Stampfli v. Susanville Sanitary District ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 DEBORAH STAMPFLI, an individual, No. 2:20-cv-01566 WBS DMC 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 15 DEFENDANT STEVE J. STUMP’S SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 political subdivision of the State of California; STEVE J. 17 STUMP, in his individual and official capacities; JOHN 18 MURRAY, in his individual and official capacities; ERNIE 19 PETERS, in his individual and official capacities; DAVID 20 FRENCH, in his individual and official capacities; KIM ERB, in 21 his individual and official capacities; MARTY HEATH, in his 22 individual and official capacities; DOES I-V, inclusive; 23 BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V; and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES, 24 inclusive, 25 Defendants. 26 27 ----oo0oo---- 28 Plaintiff Deborah Stampfli brought this action 1 containing numerous claims against the Susanville Sanitary 2 District (“District”), Steve J. Stump, John Murray, Ernie Peters, 3 David French, Kim Erb, Marty Heath, Black & White Corporations I- 4 V, Able and Baker Companies, and Does 1-5 inclusive. 5 The court previously issued three orders on separate 6 motions to dismiss, dismissing most of plaintiff’s claims. (See 7 Docket Nos. 34, 48, 66.) All that remains are plaintiff’s fifth 8 claim, alleging deprivation of procedural due process under the 9 Fourteenth Amendment by Steve J. Stump, and seventh claim, 10 alleging failure to produce public records by the District, from 11 the Third Amended Complaint. (See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 333-34, 12 365-68; Order on Mot. to Dismiss Third. Am. Compl. (Docket No. 13 66) at 18-19.) Defendant Steve J. Stump now moves for summary 14 judgment on plaintiff’s fifth claim on the sole ground of 15 qualified immunity. (Def. Steve J. Stump’s Mot. for Summ. J. 16 (“Mot.”) (Docket No. 72).) Plaintiff opposes the motion and 17 cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that 18 plaintiff was not an at-will employee. (Pl.’s Suppl. Opp’n 19 (Docket No. 102).)1 20 I. Facts 21 The District hired plaintiff as Treasurer in 2005. 22 (Decl. of Susan Stampfli (“Stampfli Decl.”) (Docket No. 81-3) ¶ 23 18.) At the time of her hiring, plaintiff became a member of 24 Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3. (Id. ¶ 18.) Agreements 25 between the union and the District established a number of 26 27 1 Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff complied with the timing requirements for filing a cross-motion under the 28 Local Rules. See L.R. 230(e). 1 protections for union members, including the right to continued 2 employment and termination only for good cause and after the 3 satisfaction of procedural requirements. (Decl. of Art Frolli 4 (Docket No. 102-7) ¶¶ 2-3.) From 2005 to 2013, plaintiff 5 performed her assigned duties and a host of additional duties 6 typically performed by supervisory personnel, and consistently 7 received high performance evaluations. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 19; 8 Decl. of Randy O’Hern (“O’Hern Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-4) ¶ 5.) 9 By October 2013, plaintiff was performing many 10 management and administrative functions but, because she was a 11 union member, she could not participate in confidential meetings 12 of the District’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). (Stampfli 13 Decl. ¶ 19.) Her inability to participate in these meetings was 14 inconvenient because the Board frequently had to stop meetings or 15 delay them to obtain information possessed only by plaintiff. 16 (Id.) Because of these difficulties, the Board proposed the 17 creation of a new management level position, entitled “Office 18 Administrator,” which would allow plaintiff to participate in 19 confidential board meetings but would require her to relinquish 20 her union membership. (Id. ¶ 21.) 21 When plaintiff was offered this new position, she 22 declined it because she did not wish to lose the job security 23 offered by her union affiliation. (Id. ¶ 22.) In response to 24 her concerns, plaintiff was advised by the General Manager and 25 the District’s General Counsel that although she could not remain 26 a union member, plaintiff would not become an at-will employee 27 and would be afforded all the job security rights and benefits 28 1 available to union members. (Id. ¶ 24; Decl. of Jaimee Jones 2 (“Jones Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-2) ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was promised 3 that her employment with the District would only be terminated 4 for cause and in accordance with established Skelly procedures.2 5 (See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 24; Jones Decl. ¶ 6.) Based on these 6 representations, plaintiff relinquished her position as Treasurer 7 and accepted the new position of Office Administrator. (Stampfli 8 Decl. ¶ 25.) 9 During 2017, plaintiff performed many duties typically 10 performed by the General Manager, a position held at that time by 11 Randy O’Hern. (Id. ¶ 30.) In October 2017, General Manager 12 O’Hern recommended to the Board that plaintiff be provided a 20% 13 salary increase to account for the additional duties she 14 performed and that she receive the additional title of Assistant 15 General Manager. (Id. ¶ 34; O’Hern Decl. ¶ 14.) O’Hern 16 presented his proposal for the title change and salary increase 17 to the Board at a board meeting on October 10, 2017. (O’Hern 18 Decl. ¶ 17.) During the meeting, O’Hern described plaintiff as 19 an “at-will” employee and explained that in the new proposed 20 position, she would “serve at the pleasure of the Board and the 21 new hire.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The official meeting minutes, which were 22 signed by plaintiff, memorialize O’Hern’s comment that plaintiff 23 was “at will.” (Minutes of Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd. 24 25 2 “Skelly procedures” refers to the case Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975). In Skelly, the California 26 Supreme Court held that an employer cannot take away a permanent 27 public employee’s property rights (i.e., their vested right to continued employment) without certain procedural safeguards. See 28 id. at 215. 1 of Directors, Oct. 10, 2017 (“Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes”) (Docket No. 2 81-6) at 139-2-483.) Following a discussion of the proposal, 3 the Board approved a motion to “change [plaintiff’s] title to 4 include Assistant General Manager with a 20% salary increase 5 effective October 1, 2017.” (Id. at 140-1-117.) 6 Plaintiff knew that there might come a time when the 7 new General Manager no longer needed her assistance in performing 8 the duties and functions of General Manager, and states that she 9 was led to believe that if this change occurred, she would be 10 relieved of any additional Assistant General Manager duties, but 11 would continue to perform all the functions she previously 12 performed as Office Administrator. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 39.) 13 Plaintiff states that she was never told that her position as 14 Office Administrator had been converted to a position terminable 15 at will or that she could summarily be deprived of her permanent 16 position as Office Administrator. (Id.) 17 In March 2018, the District hired defendant Steve Stump 18 to the position of probationary General Manager. (Decl. of Steve 19 Stump (“Stump Decl.”) (Docket No. 72-2) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contends 20 that following the completion of defendant Stump’s probationary 21 period, he became increasingly hesitant to work in conjunction 22 with her. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 46.) 23 In April 2019, defendant Stump wanted plaintiff to 24 shift funds from various accounts to allow for the purchase of a 25 portable generator. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) Given plaintiff’s 26 instructions from several board members regarding the financial 27 affairs of the District, she requested that defendant Stump delay 28 1 this purchase until after a new budget for 2020 was created or 2 seek approval from the Board for the purchase. (Id. ¶ 50.) On 3 or about January 8, 2020, defendant Stump directed plaintiff to 4 have financial computer programs placed on his office computer. 5 (Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff told defendant Stump that she wished to 6 meet with certain board members to determine whether it was 7 necessary for the programs to be placed on his computer. (Id. ¶¶ 8 55-56.) 9 On January 9, 2020, defendant Stump placed plaintiff on 10 unpaid administrative leave. (Stump Decl. ¶ 5.) On January 13, 11 2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a text message offering to 12 allow plaintiff to return to work if she promised not to be 13 insubordinate to him. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff did not respond to 14 the text message. (Id.) On January 14, 2020, defendant Stump 15 informed plaintiff that her administrative leave would be paid, 16 but not the reason she was placed on leave. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 17 59.) On March 6, 2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a letter 18 releasing her from her “at-will” employment as Office 19 Administrator/Assistant General Manager. (Stump Decl ¶ 12.) 20 Plaintiff was never afforded an appeal process or other 21 procedural safeguards. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 60-62; Stump Decl. 22 ¶¶ 12-13.) 23 II. Legal Standard 24 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 25 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 26 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 27 P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment either for one 28 1 or more claims or defenses, or for portions thereof. Id. Where 2 a court grants summary judgment only as to a portion of a claim 3 or defense, it “may enter an order stating any material fact . . 4 . that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as 5 established in the case.” Id. at 56(g). 6 III. Discussion 7 Defendant moves for summary judgment solely on the 8 basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff 9 argues that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity and 10 cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that she 11 was not an at-will employee. The court will first address 12 plaintiff’s cross-motion. 13 A. Plaintiff’s Employment Status 14 Under multiple employment policies promulgated by the 15 District, plaintiff was dismissible only for cause and in 16 accordance with Skelly procedures. (See Resol. 4.06 (Docket No. 17 81-11) at Ex. A, § 1; Ordinance No. 17 (Docket No. 81-9) § 8; 18 Admin. Policies Manual (Docket No. 81-13) at 26.3) Additionally, 19 according to O’Hern and then-General Counsel Jaimee Jones, the 20 District promised plaintiff that she would continue to receive 21 the rights afforded to union members (including for-cause and 22 procedural due process protections) despite plaintiff forfeiting 23 her union membership when she received the Office Administrator 24 25 3 The Administrative Policies Manual establishes Skelly rights for “permanent” employees, i.e., employees who had 26 completed their probationary period. See Admin. Policies Manual 27 at 6, 26. Plaintiff, as an employee of the District for over fourteen years, was clearly a permanent employee, which defendant 28 does not seem to dispute. 1 position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶ 9; Jones Decl. ¶ 6; Minutes of 2 Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd. of Dirs., Oct. 8, 2013 3 (Docket No. 102-18) at 114-1-368 to 114-1-383.) By virtue of 4 these rights, plaintiff was not an at-will employee. See Guz v. 5 Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 335 (2000) (citing Cal. Lab. 6 Code § 2922).4 7 Defendant argues that the Board’s actions at the 8 October 10, 2017 meeting implicitly repealed all of these 9 existing protections. However, the relevant District policies 10 were not even mentioned at the October 10, 2017 meeting, and 11 there was no discussion of plaintiff’s employment status and 12 protections beyond O’Hern’s comments. (See generally Pl.’s Ex. 13 4, Partial Tr. of Oct. 10, 2017 Board Meeting (Docket No. 81-4); 14 Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes.) Importantly, the motion approved by the 15 Board made no mention of plaintiff’s employment type, only the 16 title change and compensation increase. (See Oct. 10, 2017 17 Minutes at 140-1-117.) 18 A cursory remark by O’Hern--who was a manager and not a 19 member of the Board--that plaintiff was “at-will” did not serve 20 to repeal the procedural protections established by the 21 District’s ordinances, policies, and explicit promises to 22 plaintiff. See McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 23 388 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding, in light of the “City Council’s 24 stated purpose of protecting City employees from dismissal 25 26 4 Defendant testified that he understood plaintiff to not 27 be an at-will employee prior to the October 10, 2017 board meeting. (See Dep. of Steve Stump (“Stump Dep.”) (Docket No. 28 102-12) at 254.) 1 without ‘just cause,’” that City Council did not terminate 2 employee’s “permanent” status “sub silentio upon promotion, once 3 again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of . . . ‘at- 4 will’ employment status”); City & County of San Francisco v. All 5 Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C, 51 Cal. App. 5th 6 703, 715 (1st Dist. 2020) (quoting Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. 7 State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 249, 279 (1991)) 8 (because “‘the law shuns repeals by implication,’” there was no 9 implied repeal by subsequent legislative action that did “‘not 10 even mention’” the earlier legislative action). 11 Defendant relies on Iscoff v. Police Commission of City 12 & County of San Francisco, which held that “where a subsequent 13 ordinance is so conflicting with and repugnant to an earlier one 14 that the two cannot stand together, the later enactment is 15 controlling and the earlier one is repealed by implication.” 222 16 Cal. App. 2d 395, 409 (1st Dist. 1963). This case is not on 17 point for two reasons. First, O’Hern’s comments cannot be 18 equated with a binding action of the Board. Second, even if 19 O’Hern’s comments had legal effect, taken in context they are not 20 wholly inconsistent with plaintiff’s pre-existing employment 21 protections. O’Hern intended the “at-will” and “at the pleasure 22 of” descriptions to apply to the title change and salary 23 increase, which would only be in effect so long as the Board felt 24 it necessary, at which time plaintiff would revert to her 25 previous position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶¶ 17-20; see also Oct. 10, 26 2017 Minutes at 140-1-055 (indicating that plaintiff could revert 27 to former position once the new General Manager was capable of 28 1 performing all duties).)5 2 The court therefore concludes that there is no genuine 3 dispute of material fact as to plaintiff’s employment status and 4 grants plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, 5 establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee and had 6 for-cause and procedural protections according to the District’s 7 policies and the terms of her employment. 8 B. Qualified Immunity 9 The court next turns to the question of whether 10 defendant Stump is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified 11 immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a 12 clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 13 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 14 In determining whether a state official is entitled to 15 qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court first 16 determines “whether the evidence viewed in the light most 17 favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a 18 constitutional right.” Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 19 657, 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 The court then determines “whether the right was 21 clearly established such that a reasonable official would [have] 22 known that he was engaging in unlawful conduct.” Levine v. City 23 of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Pearson, 24 25 5 Defendant also cites Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 811 (1954), for the proposition that “the power to enact 26 ordinances implies power, unless otherwise provided in the grant, 27 to repeal them.” The relevance of this case is unclear, as the Board’s general ability to repeal prior ordinances is not in 28 question here. 1 555 U.S. at 244. If the right was clearly established, the court 2 evaluates whether a reasonable person in the position of the 3 defendant would know that the conduct at issue violated that 4 right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on 5 other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906. 6 Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated her right to 7 procedural due process. “The requirements of procedural due 8 process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by 9 the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 10 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The existence 11 of a property interest is determined by sources independent of 12 the Constitution, for instance state law or the terms of an 13 individual’s employment. See id. at 578; Dorr v. Butte County, 14 795 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Under California law, a 15 permanent public employee “dismissible only for cause” possesses 16 a “‘property interest in his continued employment which is 17 protected by due process.’” Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876 (quoting 18 Skelly, 15 Cal. 3d at 207–08). As explained above, plaintiff was 19 a permanent public employee dismissible only for cause. 20 Accordingly, plaintiff held a constitutionally protected property 21 interest in her continued public employment and was entitled to 22 procedural due process. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795 23 F.2d at 876. 24 Plaintiff was summarily terminated without any 25 opportunity to be heard, which defendant does not dispute. (See 26 Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 61-62; Mot. at 7-12; Stump Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.) 27 The court thus concludes that there is sufficient evidence to 28 1 establish that plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were 2 violated. See Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1139 3 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 4 (1976)) (“‘some form of hearing is required before an individual 5 is finally deprived of a property interest’”). 6 The court next considers whether the procedural due 7 process right at issue was clearly established. A right is 8 clearly established for purposes of determining qualified 9 immunity if the “contours of the right were sufficiently clear 10 that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 11 violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. In determining 12 whether the right at issue was clearly established, the court may 13 not “define clearly established law at a high level of 14 generality.” See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). 15 Rather, “the clearly established law must be particularized to 16 the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 As this court previously found (see Docket No. 48 at 19 11), the right to procedural protections for permanent public 20 employees who are dismissible only for cause according to the 21 terms of their employment is well-established under federal law. 22 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876; Skelly, 15 Cal. 23 3d at 207–08. This formulation of the right at issue is 24 appropriately tailored to the facts here. Cf. Flores v. Von 25 Kleist, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Burrell, J.) 26 (defining the relevant right for purposes of “clearly 27 established” analysis as whether “due process protections are 28 1 implicated where the plaintiff has a legitimate expectation of 2 continued employment stemming from a mutually explicit 3 understanding”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6 4 The outcome here thus turns on whether a reasonable 5 official in defendant’s position could have “reasonably believed” 6 that his conduct did not violate a clearly established 7 constitutional right. See Levine, 525 F.3d at 906; see also 8 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199. If so, defendant will be entitled to 9 qualified immunity. See id. 10 Defendant’s counsel argues that defendant “considered 11 what legal effect prior resolutions, practices, or policy manuals 12 of the District might have” on plaintiff’s employment status. 13 (Mot. at 12.) However, defendant himself testified otherwise, 14 explaining that once he learned that plaintiff was referred to as 15 an “at-will employee” during the October 10, 2017 meeting, 16 defendant concluded that he could terminate plaintiff without 17 cause or procedural protections. (See Stump Dep. at 94, 102, 18 131, 266.) In coming to this conclusion, defendant did not 19 consider the effect of any sources other than the October 10, 20 21 6 Defendant proposes that the court define the issue as 22 whether “a public employee who was told that they are ‘at will’ and serve at the ‘pleasure of’ the appointing authority during 23 the creation of their management-level position possess [sic] a constitutionally protected interest in their continued 24 employment.” (See Def.’s Reply (Docket No. 107) at 20.) This formulation is too factually granular. See Bonivert v. City of 25 Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (officials may “still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 26 even in novel factual circumstances”). Further, this formulation 27 is inappropriately skewed in favor of defendant, as it misconstrues the facts and fails to account for the litany of 28 evidence establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee. 1 2017 meeting. (See id.) 2 Defendant’s assertion that he reasonably believed his 3 conduct was lawful is thus entirely based on O’Hern’s comments at 4 the board meeting. Defendant’s alleged conclusion about 5 plaintiff’s employment status was not reasonable given the 6 circumstances here. For instance, defendant was aware that 7 plaintiff’s title and salary change were only a temporary “stop 8 gap measure.” (See Stump Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant was also aware 9 that the District’s at-will employees, including plaintiff, could 10 retain some of the rights laid out in the union contract. (See 11 Stump Dep. at 285.) A reasonable official in defendant’s 12 position would not have drawn conclusions about plaintiff’s 13 employment status based solely on offhand comments made by a 14 manager--not a member of the Board--during a presentation. 15 Rather, a reasonable official would have investigated plaintiff’s 16 employment status and based his decision upon the available 17 information. Had defendant properly investigated the issue, he 18 would have considered the applicable ordinances and information 19 concerning the promises made to plaintiff, which establish that 20 plaintiff was not an at-will employee. 21 Defendant’s failure to properly investigate is 22 especially glaring given that both the District and defendant had 23 retained legal counsel in response to the litigation risk 24 occasioned by defendant’s actions in placing plaintiff on leave. 25 (See Minutes of Adjourned Special Board Meeting, Jan. 17, 2020 26 (Docket No. 102-25 at 2-3) ¶ 9; Minutes of Adjourned Special 27 Board Meeting, Feb. 5, 2020 (Docket No. 102-25 at 4-5) ¶ 5.) 28 1 Defendant participated in multiple board meetings where both the 2 District’s counsel and his counsel discussed that litigation 3 risk. (See id.; Stump Dep. at 258-59.) Despite all this, 4 defendant failed to inquire about the legality of his intended 5 conduct with either the District’s lawyer or his own lawyer, 6 instead basing his conclusions entirely on a few words in the 7 October 10, 2017 board meeting minutes. (See Stump Dep. at 102- 8 03, 107-09.) 9 In Levine, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 10 defendant supervisor had qualified immunity based on a reasonable 11 but mistaken belief that he was acting lawfully in terminating 12 the plaintiff, a public employee, without a pretermination 13 hearing. 525 F.3d at 906-07. This belief was reasonable because 14 the supervisor instructed his agent to ensure that the 15 plaintiff’s due process rights were respected, and because the 16 plaintiff’s union contract stated that he was not entitled to a 17 pretermination hearing. Id. at 907. 18 Unlike the supervisor in Levine, it does not appear 19 that defendant was endeavoring to respect plaintiff’s rights; on 20 the contrary, it seems that rather than attempting to truly 21 discern plaintiff’s employment status and protections, defendant 22 was searching for any basis to support his desire to oust 23 plaintiff. In defendant’s words, once he saw the term “at-will” 24 in the meeting minutes, that was “all [he] needed”--he “[could 25 not] get any better luck than that.” (Stump Dep. at 94, 121.) 26 Further, unlike the union contract in Levine, a 27 manager’s comments during a meeting cannot be reasonably 28 ee nnn ee en en nn nn nn nn nnn EI EO considered to have binding legal effect. And in contrast to the instant case, there was no indication in Levine that investigation of the plaintiff’s employment rights would have yielded evidence clearly showing that the plaintiff had the right ° to a pretermination hearing. See 525 F.3d at 907. ° Because there is sufficient evidence to establish a constitutional violation and a reasonable official in defendant’s position would have known he was violating a clearly established ° right, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See 10 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 671; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Steve J. Stump’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 72) be, and hereby is, 13 DENIED. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 102) be, and hereby is, GRANTED, establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee and had for-cause and procedural protections according to the District’s policies and the terms of her employment. Dated: February 23, 2023 dete ak 4) 4 20 WILLIAMB.SHUBB © | 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16