(HC) Valdez Mendez v. Warden ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 LUIS MIGUEL VALDEZ MENDEZ, Case No. 1:22-cv-01416-EPG-HC 9 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS MOOT, 10 v. DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT, DENYING 11 WARDEN, FCI MENDOTA, PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AS 12 Respondents. MOOT, AND DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO CLOSE CASE 13 14 Petitioner Luis Miguel Valdez Mendez is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a 15 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to 16 the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 5, 9, 10.) For the reasons stated 17 herein, the Court dismisses as moot the petition Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and Petitioner’s 18 motion for temporary restraining order. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 In the petition, Petitioner challenges a Federal Bureau of Prisons’ policy of refusing to 22 allow prisoners with immigration detainers to earn and apply First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits 23 (“FTCs”). (ECF No. 1.) On January 13, 2023, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, 24 arguing that “this Court should dismiss the petition for lack of Article III standing and ripeness, 25 and statutorily for lack of jurisdiction under § 2241.” (ECF No. 8 at 1.)1 26 On February 23, 2023, Petitioner requested the Court to send him a copy of the 27 government’s response because he had not received any response due to issues with the 1 institutional mail system. (ECF No. 11.) On March 13, 2023, Petitioner filed a motion for 2 temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 12.) On March 15, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner 3 twenty-one days to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion to dismiss. 4 (ECF No. 14.) To date, Petitioner has not filed an opposition or statement of non-opposition. Per 5 the Court’s order, (ECF No. 16), Respondent filed a supplemental brief regarding mootness and 6 a response to Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, (ECF No. 18). 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. Mootness 10 The Court has “an independent duty to consider sua sponte whether a case is moot.” 11 Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 12 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999)). The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to “actual, ongoing cases 13 or controversies.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). “This case-or- 14 controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings,” which 15 “means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an 16 actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 17 decision.’” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). “When 18 subsequent events resolve the dispute, such that no live issues remain or the parties lack a legally 19 cognizable interest in the outcome, a case becomes moot.” Cuviello v. City of Vallejo, 944 F.3d 20 816, 824 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “A case that becomes moot at any point during the 21 proceedings is ‘no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III,’ and is outside 22 the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 23 (2018) (citation omitted). 24 The apparent Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) policy challenged in the petition provides in 25 pertinent part that “[w]hile inmates with unresolved pending charges and/or detainers may earn 26 FTCs, if otherwise eligible, they will be unable to apply them to prerelease custody or release to 27 supervision unless the charges and/or detainers are resolved. An inmate with an unresolved 1 application of FTCs.” (Hubbard Decl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 8-1 at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) 2 (quoting Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5410.01, First Step Act of 2018 – Time Credits: 3 Procedures for Implementation of 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), at 13)). On February 6, 2023, the BOP 4 issued Change Notice 5410.01 CN-1, which struck the language quoted above from Program 5 Statement 5410.01. Bureau of Prisons, Change Notice No. 541001 CN-1 (Feb. 6, 2023), 6 https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5410.01_cn2.pdf (last visited June 7, 2023).2 “As a result of 7 Change Notice 5410.01, federal prisoners subject to immigration detainers are no longer 8 automatically prohibited from applying their earned time credits.” Alatorre v. Derr, No. CV 22- 9 00516 JMS-WRP, 2023 WL 2599546, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 22, 2023). This change in policy is 10 recognized in Respondent’s supplemental brief, (ECF No. 18 at 4), and also reflected in 11 Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, in which Petitioner acknowledges that “the 12 BOP has changed its policy concerning inmates being able to apply their First Step Act earned 13 time credits (BOP Program Statement 5410.01),” (ECF No. 12 at 4). Based on the foregoing, the 14 Court finds that the petition is moot given that the policy challenged in the petition is no longer 15 in place.3 16 B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 17 In the motion for temporary restraining order, Petitioner asserts that although the BOP 18 has changed its policy regarding inmates with immigration detainers being able to apply their 19 FTCs, “the BOP still is preventing [Petitioner] from applying [his] earned time credit via another 20 similar scheme,” alleging that his PATTERN score has been improperly increased to medium 21 and prevents him from applying his FTCs. (ECF No. 12 at 4–5.) Petitioner requests the Court to 22 order Respondent “to immediately apply all of the earned time credits which [Petitioner] is 23 entitled to under Section 101 of the First Step Act of 2018 and release him to supervision or 24 prerelease custody as required under 18 U.S.C. 3632(d)(4)(C).” (Id. at 1.) 25 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the BOP program statement and 26 change notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201. See United States v. Thornton, 511 F.3d 1221, 1229 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of BOP program statement); United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) 27 (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record[.]”). 3 Petitioner has not opposed the motion to dismiss and does not argue that any exception to the mootness doctrine is een ee EE II IIIS IE IIE IRIE III 1 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’”* Winter 2 | v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a 3 | preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 4 | suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 5 | favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. “A district court may not grant a 6 | preliminary injunction if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim before it.” Shell 7 | Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 839, 842 (D. Alaska 2012), aff'd, 709 F.3d 8 | 1281 (th Cir. 2013). Additionally, “[wJhen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on claims not 9 | pled in the complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.” Pac. 10 | Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015). The issues 11 | raised in the motion for temporary restraining order were not pled in the petition, and as set forth 12 | in section II(A), supra, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Accordingly, the motion 13 | for temporary restraining order shall be denied as moot.> 14 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 15 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED as MOOT; 16 2. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is DENIED as MOOT; 17 3. Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 12) is DENIED as MOOT; 18 and 19 4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE the case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22| Dated: _ June 7, 2023 [spe ey 3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 | 4“The standard for a [temporary restraining order] is the same as for a preliminary injunction.” Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Stuhlbarg Int’1 Sales Co. v. John D. 27 conlision does wot preclude petitioner from raising any challenge with respect to his PATTERN score in a 2g ro vtwal remuireme Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of such claims or whether the jurisdictional and