(HC) Blasko v. Thomas ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VLADIMIR BLASKO, No. 1:18-cv-01649-DAD-SAB (HC) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY EXTRADITION PENDING APPEAL 14 LASHA BOYDEN, Acting United States Marshal for the Eastern District of (Doc. No. 24) 15 California, 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 This matter is before the court on petitioner Vladimir Blasko’s motion seeking a stay of 20 extradition pending appeal of the court’s May 16, 2022 order denying his petition for a writ of 21 habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 24.) For the reasons explained below, the court will grant petitioner’s 22 motion. 23 A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 24 As the court noted in its previous order adopting the then-pending findings and 25 recommendations and denying petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in prior orders the 26 undersigned has set out in great detail the factual background of this extradition case. (Doc. No. 27 16 at 2.) Not all of those facts need be repeated in full here. Nevertheless, as the court did in its 28 order adopting the findings and recommendations, it will repeat here only the facts deemed to be 1 relevant for the purposes of resolving the pending motion to stay this action pending appeal. (See 2 id.) 3 Petitioner Blasko was a police officer in Nitra, Slovakia, from July 1, 2004 to October 20, 4 2009. On the evening of July 13, 2007, Blasko and his police officer partner responded to a call 5 that two women had reported being harassed and slapped by men inside a bar. Blasko and his 6 partner ultimately arrested two male patrons of the bar, Zoltan Peli and Boris Kozma, for 7 disorderly conduct and assault on a public official. The same day, the District Directorate of 8 Police Corps filed criminal charges against Peli and Kozma. On January 14, 2009, the charges 9 against Kozma were suspended. However, on October 9, 2009, Peli was convicted of disorderly 10 conduct in connection with his actions on the evening in question. Many of the other details of 11 what occurred on July 13, 2007 and thereafter are the subject of varying degrees of dispute. (See 12 Doc. No. 16 at 4 n.4.) 13 Blasko remained employed as a law enforcement officer in Slovakia after the bar room 14 incident until his termination over two years later on October 20, 2009. Shortly thereafter, in 15 December 2009, Blasko married Martina Gregusova in Nitra, Slovakia, while Gregusova was 16 home in Slovakia on her winter break from college in the United States. Ms. Gregusova had been 17 enrolled at Fresno Pacific University since January 22, 2009. Following their wedding, Blasko 18 applied for and obtained a Slovakian passport and a United States F-1 student visa. On January 19 27, 2010, Blasko was informed of his acceptance for admission to Fresno Pacific University and 20 contends that he so notified the police department in Nitra. Thereafter, using his Slovakian 21 passport and student visa, Blasko departed Slovakia and arrived in the United States on February 22 26, 2010. 23 On June 3, 20101, almost three years after the July 13, 2007 barroom incident, Blasko was 24 charged with abuse of power and misdemeanor infliction of bodily harm in violation of the 25 Slovakian Penal Code. (See 17-mc-00067, Doc. No. 52-1 at 13-20.) The charging document also 26 1 The charging document was signed by a District Attorney for the Military branch of the 27 Government on May 20, 2010, but the first page of that document reflects a presumed filing date of June 3, 2010. (See In the Matter of the Extradition of Vladimir Blasko, No. 1:17-mc-00067- 28 DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.) (hereinafter cited as “17-mc-00067”), Doc. No. 52-1 at 13, 20.) 1 reported that at some unidentified time prior to its filing, “[t]he defendant, Senior Constable 2 Vladimir Blasko, excercised (sic) his right to remained (sic) silent as a person accused of a crime 3 and refused to comment on the matter.” (Id. at 17.) Over a year after the charging document was 4 issued, on June 9, 2011, the District Court in Nitra, Slovakia issued an international warrant for 5 Blasko’s arrest, identifying his last known location as being Fresno Pacific University. (Id.) 6 On February 15, 2012, U.S. Department of Homeland Security officers arrested Blasko at 7 his home in Fresno, for allegedly failing to maintain the conditions required by his non-immigrant 8 visa status in the United States. At a March 6, 2012 immigration bond hearing, Blasko’s 9 immigration attorney learned that Slovakia had issued the international arrest warrant. On April 10 20, 2012, an asylum application was filed on Blasko’s behalf seeking withholding of his removal. 11 On June 22, 2012, Blasko was released from U.S. Immigration custody on a $5,000 bond. 12 According to petitioner Blasko, it was not until June 10, 2015, that he learned that a trial 13 on the criminal charges brought against him in June 2010 had been conducted in his absence by 14 the District Court in Nitra, Slovakia. Specifically, a Slovakian criminal judgment was entered 15 against Blasko on April 15, 2013, and an appellate court decision dated November 7, 2013 had 16 affirmed the four year prison sentence which had been imposed upon him in abstentia. Although 17 the Slovakian judgment made reference to “the accused person’s barrister,” petitioner Blasko 18 contends that he was never aware of anyone acting on his behalf during these proceedings in 19 Slovakia. 20 On January 21, 2014, the Slovakian government obtained another international warrant for 21 Blasko’s arrest. (See 17-mc-00067, Doc. No. 1 at 97–109.) Over forty months thereafter, on 22 June 6, 2017, the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Washington, D.C. finally issued a formal 23 Diplomatic Note to the United States Department of State requesting Blasko’s international 24 extradition and providing the documentation required by the treaty between the two countries. 25 On October 2, 2017, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California, 26 representing the United States in fulfilling its extradition treaty obligations, filed a formal 27 extradition complaint against Blasko, giving rise to these proceedings. 28 ///// 1 B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On November 30, 2018, Blasko filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking review of the assigned magistrate judge’s November 19, 2018 order 4 certifying petitioner’s extraditability to the Slovak Republic. (17-mc-00067, Doc. No. 1.) The 5 petition was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) 6 and Local Rule 302. (Doc. No. 5.) On March 7, 2019, the assigned magistrate judge issued 7 findings and recommendations, recommending that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be 8 denied. (Doc. No. 10.) Petitioner objected to those findings and recommendations. (Doc. No. 9 11.) Specifically, petitioner objected to the magistrate judge’s findings that: (1) petitioner’s 10 extradition was not barred by the applicable Slovakian statute of limitations; and (2) the 11 government had presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that 12 petitioner committed the charged offenses. (See id. at 11, 26.) The undersigned conducted a de 13 novo review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). (Doc. No. 16.) Notwithstanding 14 the court’s reservations that it found the extradition request to be “both somewhat unusual and at 15 least arguably troubling,” the undersigned concluded that “the recommendation that petitioner’s 16 request for habeas relief be denied” was supported by the record and by proper analysis. (Id. at 17 5.) 18 On May 27, 2022, petitioner Blasko filed a notice of appeal of the court’s order denying 19 his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (See Doc. No. 18.) Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion 20 with this court seeking a stay of his extradition while he pursues his appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 21 (Doc. No. 24.) The United States has opposed that motion (Doc. No. 25) and petitioner has filed 22 a reply in support of his request for a stay (Doc. No. 26.) 23 LEGAL STANDARD 24 “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken v. 25 Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). “It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the 26 propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (internal 27 quotation and brackets omitted). “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that 28 the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433–34. 1 In exercising discretion to grant or deny a stay, courts should consider the following 2 factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on 3 the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 4 issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) 5 where the public interest lies.” Id. at 434 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that 6 courts should apply these factors flexibly when analyzing stay requests. See Leiva-Perez v. 7 Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning, in part, that “stays are typically less 8 coercive and less disruptive than are injunctions”). 9 To apply the factors flexibly, courts employ a “sliding scale,” meaning that the factors are 10 balanced so that “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” 11 Id. at 964–66 (quoting in part Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th 12 Cir. 2011)); Kum Tat Ltd. v. Linden Ox Pasture, LLC, No. 3:14-cv-02857-WHO, 2015 WL 13 674962, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2015). Under this sliding scale approach, 14 a moving party who cannot show a strong likelihood of success on the merits may nonetheless be entitled to a stay where he shows that 15 his appeal “raises serious legal questions, or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 16 971. A party satisfying this lower threshold under the first Nken factor is not required to show that it is more likely than not to win on 17 the merits, but it must demonstrate that the balance of hardships under the second and third factors tilts sharply in its favor. 18 19 Kum Tat, 2015 WL 674962, at *2 (cleaned up). 20 Against this backdrop, the Ninth Circuit has condensed the four factors from Nken and 21 held that a stay of removal in the immigration context, for instance, is warranted if the petitioner 22 establishes that “irreparable harm is probable and either: (a) a strong likelihood of success on the 23 merits and that the public interest does not weigh heavily against a stay; or (b) a substantial case 24 on the merits and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.” Leiva-Perez, 25 640 F.3d at 970; see also Luna v. O’Keefe, No. 5:17-cv-02129-LHK, 2018 WL 2197555, at *1 26 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (applying the same standards to a request for a stay after a habeas 27 petition challenging an extradition order was denied and appealed). 28 ///// 1 DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner argues that absent a stay, he will be subject to extradition from the United States 3 to Slovakia. (Doc. No. 24 at 4.) According to petitioner, extraditing him at this time, while his 4 appeal is pending, “would divest this Court, and all courts in the United States, of jurisdiction and 5 would render Mr. Blasko’s appeal moot.” (Id.) (citing Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 1354, 1356 6 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, petitioner contends that “because the failure to grant a stay would 7 result in irreparable harm to Mr. Blasko, his appeal rases serious legal questions, and the balance 8 of hardships tip sharply in his favor, a stay should be granted in this case.” (Id.) 9 A. Irreparable Injury 10 Petitioner has shown a strong likelihood of irreparable harm were the court to deny his 11 motion to stay because if the court denies the pending motion and the government extradites 12 petitioner to Slovakia, his appeal will be rendered moot and this challenge will be dismissed. See 13 Artukovic, 784 F.2d at 1356 (finding that a petitioner satisfied the irreparable harm factor because 14 if the petitioner’s stay motion was denied, the petitioner’s appeal will become moot and will be 15 dismissed since [the petitioner’s] extradition will have been carried out”); see also Luna, 2018 16 WL 2197555, at *1 (finding that the petitioner demonstrated irreparable harm because “if the 17 court denies Petitioner’s stay motion and the government extradites Petitioner to Mexico, 18 Petitioner’s appeal will become moot”). 19 Accordingly, the court now turns to consider the other relevant factors in determining 20 whether a stay should be granted. 21 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 22 Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Leiva-Perez, petitioner must, at a minimum, 23 demonstrate “a substantial case for relief on the merits” in order to establish grounds for the 24 granting of a stay. 640 F.3d at 968 (“Regardless of how one expresses the requirement, the idea 25 is that in order to justify a stay, a petitioner must show, at a minimum, that she has substantial 26 case for relief on the merits.”). To satisfy this standard, “a mere possibility of relief” is 27 insufficient, but the petitioner is not required to show that “ultimate success is probable.” Id. at 28 966–67. The petitioner may satisfy this standard by demonstrating that the appeal “raises serious 1 legal questions, or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success.” Id. at 971. As an 2 example, courts have found the burden is met when a petition implicates an area of law that is 3 evolving, because the petition then raises a “serious legal question.” Wei Lin v. Valinken, No. 4 1:19-cv-01806-EPG-HC, 2020 WL 1274133, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) (reasoning that the 5 Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari in a case implicating issues relevant to the order 6 sought to be stayed showed that the petitioner had raised a “serious legal question”). 7 In his motion to stay, petitioner argues that his case involves several complex questions of 8 law not previously addressed or settled by the Ninth Circuit, “all of which Mr. Blasko has raised 9 throughout these proceedings and intends to raise on appeal.” (Doc. No. 24 at 9.) Specifically, 10 petitioner raised two arguments in support of his petition that extradition should be denied. First, 11 petitioner argues that his “extradition is time-barred under Article V of the Extradition Treaty 12 Between the United States and Slovakia” because “the five-year Slovakian statute of limitations 13 for the execution of punishment ran on April 15, 2018.” (Id.) (citing Doc. No. 11 at 6–21). 14 Second, petitioner argues that “extradition is barred because the government has failed to present 15 sufficient competent evidence to establish probable cause that Mr. Blasko committed the charged 16 offenses.” (Id.) 17 In its opposition, the government argues that the court should deny petitioner’s motion to 18 stay this case because “he has failed to demonstrate that he is likely to obtain a reversal of this 19 Court’s decision in the Ninth Circuit.” (Doc. No. 25 at 5.) The government contends that 20 petitioner is not likely to succeed on appeal because the caselaw is clear and consistent “that a 21 U.S. court presiding over an extradition proceeding should rely upon the requesting country’s 22 interpretation of its own statute of limitations.” (Id. at 6) (citing Fejfar v. United States, 724 Fed. 23 Appx. 621, 622 (9th Cir. 2018)). Here, the district court in Slovakia determined that the 24 Slovakian statute of limitations was tolled. (17-mc-00067, Doc. No. 52-1 at 4.) The government 25 points out that although petitioner has attempted to distinguish cases “applying this long-settled 26 principle of law, this Court concluded [in its previous order] Blasko submitted no authority that 27 any of the distinctions he attempted to draw made any difference.” (Id.) The government lastly 28 asserts that petitioner is not likely to prevail on appeal with respect to his claim that “no 1 competent evidence supports the extradition court’s finding of probable cause.” (Id.) According 2 to the government, this court “thoroughly reviewed the factual record and found there was 3 competent evidence to support the conclusion that there was probable cause to believe the 4 petitioner was guilty.” (Id.) The government concludes that “[n]either the factual nor legal 5 conclusions of this court are likely to be disturbed on appeal.” (Id. at 7.) 6 In his reply, petitioner argues that the government has misapplied the law in encouraging 7 the court to require that he demonstrate a reversal is likely on appeal in order to support the 8 granting of a stay. (Doc. No. 26 at 2.) From that perspective, petitioner avers, “there would 9 never be any reason for any petitioner to ever appeal or to seek a stay.” (Id.) (citing Yoo v. United 10 States, 7:21-cv-06184-CS, 2021 WL 6100609, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021)). Petitioner 11 emphasizes, as he did in his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that “[t]he government 12 has not provided a single case where an extradition court permissibly relied wholesale on a 13 requesting country’s interpretation of its statute of limitations law in a case comparable to the one 14 before this Court.” (Id. at 3 n.2) (citing Doc. No. 8 at 8). Petitioner repeats that he has raised 15 “serious legal questions for appeal, at least one of which presents an issue that, under the facts of 16 this case, has never been specifically addressed by the Ninth Circuit.” (Id. at 3.) Given the 17 complex legal issues present in this case and the lack of authoritative case law pertaining to those 18 issues, petitioner urges the court to grant the requested stay because raising serious legal 19 questions satisfies the requirement with regard to a likelihood of success on the merits. (Id.) 20 (citing Gray v. Golden Gate Nat. Recreational Area, No. 3:08-cv-00722-EDL, 2011 WL 21 6934433, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011)). 22 As an initial matter, the court reaffirms its conclusions in the underlying order denying the 23 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As noted in that order, petitioner has simply failed to present 24 any legal support that would justify a departure from the longstanding principle that American 25 courts should “decline[] to rule on the procedural requirements of foreign law out of respect for 26 other nations’ sovereignty and because we recognize the chance of erroneous interpretation is 27 much greater when we try to construe the law of a country whose legal system is not based on 28 common law principles.” Sainez v. Venables, 588 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, 1 the court finds petitioner’s arguments as to its consideration of his showing of a likelihood of 2 success on the merits to be persuasive. Petitioner contends that “the precise issue here presents an 3 issue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit” due to the fact that the Ninth Circuit has never 4 addressed “whether it is permissible for a district court to rely on a requesting country’s judge’s 5 legal conclusion as to a matter of foreign law where the . . . requesting country’s judge’s legal 6 conclusion was reached without a hearing or argument from the individual involved.” (Doc. No. 7 24 at 10.) Although the undersigned cannot readily identify why such distinguishing facts would 8 undercut the Ninth Circuit’s prior holdings in this area, it is also true that “further development of 9 the law on these issues to guide courts in this circuit” would provide no identifiable harm to the 10 government, as explained further below. Martinez, 2014 WL 4446924, at *6. 11 Moreover, notwithstanding any deferential treatment to the Slovakian court, the 12 undersigned also recognized in denying Blasko’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus that as of 13 October 2, 2017––when the United States filed the formal extradition complaint against him–– 14 petitioner Blasko had clearly sojourned to the United States and was expressing an intent to avoid 15 that punishment by resisting extradition under the applicable treaty, as he was entitled to do under 16 the laws of the United States. (Doc. No. 16 at 8.) Therefore, since at least October 2, 2017, the 17 five-year statute of limitations has been tolled under Slovakian law and has not recommenced 18 running. Petitioner argues that there is no evidence before this court that he attempted to flee or 19 conceal his location, and the undersigned completely agrees with that statement. (Doc. No. 16 at 20 8.) Nevertheless, petitioner has presented no authority for the proposition that such actions on his 21 part were necessary in order to support a finding under the applicable treaty that he “sojourned 22 abroad with the intent to avoid punishment” given that “sojourn” is defined as to stay somewhere 23 as a temporary resident or to stay at one place while travelling or for a short period, which 24 petitioner incontrovertibly did. (Id.) As to this issue, the court cannot identify any unanswered 25 legal question or likelihood of success on the merits as to the conclusions reached by the court. 26 All of that said, and despite the court’s natural belief that it resolved these issues correctly, 27 because petitioner’s appeal raises issues that the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly considered and 28 upon which “there are non-frivolous grounds for disagreement,” consideration of this factor 1 weighs slightly in favor of the granting of a stay. Yoo, 2021 WL 6100609, at *1. Notably, other 2 district courts in this Circuit have concluded that a showing that “serious legal questions” have 3 been raised on appeal will satisfy the requirement of likelihood of success on the merits. See 4 Gray, 2011 WL 6934433, at *2; Hunt v. Check Recovery Systems, Inc., No. 4:05-cv-04993-SBA, 5 2008 WL 2468473, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2008); Pokorny v. Quixtar Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00201- 6 SC, 2008 WL 1787111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2008). 7 Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner Blasko has made a sufficient showing of his 8 likelihood of success on appeal to warrant the granting of a stay. 9 C. Substantial Injury to Other Parties and Whether a Stay is in the Public Interest 10 The third and fourth factors identified by the court in Nken (i.e., the effect of the stay on 11 the opposing party and the public interest) merge when the government is the party opposing the 12 stay. Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 970 (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 435); Luna, 2018 WL 2197555, at 13 *3 (“[T]he two remaining stay factors . . . merge into one ‘public interest’ factor because the 14 government is the party opposing Petitioner’s stay motion. . . .”)). 15 With regard to these factors, petitioner contends that the balance of hardships weighs in 16 his favor because absent a stay he will be removed from the United States, “where he has lived 17 with his wife and two young children since first arriving to the United States in February 2010, 18 over 12 years ago.” (Doc. No. 24 at 12.) Petitioner argues that, in contrast, any hardship to the 19 United States and Slovakia if a stay is granted is far less compelling because “[t]he significant 20 delay and lack of urgency evidenced by Slovakia in this matter undercuts any claim at this point 21 that [petitioner’s] immediate extradition is necessary notwithstanding Mr. Blasko’s appeal to the 22 Ninth Circuit.” (Id.) (citing various district court cases holding that long delays in seeking 23 extradition by the government counsel in favor of granting stays due to the demonstrated lack of 24 urgency). Moreover, petitioner argues that the public has an interest in allowing him to have a 25 full, fair opportunity to litigate his claims in opposing his extradition. (Id. at 13) (quoting 26 Noriega v. Pastrana, No. 1:07-cv-22816-PCH, 2008 WL 331394, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2008)). 27 According to petitioner, such an interest is heightened where his “extradition is being sought by a 28 country that does not observe comparable constitutional and procedural protections for the 1 accused.” (Id.) (citing Doc. No. 16 at 4 n.4–5). Lastly, petitioner points to his excellent behavior 2 and his contributions to the community while released on bail in connection with these extradition 3 proceedings. (Id. at 14.) He notes that he has maintained regular contact with the probation 4 officer who has been supervising his release on bail; that he and his wife own a home in Clovis 5 and have two young children; that he owns his own business that currently employs four 6 individuals; and that his company is “in the middle of constructing seven homes throughout 7 Fresno and Clovis.” 2 (Id.) Petitioner adds that since his release, he “has evidenced the utmost 8 respect for the procedural process and has repeatedly indicated that if his claims were to be 9 unsuccessful that he would surrender as required.” (Id.) 10 In opposition, the government argues that “the United States has a strong interest in 11 having extradition request[s] submitted by our treaty partners such as Slovakia resolved without 12 undue delay, both to comply with our treaty obligations and to further our reciprocal interest in 13 having other nations cooperate swiftly with our own extradition requests and other law 14 enforcement objectives.” (Doc. No. 25 at 8–9.) The government argues that there is always a 15 public interest in the prompt execution of surrender orders. (Id. at 9) (citing Artukovic, 556 U.S. 16 at 436). By contrast––according to the government––a stay that causes “unwarranted delay in the 17 United States’ fulfillment of its obligations to Slovakia” may harm its credibility in the 18 international arena and “impair its ability to obtain the cooperation of foreign nations in bringing 19 U.S. fugitives to justice.” (Id.) 20 In his reply in support of his motion, petitioner reiterates that both Slovakia and the 21 United States have proceeded with a marked lack of urgency in this extradition case. (Doc. No. 22 26 at 6.) Petitioner points out that he was not charged in Slovakia until three years after the 23 alleged incident, and that despite knowing his location within the United States, over the next 24 several years, petitioner was not notified by Slovakia that charges were being pursued against him 25 in that country. (Id.) Moreover, petitioner underscores that “[e]ven after an in absentia trial took 26 27 2 The undersigned has confirmed with the supervising probation officer petitioner’s full compliance with all of the conditions placed upon his release as well as his maintenance of open 28 and complete communication with the probation office. 1 place without Mr. Blasko’s knowledge or presence” on April 15, 2013, “Slovakia did not actually 2 seek his extradition until June 6, 2017, over four years after the in absentia trial, and nearly 10 3 years after the alleged incident.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). Thus, petitioner once more urges 4 the court to conclude that the balance of hardships and the general public interest weigh in favor 5 of granting his request for a stay of extradition. 6 The court again finds petitioner’s arguments as to this factor to be persuasive. For the 7 reasons already expressed above, petitioner has presented legal challenges to his extradition that 8 are worthy of review and consideration by the court of appeals. Furthermore, the undersigned 9 does not believe that staying its certification order to allow petitioner to seek appellate review will 10 substantially injure the other parties in this proceeding, especially given Slovakia’s demonstrated 11 lack of urgency in pursuing this matter. As petitioner has argued, the incident underlying this 12 extradition request occurred on July 13, 2007, but petitioner was not charged with the offense 13 until three years later on June 3, 2010. Then, his in absentia trial took place without petitioner’s 14 knowledge or presence three additional years later on April 15, 2013. It was not until June 6, 15 2017, that the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Washington, D.C. finally issued a formal 16 Diplomatic Note to the United States Department of State requesting Blasko’s international 17 extradition and providing the documentation required by the treaty between the two countries. 18 Although the court agrees with the United States that honoring its treaty obligations is 19 important, the court does not agree that permitting petitioner to seek appellate review of his legal 20 claims in this case interferes with the ability of the United States to comply with its treaty 21 obligations. As one district court concluded, “staying extradition to allow [petitioner] to seek 22 appellate review of his claims that the extradition is unlawful clearly is in the public interest.” 23 Martinez, 2014 WL 4446924, at *6; see also Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (“The authority to hold an 24 order in abeyance pending review allows an appellate court to act responsibly. A reviewing court 25 must bring considered judgment to bear on the matter before it, but that cannot always be done 26 quickly enough to afford relief to the party aggrieved by the order under review.”). The public 27 interest in prompt execution of extradition orders “is not so urgent that it should outweigh 28 [petitioner’s] interest in having a ‘full [and] fair opportunity to litigate his claim.’” Yoo, 2021 1 | WL 6100609, at *2 (quoting Noriega, 2008 WL 331394, at *3). Finally, the court highlights that 2 || to the extent any delay has occurred in this case, it has not been the result of delay on petitioner 3 | Blasko’s part. “Nor is his request to have his ‘serious questions’ reviewed by the court of appeals 4 || in any way an abuse of the legal process.” Martinez, 2014 WL 4446924, at *6. The delays in 5 || this case have been caused in large part by the government of Slovakia, as well as this court itself, 6 || which again apologizes for the extensive delay in the issuance of orders in this matter due to the 7 | long-standing and ongoing judicial emergency in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 8 | of California. (See Doc. No. 16 at 1, n.5.) 9 Accordingly, the court concludes that consideration of the third and fourth factors of the 10 || Nken test likewise weigh in favor of granting the requested stay. 11 CONCLUSION 12 For the reasons set forth above, petitioner’s motion for a stay of extradition pending his 13 | appeal of this court’s May 16, 2022 order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 14 || hereby granted. Petitioner Blasko shall remain released on bail pending appeal of the extradition 15 || order in this case with all of the terms and conditions set on August 6, 2018 and February 8, 2019 16 | continuing to govern in full force and effect. See Case No. 1:17-mc-00067-DAD-SAB, Doc. Nos. 17 | 45-49, 70-73, 76. 18 | IT IS SO ORDERED. me □ | Dated: _ August 31, 2022 Yele A Yad 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13