(PS) Claire v. County of Sutter ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROUBLE P. CLAIRE, No. 2:22-cv-00780 TLN AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER and 14 SARA M. HOLLIS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 15 Defendant. 16 17 This case was initiated against multiple defendants, including pro se defendant Sara M. 18 Hollis. ECF No. 1 (initial complaint); ECF No. 4 (amended complaint). Plaintiff brought federal 19 civil rights claims against Sutter County and two Sutter County Sheriff Deputies, and various 20 state law claims against Hollis and an unserved Jane Doe. The complaint accused Hollis of a 21 racially motivated assault, Jane Doe of racist vandalism, and the County defendants with failing 22 to properly respond to the incidents. Judgment was entered against the County defendants 23 pursuant to acceptance of an offer of judgment. ECF No. 15. 24 Because claims remained against the pro se defendant, the case was referred to the 25 undersigned magistrate judge. ECF No. 18. A pre-trial scheduling conference was held on 26 December 7, 2022. Counsel for plaintiff was present; defendant Hollis failed to appear. Counsel 27 for plaintiff represented that he had communicated with Hollis, and that Hollis was willing to 28 participate in this court’s Voluntary Dispute Resolution Program. The case was accordingly sent 1 to VDRP, but Hollis failed to attend the scheduled mediation. ECF No. 22. The case was 2 therefore removed from VDRP, and a status conference was set. ECF No. 33. The parties were 3 ordered to submit a status report. Id. Plaintiff submitted a status report, which contained the 4 following statement on jurisdiction: 5 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint included claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus this Court had subject matter jurisdiction 6 over the claims per 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (civil rights), and 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. 7 Although Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims have been resolved pursuant to acceptance of a Rule 68 offer of judgment, the Court 8 retains supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1367. 9 ECF No. 36 at 2. 10 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 11 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, (1994). Because the federal claims in this case have been eliminated, the 12 exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claims is discretionary. 13 Carlsbad Tech. Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 640 (2009) (statutory supplemental 14 jurisdiction over state law claims may be exercised at court’s discretion after dismissal of federal 15 claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 16 where all claims over which it had original jurisdiction are dismissed). The court’s decision 17 whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should be informed by “values of economy, 18 convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 19 1997) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 The primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with the state 21 courts. Therefore, when federal claims are eliminated before trial, district courts should usually 22 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 23 350 & n.7 (1988) (citation omitted); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 24 (9th Cir. 1994) (“‘[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 25 balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state 26 law claims.’” (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 27 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991)). This general rule is appropriately followed here, because this court has 28 conducted no substantive proceedings regarding the remaining claims. There has not even been a 1 | scheduling order addressing litigation of the claims against Ms. Hollis. The values of economy, 2 || convenience, fairness, and comity are all therefore best served by plaintiffs state law claims 3 || proceeding in state court. No relevant factors weigh in favor of this court’s exercise of 4 || supplemental jurisdiction. 5 Because the federal claims have been resolved, the court should decline to exercise 6 || supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. 7 || at 357 (“[A] district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving 8 | pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be 9 || inappropriate.”). Plaintiff's remaining claims may be re-filed against Hollis in state court. 10 CONCLUSION 11 Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference set for June 12 | 28, 2023, is VACATED. 13 It is further RECOMMENDED that this court decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction 14 | over plaintiffs remaining state law claims, and that this case be closed. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 16 || assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one (21) 17 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 18 || objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 19 | Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 20 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 21 | Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 || DATED: June 13, 2023 ~ 23 Aten —Chare ALLISON CLAIRE 24 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28