police” once, it does not allege the Chief made any 20 of the challenged decisions, but rather merely alleges the Chief 21 was aware protests would occur. (4AC at ¶ 15.)2 22 In her opposition brief, plaintiff also argues the 23 Fourth Amended Complaint states a claim for municipal liability 24 based on a failure to train. (See Opp. at 6-7 (Docket No. 50).) 25 Plaintiff’s new allegations, however, do not address training. 26 27 2 Nor does the Fourth Amended Complaint allege the Chief 28 of Police possesses final policymaking authority. 1 (See 4AC at ¶¶ 15-19, 33.)3 The Fourth Amended Complaint, like 2 the previous complaint, also alleges that officers “corral[led] 3 dozens of peaceful protesters into an enclosed space then 4 arrest[ed] all of them without reasonable suspicion or probable 5 [cause] in accordance with . . . their training policies.” (4AC 6 at ¶ 34.) As the court explained in its prior Order, however, 7 neither this allegation or others indicate what these training 8 policies were, how they were deficient, or how they led the 9 officers to arrest plaintiff without probable cause, as is 10 necessary to state a municipal liability claim based on failure 11 to train. (See Order at 8 n.3 (holding plaintiff failed to state 12 claim based on failure to train because she “d[id] not identify 13 how training that police officers received was inadequate”); 14 Anakin, 2016 WL 2893257, at *5 (claim stated based on failure to 15 train where complaint identified discrete training issues that 16 were “sufficient to put the County on notice of the specific 17 training policies that allegedly caused the constitutional 18 violation at issue”). 19 Finally, plaintiff argues the fact that defendants 20 allegedly arrested plaintiff and others indiscriminately and 21 without individual determinations of probable cause indicates 22 that “the inadequacy of the Defendants[’] training . . . was ‘so 23 24 3 Although plaintiff points to the Fourth Amended Complaint’s new allegation that “[Antonetti] and other 25 supervisors told [plaintiff] that it did not matter that [she] had tried to follow the dispersal orders” and everyone would be 26 arrested with or without probable cause, (4AC at ¶ 19; see Opp. 27 at 6), this allegation gives no indication that this decision was the product of official training, rather than an ad-hoc decision 28 by officers. 1 likely to result in violation of constitutional rights’” that the 2 officers’ alleged conduct is itself sufficient to establish 3 municipal liability based on a failure to train. (See Opp. at 7- 4 9 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).) 5 The Supreme Court has stated that a single incident of 6 unconstitutional conduct alone may, in rare cases, suffice to 7 show a municipality’s deliberate indifference to the need for 8 additional or different training. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 9 U.S. 51, 63-64 (2011); Harris, 489 U.S. at 390. However, this 10 argument suffers from the same flaw as addressed above, in that 11 the Fourth Amended Complaint does not specify the obviously 12 necessary or incorrect training at issue, such as by alleging the 13 City provides no training regarding the probable cause 14 requirement or that it specifically trains officers that they may 15 perform arrests without probable cause.4 Accordingly, the Fourth 16 Amended Complaint also does not support a claim for municipal 17 liability on this ground.5 18 Because the Fourth Amended Complaint fails to 19 adequately allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy 20 under any theory, plaintiff’s claim for municipal liability will 21 4 Although in her opposition plaintiff states that 22 defendants “conducted themselves in a way to suggest that [t]hey had been trained that they were permitted to conduct mass arrests 23 of protestors regardless of whether they complied with dispersal orders,” (Opp. at 7), this allegation does not appear in the 24 Fourth Amended Complaint, nor does it state that such training was in fact provided. 25 26 5 Although the previous complaint included allegations about prior incidents in support of an unlawful custom or 27 practice theory of municipal liability, plaintiff appears to no longer pursue such a theory, as those allegations regarding prior 28 incidents do not appear in the Fourth Amended Complaint. nen een en ne nn on nn nnn nnn nn nnn eo ON 1 | be dismissed. 2 The court notes that, although some amendments have 3 | been by stipulation, plaintiff has now amended her complaint four 4 times. (See Docket Nos. 5, 16, 36, 46.) In its prior order the 5 court specifically identified numerous deficiencies in 6 | plaintiff’s municipal liability claim, which plaintiff has failed 7 to rectify in her Fourth Amended Complaint. Because plaintiff 8 has been unable to state a claim for municipal liability despite 9 these observations, the court can only conclude that it is 10 because that claim “[can]not be saved by any amendment.” In re 11 Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 12 | Accordingly, the court will not grant plaintiff further leave to 13 | amend. See id. 14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to 15 Dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action of plaintiff’s Fourth Amended 16 Complaint, for supervisory and municipal liability (Docket No. 17 49-1) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 18 | Dated: August 23, 2022 he bloom HK Ld. 19 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28