Raines v. Lehigh Hanson Services LLC ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WALTER L. RAINES, on behalf of No. 2:23-cv-01539-DJC-CKD himself and all others similarly 12 situated, 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 14 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION WITH LEAVE v. TO AMEND 15 LEHIGH HANSON SERVICES, LLC; 16 CALAVERAS MATERIALS, INC.; 17 MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff Walter L. Raines brings a putative class action against Defendants 22 Lehigh Hanson Services, LLC (“Lehigh”); Calaveras Materials, Inc. (“Calaveras”); Martin 23 Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin”); Heidelberg Cement Group (“Heidelberg”); and 24 Does 1 through 100, alleging various violations of California’s labor laws. Defendant 25 Martin moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violations of California’s 26 meal and rest break rules and to dismiss the Doe defendants from this case. For the 27 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Martin’s 28 Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 As alleged in the Complaint, each of the Defendants are related to each other, 4 either as employer-employee, principal-agent, parent-subsidiary, affiliates, or 5 otherwise in some joint enterprise. (See Pl.’s Compl. for Damages and 6 Restitution . . . (ECF No. 1-2 at 7–31) ¶ 12 [hereinafter Complaint or Compl.].) Plaintiff 7 worked for one of the Defendants from about July 2018 to June 30, 2022. (See 8 Martin’s Mem. of P. and A. in Supp. of Partial Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 7-1) 2 9 [hereinafter Motion or MTD]; Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendant Martin acquired Defendant 10 Lehigh’s California subsidiaries on or around October 1, 2021, after which Martin 11 became Plaintiff’s employer around May 2022. (See MTD 1.) While Defendants 12 employed Plaintiff, Plaintiff was subject to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) 13 between his employer and his union. (See Decl. of Aaron D. Boal in Supp. of Pl.’s 14 Opp’n to Martin’s MTD Ex. A (ECF No. 17-2) [hereinafter 2022 CBA or Boal Decl. Ex. A] 15 (providing a copy of Plaintiff’s CBA while employed with Martin); Not. of Errata to 16 Martin’s MTD Ex. A (ECF No. 15) [hereinafter 2020 CBA or MTD Ex. A] (providing a 17 copy of Plaintiff’s CBA while employed with Calaveras, Lehigh’s subsidiary).) 18 II. Procedural Background 19 Plaintiff filed the putative class action Complaint in San Joaquin County 20 Superior Court on June 5, 2023. (See Compl. 25.) Martin removed the matter to 21 federal court on July 27, 2023. (See MTD 2.) Martin filed the instant partial Motion to 22 Dismiss on August 24, 2023. (See ECF No. 24.) After the Court issued an Order to 23 Show Cause, Plaintiff filed his Opposition on September 14, 2023. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to 24 Martin’s MTD; Mem. of P. and A. (ECF No. 17) 17 [hereinafter Opposition or Opp’n].) 25 Martin filed its Reply on September 25, 2023. (See Martin’s Reply in Supp. of MTD 26 (ECF No. 19) [hereinafter Reply].) The Court took the matter under submission without 27 appearance and without oral argument. (See ECF No. 18.) The matter is fully briefed. 28 //// 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. The Motion to Dismiss 3 A. Legal Standard 4 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can 5 be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint 6 lacks a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a 7 cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th 8 Cir. 2019) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light 10 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 11 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 12 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to 13 an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 14 679 (2009). 15 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim 16 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed 17 factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule 18 demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the 19 claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or 20 formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 21 555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial 22 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 23 B. Analysis 24 1. The Third Cause of Action Does Not State a Valid Claim. 25 Martin asks that Plaintiff’s claims based on Wage Order 9 be dismissed as 26 inapplicable because Martin is not in the “transportation industry.” (See MTD 4–5.1) 27 1 The Court declines to take judicial notice of the SEC filings at this stage because Martin has failed to 28 attach the relevant filing or otherwise provide the Court the "necessary information." Fed. R. Evid. 1 Plaintiff agrees with Martin about the first request to dismiss claims related to Wage 2 Order 9 following a meet-and-confer on September 5, 2023. (See Opp’n 1 and n.1 3 (indicating that Plaintiff will file an amended complaint raising the same claim under 4 Wage Order 4); Boal Decl. (ECF No. 17-1) ¶¶ 3–4 (same).) Plaintiff also agrees that his 5 claim under the third cause of action for violations of California Labor Code 6 section 512 fails. (See Opp’n 1 and n.2; Reply 1.) As Martin indicated, without Wage 7 Order 9 and California Labor Code section 512 to allege violations of California’s 8 labor laws, Plaintiff’s third cause of action that also alleged violations of California 9 Labor Code section 226.7 must fail because section 226.7 is a derivative statute that 10 requires predicate violations to state a cause of action. (See MTD 6; Reply 1–3.) 11 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s third cause of action as alleged in the 12 Complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory and therefore should be dismissed. 13 Martin also asks that the Court go further and dismiss the future claims Plaintiff 14 intends to bring under Wage Order 4 and California Labor Code section 226.7. (See 15 Reply 2–7.) This is understandable given that Plaintiff already has stated his intent to 16 re-allege the third cause of action and to omit reference to California Labor Code 17 section 512 and instead rely on Wage Order 4. (See Opp’n 1 and nn.1–2.) However, 18 the Court declines to grant such relief at this stage because a court is limited to 19 granting relief based on the operative complaint before it. See, e.g., Falck N. Cal. 20 Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Sols., LLC, 25 F.4th 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2022) 21 (dismissing an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion to 22 dismiss the first amended complaint after the plaintiff filed their second amended 23 complaint before the appeal was filed). Moreover, given the procedural posture, the 24 Court believes it would be beneficial to give the parties the opportunity to brief these 25 issues in the context of an amended complaint. 26 //// 27 Plaintiff and Martin. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 28 Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998)). 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the third cause of action 2 with leave to amend. 3 2. The Doe Defendants Cannot Be Dismissed at this Stage. 4 Martin’s final request is to dismiss the Doe defendants from this case because 5 the Ninth Circuit disfavors their use. (See MTD 12–14.) Plaintiff counters, arguing that 6 Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that district courts must permit Doe defendants to 7 allow the plaintiff to use discovery to identify the Doe defendants, and that using Doe 8 defendants under California law is a substantive right that this Court must enforce. 9 (See Opp’n 11–13 (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642–43 (9th Cir. 1980); 10 Lindley v. Gen. Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 799–802 (9th Cir. 1986)).) 11 “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” 12 Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642 (citing Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 518 13 (9th Cir. 1968)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, that a plaintiff may use 14 Doe defendants “where the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to 15 the filing of a complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an 16 opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear 17 that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint should be 18 dismissed on other grounds.” Id. (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff using Doe 19 defendants must still “allege sufficient facts to state a claim to survive dismissal on the 20 pleadings.” Wilson v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 14-cv-04726-JCS, 2015 WL 136557, 21 at *11 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015) (citing Lopez v. Bank of Am., No. 1:11-cv-00485-LJO- 22 SMS, 2011 WL 1134671, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011)). 23 The Court finds that Plaintiff provides sufficient factual allegations regarding the 24 Doe defendants, by incorporating their actions with the other Defendants and parties, 25 to state a cause of action against the Doe defendants. Martin criticizes Plaintiff for only 26 making the conclusory statement that “each Doe Defendant was a person ‘acting on 27 behalf of’ the named Defendants ‘in the establishment of, or ratification of, the 28 aforementioned illegal wage and hour practices or policies’ . . . .” (Reply 7 (quoting 1 Compl. ¶¶ 6–10, 12).) However, Martin omits mentioning the end of paragraph 12 of 2 the Complaint, which states that “[a]s used in this Complaint, ‘Defendant’ means 3 ‘Defendants and each of them,’ and refers to the Defendant named in the particular 4 cause of action in which the word appears and includes Defendants LEHIGH HANSON 5 SERVICES, LLC; CALAVERAS MATERIALS, INC.; MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS, INC.; 6 HEIDELBERG CEMENT GROUP; and DOES 1 to 100, inclusive.” (Id. ¶ 12.) The 7 incorporation of the Doe Defendants into the allegations in the Complaint is sufficient 8 at this stage of the proceedings to state a claim. 9 As for any notice problems, it appears that the Complaint uses the Doe 10 defendants as a fill-in for the various employees and entities that supervised Plaintiff 11 and the putative class members that denied them their various meal and rest break 12 periods and other labor rights. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 18 (complaining that Defendants 13 “[r]equir[ed] Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to call in prior to the start shift to 14 determine whether or not they were scheduled to work that day[ ]”). Because the 15 Defendants in this case are all corporate or abstract entities, the Doe defendants 16 appear to be the individuals that implemented and executed these practices and 17 policies that allegedly violated California’s labor laws, and their inclusion is still proper 18 to pursue their true identities through discovery. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642–43. 19 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Martin’s motion to dismiss 20 the Doe defendants. 21 //// 22 //// 23 //// 24 //// 25 //// 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 3 | PART Defendant Martin Marietta Materials Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). 4 | Specifically, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action 5 | with leave to amend, and the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss the Doe defendants 6 | from this action. The Court also discharges the Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 16). 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: _ October 3, 2023 Bek | Cbabeatin.. Hon. Daniel labretta 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 | DJC3 - Raines23cv1539.MTD 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28