(PC) Roberson v. Dept. of State Hospitals-Coalinga ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE V. ROBERSON, Case No. 2:23-cv-01095-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. 14 DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS-COALINGA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff, a civil detainee held by the Department of State Hospitals in Coalinga, brought 22 this action against defendants in the Fresno County Superior Court, small claims division. ECF 23 No. 1-1 at 2. He alleges that the defendants unlawfully emailed a patient roster that contained his 24 protected health information, including his date of admission, legal commitment, and unit 25 number. Id. at 9. Defendant Gonzalez, the only federal employee sued, removed the case to this 26 court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3). Id.; ECF No. 1 at 1. After screening the complaint, I 27 find that plaintiff’s allegations against Gonzalez should be dismissed. The remaining claims 28 against the non-federal defendants should be remanded to state court. 1 Screening Order 2 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed 4 in forma pauperis.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and 5 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 6 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief. Id. 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 26 1 This screening requirement still applies where a case is removed from state court. See 27 Walker v. Departmental Review Bd., No. 2:17-cv-02191-AC-P, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176242, 2017 WL 11517550 *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2017) (“The screening obligation applies where a 28 complaint is removed from state court.”). 1 II. Analysis 2 As noted above, plaintiff alleges that defendants, including Gonzalez, unlawfully shared 3 his personal information during an exchange of emails, thereby violating his rights under state 4 law—California Civil Code § 56.35 and § 1798. ECF No. 1-1 at 9. The complaint indicates that 5 Gonzalez emailed the relevant information in the course of her duties as an Operational 6 Supervisor in this district. Id. Her purpose in doing so allegedly related to the identification of 7 detainees who might file a lawsuit and who might be eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. 8 Judicial immunity, usually relevant to judges, also extends to court staff where the acts 9 complained of occurred as part of the judicial process. See Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 10 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Curry v. Castillo (in Re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e 11 have extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity . . . to court clerks and other nonjudicial officers 12 for purely administrative acts—acts which taken out of context would appear ministerial, but 13 when viewed in context are actually a part of the judicial function.”). Here, Gonzalez’s actions in 14 ascertaining litigants’ ability to proceed in forma pauperis should be categorized as part of the 15 judicial process, and she is entitled to immunity. The claims against Gonzalez should, therefore, 16 be dismissed. 17 The only remaining question is whether to retain pendent jurisdiction over the remaining 18 state law claims. In making this determination, the court must consider “the litigation, the values 19 of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise 20 jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie- 21 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Generally, if all federal claims are disposed of 22 at an early stage of the litigation, and only state law claims remain, a case should be remanded. 23 Id. (“When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as 24 when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law 25 claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case 26 without prejudice.”); see also Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) 27 (“[I]t is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining pendent claims to state court 28 . . . .”). Here, all factors weigh in favor of remanding the remaining claims. Plaintiff’s claims, 1 | which sound purely in state law, are likely to be decided more quickly in state court. 2 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court assign a district judge to this action. 3 Further, it is RECOMMENDED that: 4 1. All claims against defendant Gonzalez be DISMISSED as barred by quasi-judicial 5 | immunity; and 6 2. All other claims be REMANDED to the Superior Court of Fresno County. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within fourteen days of 9 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 10 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 11 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 12 | served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that 13 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 14 | Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 15 } 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 ( q oy — Dated: _ October 6, 2023 q——— 19 JEREMY D. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28