(PC) Quang v. Alamosa ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THANH QUANG, No. 2:22-CV-01704-DAD-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 S. ALAMOSA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 8 9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 10 The only defendant named in the complaint is the California Medical Facility. 11 Though the Court’s docket also lists “S. Alamosa,” no such individual is named or mentioned in 12 the complaint. Plaintiff alleges as follows: “I’m no getting the treatments that I needs[sic]. Shoe 13 & foot problems.” ECF No. 1, pg. 3. 14 15 II. DISCUSSION 16 As discussed below, the California Medical Facility is an immune defendant. To 17 the extent Plaintiff intends to proceed against an individual “S. Alamosa,” Plaintiff’s complaint 18 does not allege sufficient facts to show a causal link to a constitutional violation. 19 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 20 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 21 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 22 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 23 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 24 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 25 Cir. 1989). A state’s agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state 26 agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 27 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff names as the only defendant the California Medical Facility, which is a 2 prison within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation system. As such, it is 3 part of the agency responsible for incarceration and correction and, as such, is immune from suit. 4 B. Causal Link 5 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 6 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 7 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 8 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 9 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 10 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 11 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 12 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 13 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 14 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 15 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 16 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 17 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 18 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 19 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious 20 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; 21 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health 22 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by 23 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to 24 treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and 25 wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 26 on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see 27 also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness 28 are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2) 1 whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the 2 condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 3 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases 5 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with 6 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin, 7 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to 8 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 9 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See 10 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical 11 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See 12 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate 13 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 14 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give 15 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a 16 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate 17 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 18 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 19 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 20 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 21 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 22 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 23 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 24 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 25 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 26 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 27 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 28 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 1 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 To the extent Plaintiff alleges “S. Alamoso” is liable for a violation of his Eighth 3 Amendment rights related to medical care, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to establish a causal 4 link between this individual and a constitutional violation. Because this defect may be cured 5 through amendment, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 6 7 III. CONCLUSION 8 Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be 9 cured by amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the 10 entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff 11 is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 12 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 13 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 14 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 15 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 16 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 17 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 18 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 19 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 20 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 21 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 22 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 23 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 24 Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by 25 amendment, Plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now 26 has the following choices: (1) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the 27 claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and 28 the Court will address the remaining claims; or (2) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint which 1 | continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the Court will issue findings and 2 || recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders 3 || and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims. 4 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 5 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 6 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 7 || with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 8 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 10 1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 11 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 12 || service of this order. 13 14 | Dated: February 15, 2023 Ss..c0_, 15 DENNIS M. COTA 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28