(PC) Trevino v. Sheehan ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERT TREVINO, Case No. 2:23-cv-00235-KJM-JDP (PC) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A 13 v. VIABLE CLAIM AGAINST ANY DEFENDANT AND GRANTING LEAVE 14 X. SHEEHAN, et al., TO AMEND 15 Defendants. ECF No. 1 16 17 18 19 20 21 Plaintiff brings this section 1983 case against defendants Sheehan, Schneider, Hickey, 22 Comeau, Cano, and De La Cruz, all officials at various state prisons. ECF No. 1 at 2. He alleges 23 that these defendants have violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for 24 filing a case in the Northern District of California. Id. at 7. Having reviewed the complaint, I 25 find that his allegations are insufficient to state a viable claim against any defendant. I will allow 26 him leave to amend. 27 28 1 Screening Order 2 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 3 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 4 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 5 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 6 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 7 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 8 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 10 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 11 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 12 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 13 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 14 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 15 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 16 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 17 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 18 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 19 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 20 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 21 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 22 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 23 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 24 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 25 26 27 28 1 II. Analysis 2 As noted above, plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing a prisoner 3 civil rights case in the Northern District of California. ECF No. 1 at 7. Specifically, he alleges 4 that defendant Sheehan retaliated against him by authoring a memorandum that falsely alleged 5 that he attacked another inmate, thereby sabotaging his opportunity for parole. Id. at 7-8. 6 Plaintiff claims that he informed defendants Cano and De La Cruz about the memorandum’s 7 falseness and that, based on information available to them, they knew he was telling the truth. Id. 8 at 8-9. He fails, however, to allege any “connective tissue” that would link these adverse actions 9 to the litigation he mentions. There is, for instance, no allegation that any of the defendants knew 10 or was affected by this litigation. Nor is there enough information to infer that this adverse action 11 was otherwise linked to the litigation. 12 These omissions necessarily doom plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants, two of 13 whom are parole commissioners who had no hand in authoring the memorandum. Id. at 10. The 14 only allegation against them is that they failed to review information that would have confirmed 15 that the memorandum was false. Id. This alone does not support an inference that they were 16 retaliating against plaintiff because of his litigative activities. And, with respect to defendant 17 Comeau, plaintiff alleges only that he explained the retaliation to her and she did not take him 18 seriously. Id. at 11-12. This alone is not indicative of any intent to retaliate on Comeau’s behalf. 19 Moreover, based on the information in the complaint, it does not appear that Comeau is a state 20 actor. Id. at 2 (indicating that her title is “attorney at law” and listing an address not associated 21 with an CDCR office or facility). 22 Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that addresses these deficiencies. Plaintiff is 23 advised that the amended complaint will supersede the current complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa 24 County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended complaint should be titled 25 “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case number. 26 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 27 1. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 28 complaint. If he does not, I will recommend this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 1 2. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a section 1983 complaint form with this order. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ( _ Dated: _ December 4, 2023 q-—— 5 JEREMY D. PETERSON 6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28