(PC) Davis v. Lynch ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE DARONTE DAVIS, No. 2:23-cv-00060-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JEFF LYNCH, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. 20 Before the court could screen plaintiff’s complaint that was docketed on January 11, 2023, 21 he filed a first amended complaint. See ECF Nos. 1, 5. Since the amended complaint supersedes 22 the original complaint, the court will proceed to screen plaintiff’s first amended complaint. 23 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(a). Accordingly, his motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 25 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 26 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 27 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 28 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 1 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 2 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 3 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 4 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(b)(2). 6 I. Screening Requirement 7 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 8 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 9 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 10 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 11 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 14 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 15 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 16 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 17 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 18 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 19 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 20 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 21 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 22 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt 23 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under 24 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. 25 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light 26 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. 27 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 28 ///// 1 II. Allegations in the Amended Complaint 2 At all times relevant to the allegations in the first amended complaint, plaintiff was an 3 inmate at California State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”). Plaintiff sues Jeff Lynch, the Warden 4 of CSP-Sac because he approved plaintiff’s grievance that directed that plaintiff get a prison job 5 with higher wages. ECF No. 5 at 2. To date, plaintiff has not been given a job or even put on the 6 list for a prison job. Id. 7 III. Legal Standards 8 The following legal standards are provided based on plaintiff’s pro se status as well as the 9 nature of the allegations in the complaint. 10 A. Linkage 11 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 12 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 13 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 14 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 15 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 16 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 17 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 18 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 19 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 20 plaintiff's federal rights. 21 B. Supervisory Liability 22 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 23 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 24 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 25 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 26 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 27 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 28 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 1 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 2 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 3 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 4 C. Grievance Administrators 5 The existence of a prison grievance procedure establishes a procedural right only and 6 “does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 7 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) 8 (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance 9 procedure). This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot 10 serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. “Only persons who 11 cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an 12 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard who stands and 13 watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an 14 administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.” George v. Smith, 507 15 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 16 IV. Analysis 17 The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint so vague and conclusory 18 that it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 19 relief. Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendant 20 engaged in that support plaintiff's claim other than simply reviewing a grievance that he filed. 21 Id.; see Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). For these reasons, the amended 22 complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file a second amended 23 complaint. 24 If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how 25 the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or 26 statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended 27 complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no 28 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 1 defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. 2 Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 3 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 4 violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 5 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 6 make plaintiff’s second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 7 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 8 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 9 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the original 10 pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as 11 in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 12 alleged. 13 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 14 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 15 intended as legal advice. 16 The court has reviewed the allegations in your amended complaint and determined that 17 they do not state any claim against the defendant. Your first amended complaint is being 18 dismissed, but you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening 19 order. 20 Although you are not required to do so, you may file a second amended complaint within 21 30 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 22 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 23 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 25 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 26 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 28 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 1 |} herewith. 2 3. Plaintiffs first amended complaint is dismissed. 3 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 4 | amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 5 || of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the 6 || docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure to 7 || file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation 8 | that this action be dismissed. 9 | Dated: June 2, 2023 / hice ANKE) flo "0 CAROLYNK.DELANEY/ 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 || □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28