Sanders v. JD Home Rentals ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PHILLIP SANDERS, Case No. 1:22-cv-00251-ADA-SKO 12 Plaintiff, SECOND SCREENING ORDER 13 v. ORDER FINDING PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 14 JD HOME RENTALS, et al., A COGNIZABLE FEDERAL CLAIM AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 15 Defendants. (Doc. 6) 16 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 17 18 19 20 21 On March 1, 2022, Plaintiff Phillip Sanders, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 22 filed a complaint. (Docs. 1, 3). On June 8, 2022, the Court screened the complaint, found that it 23 failed to state any cognizable claims, and granted Plaintiff thirty days leave to file an amended 24 complaint curing the pleading deficiencies identified in the order. (Doc. 6.) On July 8, 2022, 25 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 6.) 26 After screening Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the Court finds that despite the explicit 27 recitation of the deficiencies of the original complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 28 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff has also added claims for violations of 42 1 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1988, which are not sufficiently pleaded. Given Plaintiff’s pro se 2 status, Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure, to the 3 extent possible, the identified deficiencies. Plaintiff is once again provided the pleading 4 requirements and legal standards under which his claim in a second amended complaint will be 5 analyzed. 6 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 7 In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to 8 screen each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation 9 of poverty is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim 10 upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 11 from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 12 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from 13 immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has 14 discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. 15 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a 16 claim). If the Court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be 17 granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. 18 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 19 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 20 standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and 21 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 23 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 24 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A 25 complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack 26 of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See 27 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a 28 minimum factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice 1 of what the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. 2 Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th 3 Cir. 1991). 4 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and 5 accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 6 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a 7 court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] 8 complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops 9 short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 11 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 12 Plaintiff’s amended complaint lists six defendants: JD Home Rentals, Bryce D. 13 Hovannisian, Lindsay Bedrosian, Lance Armo (erroneously named as “Lance Armor”), and 14 Vanessa Hernandez (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that: Hovannisian 15 and Bedrosian are the owner and vice president of operations of JD Home Rentals, respectively; 16 Armo is the attorney for JD Home Rentals; and Hernandez is a process server. (Id. at 2, 6.) 17 In describing the nature of the instant action, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his civil rights 18 lawsuit seeks monetary tort and punitive relief to remedy damages for [D]efendants[’] 19 unconstitutional business practices[,] fraud[,] perjury[,] and conspiracy to commit fraud that led 20 to civil rights violations[,] particularly 14th [A]mendment due process violation[.]” (Doc. 6 at 1.) 21 Plaintiff’s claims arise from an “illegal eviction where [D]efendants fabricated a fraudulent 22 unlawful detainer complaint [and] had Plaintiff illegally evicted without a deed or property title 23 rights to be the owner or landlord to hire anyone as a property management company[.]” (Id.) 24 Plaintiff obtained the property at issue in 1986. (Doc. 6 at 5.) On March 11, 2019, 25 Plaintiff lost the property when JD Home Rentals bought it at a tax sale. (Id.) On March 15, 26 2019, one month before the deed of purchase was recorded and before JD Home Rentals “had 27 title or deed rights,” Armo, on behalf of JD Home Rentals, filed a “fraudulent fabricated unlawful 28 detainer” complaint against Plaintiff in the Fresno County Superior Court. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 1 the complaint contained false information, indicating that he had entered into an oral agreement 2 with JD Home Rentals the day before the tax sale, which Plaintiff claims never occurred. (Id.) 3 Additionally, the wrong unlawful detainer complaint form was used. (Id. at 2.) The complaint 4 was verified by Bedrosian. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, Hernandez claimed to serve 5 Plaintiff by substitute service, leaving the relevant court documents with a third-party roommate, 6 but Plaintiff alleges that he had no roommates. (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently evicted from the 7 property and “rendered homeless with no food or shelter[.]” (Id. at 3.) 8 Based on these events, Plaintiff asserts claims for the deprivation of his constitutional 9 rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in addition to 10 claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1988. (Doc. 6 at 8–9.) Plaintiff also asserts state law 11 claims for fraud and perjury. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff requests $500,000 in damages per defendant. 12 (Id.) 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the complaint does not state any 15 cognizable claims. Plaintiff shall be provided with the legal standards that appear to apply to his 16 claims and will be granted an opportunity to file a second amended complaint to correct the 17 identified deficiencies. 18 A. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Cognizable Federal Claim 19 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for 21 violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 6 at 2, 4.) As Plaintiff was 22 advised in the First Screening Order (Doc. 5), to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must 23 allege that the defendant (1) acted under color of state law, and (2) deprived him of rights secured 24 by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 25 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 26 “under color of state law”). With regard to the first element, private parties are not generally 27 acting under color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 28 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of 1 individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids 2 imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot 3 fairly be blamed.”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982)). There 4 exist, however, some circumstances in which the actions of a private actor may render that actor 5 liable under section 1983. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 6 2008) (en banc). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that “the conduct allegedly causing the 7 deprivation of a federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 8 Here, Defendants are all private parties, and, as in the initial complaint, Plaintiff fails to 9 allege facts to support a finding that any defendant has acted such that their conduct is fairly 10 attributable to the government. Plaintiff cannot base his Section 1983 claim on Defendants’ 11 unlawful detainer action. See Hoffman v. Indymac Bank FSB, No. C-10-0802 MMC, 2010 WL 12 3463641, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) (noting that the filing of an unlawful detainer action, as 13 a matter of law, does not constitute state action); Damian v. N. Neon Operations, LLC, No. C 11- 14 06416 DMR, 2012 WL 1438705, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2012) (“an unlawful detainer suit does 15 not constitute state action for purposes of Section 1983”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 16 state a cognizable Section 1983 claim. 17 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 18 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) provides: 19 All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 20 evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 21 subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 22 23 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). To state a claim under Section 1981, a complaint must establish that: (1) the 24 plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to discriminate on the 25 basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the 26 statute. Keum v. Virgin Am. Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 944, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see generally 27 Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). Section 1981 “can be violated only 28 be purposeful discrimination,” General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 1 375, 391 (1982), and a plaintiff must plausibly allege “intentional discrimination on account of 2 race.” Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1989). The complaint must set forth 3 “overt acts” of discrimination and contain facts to establish that the defendant’s conduct was 4 motivated by racial animus. Id. at 1345. A complaint must allege a “direct connection” between 5 a defendant’s actions and the claimed discrimination. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 6 Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he was intentionally 8 discriminated against by any named defendant due to his race. The amended complaint merely 9 alleges that Plaintiff believes he was “conspired [against] because [he] is black.” This is 10 insufficient to support that Defendants’ conduct was motivated by racial animus. Plaintiff has 11 thus not stated a cognizable claim for violation of Section 1981. 12 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 13 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (“Section 1985(3)”) creates a civil action for damages caused by two 14 or more persons who “conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving” the injured person of “the equal 15 protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws” and take or cause to 16 be taken “any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state 17 a claim under Section 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; 18 (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the 19 equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act 20 in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property 21 or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Brotherhood of 22 Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983). 23 To adequately allege the first element, Plaintiff must allege specific “facts to support the 24 allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual 25 specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th 26 Cir. 1988). The second element requires that some racial or otherwise class-based “invidiously 27 discriminatory animus” behind the conspirators’ actions. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health 28 Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268–69 (1993). 1 Here, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired together (see Doc. 6 at 6, 7, 8), this 2 allegation is conclusory and unsupported by specific facts. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged any 3 facts demonstrating that the actions of Defendants were motivated by racial, or other class-based, 4 animus. Moreover, “[w]here a Section 1985(3) claim is based on the alleged deprivation of a 5 federal right that requires state action, the claim cannot be based on a conspiracy among private 6 parties.” Hoffman, 2010 WL 3463641, at *3 (citing Scott, 463 U.S. at 830–34). Plaintiff’s 7 claims—that Defendants deprived him of his property without due process and violated his 8 Fourth Amendment rights—require state action to be cognizable. See id. (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. 9 at 924 (holding due process clause “can be violated only by conduct that may be fairly 10 characterized as ‘state action’ ”); Ballinger v. City of Oakland, 24 F.4th 1287, 1300 (9th Cir. 11 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ballinger v. City of Oakland, 142 S. Ct. 2777 (2022) (“to establish a 12 deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights, the [plaintiffs] must allege the seizure was caused by 13 state action.”). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants’ actions are 14 fairly attributable to the state, and, consequently, he may not pursue a Section 1985(3) conspiracy 15 claim. See Caldeira v. Cnty. of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “the 16 absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim 17 predicated on the same allegations”). 18 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 19 Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“Section 1988”). (See Doc. 6 20 at 8–9.) Section 1988, however, does not create an independent cause of action. See Moor v. 21 County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703-04 n.17 (1973). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1988 claim 22 fails. 23 5. State Law Claims 24 The amended complaint also purports to assert state law claims for fraud and perjury. 25 (Doc. 6 at 4, 7– 8.) Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law 26 claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law, which, for the 27 reasons explained above, he does not. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Accordingly, the Court will not 28 address the viability of Plaintiff’s state law claims. 1 B. Leave to Amend 2 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint and finds that it fails to state any 3 cognizable claim. Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court should 4 freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide 5 Plaintiff with one final opportunity to cure, to the extent possible, the identified deficiencies. 6 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–30. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint within 7 thirty days. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must state what each named 8 defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. 9 P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff 10 should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for the purpose of 11 changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 12 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 13 Plaintiff is advised that a second amended complaint supersedes the amended complaint, 14 Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty. 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 15 complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 220. 16 Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement 17 of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly titled 18 “Second Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 19 under penalty of perjury. 20 21 22 IV. ORDER 23 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 24 25 1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a 26 Second Amended Complaint; 27 2. Plaintiff shall caption the amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” and 28 refer to case number 1:22-cv-00251-ADA-SKO; and 1 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation of dismissal of 2 this action. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 Dated: September 8, 2022 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28