(PS) McGee v. State of CA ( 2024 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFERSON A. McGEE, No. 2:24-cv-00012-TLN-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jefferson A. McGee’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 18 a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 3.) For the reasons set forth below, the 19 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint and instant motion for TRO on January 2, 3 2024. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) At the outset, Plaintiff’s 141-page Complaint lacks clarity. Plaintiff 4 broadly alleges Defendants engaged in a “racially motivated conspiracy” in violation of various 5 state and federal laws. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants 6 “conspired to deprive [him] and other African Americans of the full and equal enjoyment of the 7 goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of Little League Baseball, 8 Inc., Airport Little League Baseball, Inc., and [a] sports arena owned by the City.” (Id.) Plaintiff 9 also alleges Defendants prevented him from using City property and intimidated and retaliated 10 against him in October 2021 because he had filed prior actions against the City in 2010 and 2014. 11 (Id.) Plaintiff then alleges Defendants sent him letters in October, November, and December 12 2023 demanding he pay the County $7,517 to punish him for filing the prior actions. (Id. at 8–9.) 13 Plaintiff alleges he “is frightened” and “it is hard for [him] to concentrate on his work because 14 [he] does not know what [Defendants] will do to collect the $7,517.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff seeks 15 monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 138–149.) 16 Like the Complaint, the instant motion for a TRO also lacks clarity. Plaintiff requests the 17 Court enjoin Defendants from taking the following actions: (1) intimidating and retaliating 18 against him; (2) searching, detaining, or harassing him; (3) withholding and interfering with his 19 real and personal property; (4) refusing to enter judgments in his favor; (5) maintaining false 20 criminal records on him; (6) interfering with Plaintiff’s liquor license for his business; (7) 21 withholding Plaintiff’s handgun; (8) using government entities and public monies to break the 22 laws of the United States; (9) implementing a general policy and conspiracy to discriminate 23 against African Americans; and (10) that Little League Baseball, Inc. be enjoined from holding 24 any games, tournaments, practices, or conditioning sessions. (ECF No. 3 at 2–3.) 25 II. STANDARD OF LAW 26 A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary and temporary “fix” that the court may 27 issue without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the movant 28 “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 1 before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The purpose 2 of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 65. It is the practice of this district to construe a motion for temporary restraining order as 4 a motion for preliminary injunction. E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a); see also Aiello v. One West Bank, 5 No. 2:10-cv-00227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (“Temporary 6 restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.”) 7 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 8 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 9 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 10 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The 11 purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until 12 a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see 13 also Costa Mesa City Emp.’s Assn. v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal. App. 4th 298, 305 (2012) 14 (“The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a 15 trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 16 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the 17 filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which preceded the pending 18 controversy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In cases where the movant seeks to alter the 19 status quo, preliminary injunction is disfavored and a higher level of scrutiny must apply. Schrier 20 v. Univ. of Co., 427 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2005). A preliminary injunction is not 21 automatically denied simply because the movant seeks to alter the status quo, but instead the 22 movant must meet heightened scrutiny. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 23 27, 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995). 24 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed 25 on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, 26 [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” 27 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test 28 to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 1 Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may 2 weigh the plaintiff's showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A 3 stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction 4 even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the 5 plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 6 public interest.” Id. Simply put, the plaintiff must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going 7 to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply in the plaintiff’s 8 favor,” in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 9 III. ANALYSIS 10 Plaintiff fails to persuade the Court that he is entitled to a TRO for two related reasons. 11 First, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that irreparable harm will occur in the absence of injunctive 12 relief. As to irreparable harm, Plaintiff argues Defendants sent him letters in October, November, 13 and December 2023, demanding payment of $7,517. (ECF No. 3 at 24.) Plaintiff argues these 14 letters “punished Plaintiff by intimidating and retaliat[ing] against him.” (Id.) Plaintiff also 15 argues the State of California has refused and neglected to arrest individuals that Plaintiff 16 previously alleged committed crimes against him. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff then vaguely argues that if 17 Defendants are not restrained, he will continue to suffer irreparable injury. (Id. at 25–26.) The 18 Court concludes Plaintiff’s conclusory and disjointed arguments are insufficient to establish that 19 he is likely to suffer imminent, irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. See Alliance, 20 632 F.3d at 1131 (“Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 21 possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.”). 22 Second, Plaintiff’s delay in seeking emergency relief weighs against a finding of 23 imminent, irreparable harm. The Court notes Plaintiff filed a similar action in this district in 24 2021, which was dismissed for failure to state a claim in May 2023. (See 2:21-cv-01654-DAD- 25 DB.) As in the previous action, Plaintiff’s Complaint in the instant case references events that 26 occurred in 2021. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Even considering Plaintiff’s more recent allegations, 27 Plaintiff references events that occurred as early as October 1, 2023. (ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 3 28 at 24.) Plaintiff’s unexplained delay in seeking relief warrants outright denial of his motion for 1 | TRO. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(b) (In considering a motion for TRO, the Court “will consider 2 | whether the applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary injunction at an earlier 3 | date without the necessity for seeking last-minute relief’ and may deny the motion if “the 4 | applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive relief.”). 5 Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate imminent, irreparable harm, the Court need not and 6 | does not address the remaining Winter factors herein. See MD Helicopters, Inc. v. Aerometalls, 7 | Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02249-TLN-AC, 2018 WL 489102, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018). 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion fora TRO. (ECF 10 | No. 3.) 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 | Date: January 4, 2024 /) 14 “ MN Veacxkay 15 Troy L. Nunley ] United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28