Barrera v. City of Woodland ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANIEL BARRERA, et al., No. 2:18-cv-00329-JAM-KJN 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 14 CITY OF WOODLAND, et al., FAMILIAL ASSOCIATION CLAIM 15 Defendants. 16 17 The matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for 18 Summary Judgment following an appeal and remand from the Ninth 19 Circuit. See Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 66. The 20 Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the Court’s order denying 21 qualified immunity to Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and 22 Krause on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment familial association 23 claim. See USCA Mandate, ECF No. 102. Having reviewed the 24 parties’ supplemental briefs, the record, and applicable 25 authority, the Court grants qualified immunity for Defendants 26 Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause on Plaintiffs’ familial 27 association claim. See Pls.’ Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 107; Defs.’ 28 Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 106. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On February 8, 2017, at 12:15 p.m., Woodland Police 3 Department received a report of a Hispanic man in his forties, 4 walking around a residential neighborhood cursing and waving a 5 weapon, later identified as a golf club. Defs.’ Statement of 6 Undisputed Facts (SUF) 1-3, ECF No. 72-2. Woodland Police 7 Officer Parveen Lal, Sergeant David Krause, and Sergeant Thomas 8 Davis responded to the dispatch and approached in separate patrol 9 units. SUF 2. 10 Sergeant Krause was first to find Decedent Michael Barrera 11 walking on Garfield Place. SUF 5. Sergeant Krause broadcasted 12 his location and reported a bald Hispanic man carrying a golf 13 club in one hand and a towel in another. Id. Sergeant Krause 14 parked his vehicle, exited his vehicle, and unholstered his 15 firearm. SUF 6. Sergeant Krause ordered Barrera to stop, but he 16 continued walking. SUF 8. Sergeant Davis and Officer Lal 17 arrived seconds after Sergeant Krause. SUF 9. Sergeant Davis 18 exited his vehicle without weapons in hand. SUF 12. Officer Lal 19 also exited his vehicle, drew his taser, and ordered Barrera to 20 drop the items he was holding and to get on the ground. SUF 10. 21 Barrera continued to walk away, telling the officers he was 22 not a threat. SUF 11. When Barrera reached the end of 23 Garfield Place, which terminated in a cul-de-sac, Barrera began 24 to walk up a residential driveway, past a parked truck, and 25 towards a garage door. SUF 5, 18. Barrera then turned around 26 and approached Sergeant Krause. SUF 19 (disputed on other 27 grounds, such as the speed of the approach and whether the golf 28 club was raised.) Sergeant Krause raised his firearm but did not 1 fire. SUF 20. Approximately twenty feet away from 2 Sergeant Krause, Barrera “fell, dropped the golf club onto the 3 driveway, immediately jumped up, and ran in the opposite 4 direction toward a fence on the side of [the property].” Id. 5 The three officers gave chase. SUF 21. 6 Barrera attempted to scale the fence on the side of the 7 property, failed, turned around, and charged at Sergeant Davis 8 from approximately 10-15 feet away. SUF 24. Sergeant Davis and 9 Barrera went to the ground. SUF 25. 10 Officer Lal fired his taser four times at Barrera, pausing 11 briefly between each shot. SUF 34, 42, 44, 46. Over the course 12 of 51 seconds, Barrera was tased for 24 seconds. Id. 13 Officers Hanna Gray and Richard Wright arrived shortly after 14 Sergeant Davis and Barrera hit the ground. SUF 48-49. Officer 15 Gray straddled Barrera to hold him down. SUF 51. Officer Wright 16 and Officer Lal managed to handcuff Barrera approximately two 17 minutes after the parties went to the ground. SUF 61. Sergeant 18 Krause, Sergeant Davis, and Officer Lal physically disengaged 19 from Barrera but remained in the vicinity. SUF 74-77. 20 Although Barrera was handcuffed and prone, Officers Gray and 21 Wright continued to exert force to keep Barrera on the ground. 22 SUF 78, 80, 83-84. At one point, Officer Wright placed his knee 23 on Barrera’s shoulder. SUF 87. Barrera told the officers he 24 could not breathe. SUF 95. Officer Gray and Officer Wright 25 continued to hold Barrera down. SUF 97-98. After Barrera’s 26 statement, Sergeant Krause requested a WRAP device be attached to 27 Barrera’s feet. SUF 103. A WRAP is a mesh restraint system that 28 is secured around a suspect’s legs and ankles to restrict leg 1 movement. SUF 105. Officer McManus arrived and began attaching 2 the WRAP. SUF 107, 109. Officers Gray and Wright continued to 3 hold Barrera down. SUF 110-111. 4 Shortly after the WRAP was administered, Barrera became 5 unresponsive. SUF 120-22. Officers administered CPR, but it was 6 ineffective. SUF 123-24. Barrera was transported to a hospital, 7 where he was pronounced dead. SUF 125. Toxicology revealed 8 1800 ng/mL of methamphetamine in Barrera’s system. SUF 126. 9 Plaintiffs sued asserting § 1983 claims under the Fourth and 10 Fourteenth Amendments, against which Defendants asserted 11 qualified immunity. 12 13 II. OPINION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Qualified immunity protects government officials from 16 liability for money damages unless their conduct violates 17 “clearly established” law that a reasonable public official 18 would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 19 (2009). There are two conditions necessary to defeat an 20 assertion of qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 21 200 (2001). First, the facts alleged, taken in the light most 22 favorable to the plaintiff, must establish a constitutional 23 violation. Id. Second, the constitutional right that was 24 violated must have been “clearly established” at the time of the 25 alleged violation. Id. If either condition is not met, 26 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Discussion 2 Here, because the second question is clearly dispositive, 3 the Court exercises its discretion to address it first. 4 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242. A constitutional right is clearly 5 established when “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently 6 clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he 7 is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 8 744 (2002). “[W]hether the violative nature of particular 9 conduct is clearly established” is a question to be answered 10 “not as a broad general proposition,” but with reference to the 11 facts of specific cases. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12. 12 Although the Supreme Court does not require a case directly on 13 point for a right to be clearly established, “existing precedent 14 must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 15 debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017). 16 “The precedent must be ‘controlling’—from the Ninth Circuit 17 or the Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced by a ‘consensus’ 18 of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Martinez v. City 19 of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sharp v. 20 Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017)). Cases 21 decided after the alleged constitutional violation cannot create 22 clearly established law for purposes qualified immunity because 23 reasonable officers are “not required to foresee judicial 24 decisions that do not yet exist in instances where the 25 [constitutional] requirements . . . are far from obvious.” 26 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2018). 27 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated their 28 constitutional right to familial association two ways. First, 1 they claim that Officer Lal violated their Fourteenth Amendment 2 right when he tased Barrera repeatedly during his arrest. Pls.’ 3 Suppl. Brief at 9. Second, Plaintiffs claim that 4 Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause violated the 5 Fourteenth Amendment when they directly or integrally 6 participated in holding Barrera face-down after he was 7 handcuffed, despite his pleas for air. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiffs 8 assert that both the tasing during the arrest and the use of 9 compressive force after the arrest contributed to Barrera’s 10 death in a manner that “shocks the conscience” under the 11 Fourteenth Amendment. 12 To establish that their right to familial association was 13 clearly established, Plaintiffs submit three cases, arguing that 14 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011), placed beyond 15 debate that excessive tasing violates the Fourteenth Amendment 16 and that Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 17 1052 (9th Cir. 2003), and Garlick v. County of Kern, 167 F. 18 Supp. 3d 1117, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2016), clearly establish the 19 violative nature of using compressive downward force against a 20 handcuffed and prone individual. The Court reviews Drummond and 21 Garlick first. 22 In Drummond, the Ninth Circuit held that Anaheim police 23 officers violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 24 excessive force when they used their body weight to hold 25 Drummond down for over twenty minutes after he was handcuffed, 26 despite his repeated insistence that he could not breathe, 27 causing him to pass out and ultimately fall into a coma. 28 Drummond, 343 F.3d at 1054-1055. This case puts officers on 1 notice that the prolonged use of compressive force on a detained 2 individual who is prone and handcuffed is constitutionally 3 excessive. 4 In Garlick, the district court relied on Drummond in its 5 opinion denying qualified immunity for defendants on Garlick’s 6 excessive force and familial association claims, finding that 7 Drummond clearly establishes the law that prolonged use of 8 bodyweight on a prone suspect risked asphyxia in an 9 unconstitutional manner. Garlick, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1171-72, 10 n.33 (discussing Drummond at length before denying qualified 11 immunity in a footnote). 12 Garlick, however, does not address whether Drummond, a case 13 about excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, clearly 14 establishes law in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment 15 familial association claim. Other courts in this circuit have 16 also posed but not answered this question. See, e.g., Wroth v. 17 City of Rohnert Park, No. 17-cv-05339-JST, 2019 WL 1766163, at 18 *13 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019) (“assum[ing] without deciding that 19 Drummond’s Fourth Amendment excessive force holding could 20 clearly establish rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 21 Process Clause, despite the different standards for 22 constitutional violations”). 23 It is undisputed at this stage that Drummond clearly 24 establishes the law that using bodyweight to apply compressive 25 force to a prone and handcuffed suspect for a prolonged time is 26 unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit mandate, when it affirmed 27 the Court’s denial of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth 28 Amendment claim, stated that “Drummond is sufficiently similar 1 to this case that the Defendants would have been on notice that, 2 when Barrera was handcuffed and prone on the ground, additional 3 restraint, as applied here, is unconstitutionally excessive.” 4 Mandate at 4. 5 However, an excessive force claim under the Fourth 6 Amendment is different from a familial association claim under 7 the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court established in 8 Graham v. Connor, an excessive force claim “should be analyzed 9 under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard 10 rather than under a ‘substantive due process’ approach” under 11 the Fourteenth Amendment. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Further, 12 reasonableness is to be judged objectively “from the perspective 13 of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 14 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 394-97. 15 A familial association claim, by contrast, is evaluated 16 under a “shocks the conscience” standard, which requires either 17 a “purpose to harm” or “deliberate indifference” to a person’s 18 constitutional rights. Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 19 (9th Cir. 2010). When an officer has time to deliberate, the 20 standard for shocking the conscience is “deliberate indifference 21 or reckless disregard for [an individual’s] rights,” meaning a 22 “conscious or reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s 23 acts or omissions.” Id. When an officer lacked time to 24 deliberate, such as when an emergency evolves quickly, the 25 standard for shocking the conscience is when an officer acts 26 “with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law 27 enforcement objective.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 28 (9th Cir. 2008). Unlike the objective reasonableness standard 1 of an excessive force claim, the “shocks the conscience” 2 standard requires a subjective inquiry into whether an “official 3 kn[ew] of and disregarded an excessive risk.” Farmer v. 4 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 5 Because the standards are different and because a familial 6 association claim requires a further subjective inquiry, the 7 Court holds that an excessive force case under the Fourth 8 Amendment does not put an officer on notice that his conduct may 9 violate a plaintiff’s right to familial association under the 10 Fourteenth Amendment. Objective reasonableness, reckless 11 indifference, and purpose to harm fall on a continuum of 12 culpability, with each successive standard requiring a greater 13 presence of mind on behalf of the actor to be liable for his 14 actions. Because deliberate indifference is a higher bar than 15 objective unreasonableness, it is possible for one’s actions to 16 violate the Fourth Amendment without violating the Fourteenth 17 Amendment. As such, notice that one’s action violates the 18 Fourth Amendment does not put one on notice that one’s action 19 violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 This Court’s reasoning is bolstered by the Ninth Circuit’s 21 opinion in Perkins v. Edgar, No. 21-55552, 2022 WL 14476272, at 22 *1-2 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022).1 In Perkins, the Ninth Circuit 23 affirmed a district court’s denial of qualified immunity on a 24 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, citing Drummond, but 25 1 Although Perkins is unpublished, U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 36-3 provides that an unpublished order issued on or after 26 January 1, 2007 may be cited to the courts of the 9th circuit in 27 accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1, permitting the citation of unpublished opinions for their 28 persuasive value. 1 reversed the court’s denial of qualified immunity on Fourteenth 2 Amendment claims for familial association and inadequate medical 3 care. Id. While the Ninth Circuit “reaffirmed that an 4 individual can assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of 5 companionship and familial association in a police excessive 6 force case,” it held that “there is no sufficiently analogous 7 precedent for the loss of familial relations claim here” and 8 thus the officers did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 9 Amendment rights. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis, which 10 discussed Drummond squarely in the context of the Fourth 11 Amendment claim, but not the Fourteenth Amendment claim, implies 12 that while Drummond clearly establishes the law in the excessive 13 force context, it does not establish the law in a familial 14 association context. 15 Plaintiffs disagree, contending that “[w]hile a Fourteenth 16 Amendment claim and a Fourth Amendment claim are evaluated under 17 different standards, these claims relate to the same core rights 18 vis-à-vis law enforcement and substantially overlap.” Pls.’ 19 Suppl. Brief at 9 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 20 2466 (2015)). Kingsley, however, does not apply to the present 21 case. In Kingsley, the Supreme Court invoked the standards of a 22 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim to analyze a pretrial 23 detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. The fact 24 that two excessive force claims share a standard even when they 25 derive from different constitutional amendments does not 26 necessarily mean that the Fourth Amendment’s objective 27 reasonableness standard may be ported to other Fourteenth 28 Amendment claims outside of claims brought by a pre-trial 1 detainee. As such, Plaintiffs’ citation to Kingsley is 2 unpersuasive to the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that 3 Drummond and Garlick, which relies on Drummond, do not clearly 4 establish that the prolonged use of compressive force on a prone 5 and restrained suspect violates the suspect’s family’s right to 6 familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Similarly, the Court finds that Mattos, a Ninth Circuit 8 case about a taser used in excessive force, does not put 9 Officer Lal on notice that his conduct runs afoul of the 10 Fourteenth Amendment. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 452 (holding that the 11 officers violated the Fourth Amendment in using their tasers but 12 nevertheless granted qualified immunity because the law was not 13 clearly established at the time). For the same reasons 14 articulated above, the Court declines to extend the Fourth 15 Amendment reasoning in Mattos to clearly establish law in the 16 context of the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the Court finds 17 that the law was not clearly established at the time that 18 Officer Lal allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ familial association 19 rights when he tased the decedent. For this reason, qualified 20 immunity is appropriate for Officer Lal. 21 22 III. ORDER 23 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds not every 24 reasonable officer at the time of the incident would have known, 25 beyond debate, that their conduct violates the Fourteenth 26 Amendment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS qualified immunity to 27 Defendants Gray, Wright, Lal, Davis, and Krause on Plaintiffs’ 28 § 1983 Familial Association claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. eee eee EIEN SIN 1 Summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants on this claim. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: June 12, 2023 4 LA Ps JOHN A. MENDEZ 6 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12