(PC) Borja v. Amador County ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC BORJA, No. 2:22-cv-01480-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 AMADOR COUNTY, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff, a former prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). Screening applies only to “claims brought by individuals incarcerated at the time 22 they file their complaints.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 23 2017). Here, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed his complaint. 24 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 25 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 26 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 27 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement 28 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means 1 that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 2 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 3 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the Plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 4 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege 5 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 6 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 7 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 8 and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 Plaintiff names Amador County as the sole defendant in this action. See ECF No. 12 1, pg. 1. Plaintiff alleges he was not afforded a “single opportunity for physical exercise” while 13 incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee at the Amador County Jail between July 21, 2021, and 14 September 21, 2021. See id., pg. 3. Plaintiff states that the facility’s exercise yard was closed 15 two years prior to and during his incarceration to house a “Covid tent.” Id. Plaintiff claims that 16 the county had “never once housed an inmate in the tent,” even during COVID-19 outbreaks at 17 the facility. Id. 18 During his incarceration, Plaintiff states there was not enough room to exercise in 19 his cell because it had “less than 20 square feet of usable floor space, which is shared by a cell 20 mate and 2 storage bins.” See ECF No. 1, pg. 3. Further, Plaintiff claims that the dayroom has 21 300 square feet of space and is not suitable for exercise because most of the space is occupied by 22 tables, bunkbeds, and shower stalls, as well as inmates sleeping on the floor due to overcrowding. 23 Id. Plaintiff alleges that there is no other place to exercise within the facility, and the county 24 made no effort to find an alternative area for physical exercise. Id., pg. 4. 25 Plaintiff also alleges that his attempt to obtain administrative relief was 26 unsuccessful because exercise was suspended due to COVID-19 and grievances were not allowed 27 for COVID related issues. See ECF No. 1, pg. 4. 28 / / / 1 Plaintiff claims that prior to his incarceration he suffered a knee injury. As a 2 result, Plaintiff alleges that “not being able to walk more than a few steps unimpeded” caused his 3 knee to “stiffen badly and not heal properly,” causing pain, depression, and anxiety both during 4 and after his incarceration. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 3-4. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the 5 amount of $1,000,000.00. See id., pg. 7. 6 7 II. DISCUSSION 8 A. Amador County Liability 9 Plaintiff names Amador County as the sole defendant. See ECF No. 1, pg. 1. 10 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 11 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and 12 municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also 13 Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government 14 unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a 15 respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 16 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the 17 actions of its employees or officers. See id. 18 To assert municipal liability, the Plaintiff must allege that the constitutional 19 deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id. Official 20 policy includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking 21 officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 22 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Generally, a claim against a local government 23 unit for municipal or county liability requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy, custom, or 24 practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . . suffered.” Galen v. 25 County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 26 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth,” Plaintiff must establish an 27 affirmative causal link between the municipal policy or practice and the alleged constitutional 28 violation. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011); see Canton, 489 U.S. at 385, 391- 1 92; Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 2 1470, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 1992)). 3 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating the existence of an official policy, 4 custom, or practice on the part of Defendant Amador County which resulted in denial of a 5 constitutional right. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend to cure this defect. 6 B. Access to Courts 7 To the extent that the Plaintiff is asserting a claim relating to his inability to submit 8 grievances, prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative 9 grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. 10 Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest entitling 11 inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is no right to any particular grievance 12 process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by ignoring or failing to properly 13 process grievances. Numerous district courts in this circuit have reached the same conclusion. 14 See Smith v. Calderon, 1999 WL 1051947 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that failure to properly 15 process grievances did not violate any constitutional right); Cage v. Cambra, 1996 WL 506863 16 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (concluding that prison officials’ failure to properly process and address 17 grievances does not support constitutional claim); James v. U.S. Marshal’s Service, 1995 WL 18 29580 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing complaint without leave to amend because failure to process 19 a grievance did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Murray v. Marshall, 1994 WL 245967 20 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that prisoner’s claim that grievance process failed to function 21 properly failed to state a claim under § 1983). Prisoners do, however, retain a First Amendment 22 right to petition the government through the prison grievance process. See Bradley v. Hall, 64 23 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, interference with the grievance process may, in 24 certain circumstances, implicate the First Amendment. 25 Plaintiff alleges that he “attempted to obtain grievances for not being able to 26 exercise but was denied because exercise was suspended due to the Covid-19 tent, and grievances 27 were not allowed for Covid related issues.” See ECF No. 1, pgs. 3-4. On the face of the 28 complaint, Plaintiff has alleged that there is no available grievance process concerning the 1 availability of exercise. If true, such a policy could thwart an inmate’s ability to exhaust claims 2 and access the courts. Given that the Amador County Jail is under the jurisdiction of Amador 3 County, the Court finds that this contention is sufficient to meet the requirement that Plaintiff 4 allege a custom or policy of the municipality to state a claim. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff 5 possibly states a claim against Amador County based on interference with the grievance process, 6 which can constitute a violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights of access to the courts. See 7 Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In this regard, however, Plaintiff has not 8 alleged an actual injury, which is a jurisdictional requirement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 9 349 (1996). Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. 10 C. Meaningful Opportunity to Exercise 11 Exercise has been recognized as “one of the basic human necessities protected by 12 the Eighth Amendment” and the same is true under the Fourteenth Amendment. Norbert v. City 13 and Cnty. of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 928 (citing May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th 14 Cir. 1997)). “Deprivation of outdoor exercise violates the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates 15 confined to continuous and long-term segregation.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 16 1996) (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 17 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Richardson 18 v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 19 2005); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 20 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1995); Allen v. City of Honolulu, 39 F.3d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1994); 21 LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457-58 (9th Cir. 1993); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 22 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984). “[A] temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not 23 a substantial deprivation.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Noble v. 24 Adams, 636 F.3d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding prison officials were entitled to qualified 25 immunity from § 1983 claim that post-riot lockdown of prison resulted in denial of Eighth 26 Amendment right to exercise); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) 27 (recognizing that temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial 28 deprivation); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the Constitution requires jail officials to provide 2 outdoor recreation opportunities, or otherwise meaningful recreation, to prison inmates.” Norbert 3 v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 10 F.4th 918, 929 (citing Shorter v. Baca, 895 F.3d 1176, 4 1185 (9th Cir. 2018)). Therefore, to “vindicate a constitutional right to exercise, outdoor exercise 5 can indeed be required, when ‘otherwise meaningful recreation’ is not available.” Norbert, 10 6 F.4th 918 at 929. 7 Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he is unable to exercise in the outside yard 8 due to a COVID-19 tent. See ECF No. 1, pg. 3. Plaintiff also alleges he is unable to exercise in 9 his cell, or in the dayroom due to space constraints and overcrowding. See id., pg. 3. Plaintiff 10 further contends there is no other alternative place to exercise within the facility. See id., pg. 4. 11 The Court must assume the allegations in the complaint are true. In doing so, the current 12 allegations are sufficient to state a possible claim for the denial of meaningful exercise 13 opportunities at the Amador County Jail. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s complaint 14 does not contain sufficient allegations regarding an official municipal policy or custom pertaining 15 to the meaningful opportunity to exercise. In his complaint, Plaintiff states that there was a 16 “custom or policy” of closing the exercise yard for two years due to the COVID-19 tent. See 17 ECF No. 1, pg. 4. Plaintiff makes only general and conclusory allegations regarding municipal 18 policies, customs, or practices pertaining to inmate exercise, which cannot support a municipal 19 liability claim. 20 Plaintiff must plead with specificity how: (1) Plaintiff’s constitutional deprivation 21 resulted from a particular policy, custom, or practice of the local government (2) that policy was 22 based on the actual decisions and acts of its policymakers, and (3) those practices are persistent 23 and widespread. Alternatively, Plaintiff must show that the municipality was deliberately 24 indifferent as to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights due to either actual or constructive notice that its 25 omissions would likely result in unlawful conduct. Plaintiff must allege more than just broad 26 elements of a claim for relief; such allegations must be supported by facts. At this time, 27 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim of municipal liability against Amador County. Plaintiff 28 will be provided an opportunity to amend. 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 | Dated: June 6, 2023 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28