(PC) Adkins v. Hurtado ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DUPREE LAMONT ADKINS, Case No. 2:21-cv-00531-TLN-JDP (PC) 11 Plaintiff, ORDER: 12 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CHANGE PLEADINGS AND 13 DAVID HURTADO, et al., DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE A RESPONSIVE PLEADING WITHIN 14 Defendants. THIRTY DAYS OF THIS ORDER; AND 15 (2) DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO SEPARATELY DOCKET THE 16 SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT CONTAINED THEREIN 17 ECF No. 36 18 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 19 SCREENING ORDER FINDING THAT 20 PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES COGNIZABLE 21 FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS TO COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION 22 CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS HURTADO AND MARSHAK AND A 23 FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM AGAINST MARSHAK 24 25 26 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, has moved to amend his complaint 27 ECF No. 36. Defendants do not oppose the motion. ECF No. 37. Accordingly, the motion to 28 change pleadings, ECF No. 36, will be granted. I find that, for screening purposes, the second 1 amended complaint attached therein states cognizable First Amendment access to court and Equal 2 Protection claims against defendants Hurtado and Marshak. It also states a viable First 3 Amendment retaliation claim against Marshak. 4 Screening Order 5 I. Screening and Pleading Requirements 6 A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 7 entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 8 claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 9 claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 10 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 11 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 14 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 15 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 16 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 17 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 18 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 19 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 20 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 21 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 22 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 23 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 24 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 25 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 26 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 27 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 28 1 II. Analysis 2 As before, plaintiff, who is non-white, alleges that defendant Marshak denied him library 3 || access and permission to make copies while extending those services to similarly situated white 4 | inmates. ECF No. 36 at 8. He alleges that defendant Hurtado, a deputy warden, knew or should 5 | have known about Marshak’s discriminatory actions, but turned a blind eye to them. /d. at 11. 6 | Plaintiff alleges that he was denied access to the courts by defendants’ actions when his inability 7 | to fully access the law library caused him to miss two court deadlines. Jd. at 19. Finally, plaintiff 8 | alleges that Marshak’s refusal to grant him access to the law library was motivated, in part, by his 9 | filing of administrative grievances. Id. at 20. Thus, he has stated a cognizable First Amendment 10 | retaliation claim against this defendant. 11 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 12 1. Plaintiffs motion to alter pleadings, ECF No. 36, is GRANTED and the Clerk of Court 13 | is directed to separately docket the complaint and attached exhibits that are appended to that 14 | motion. The separate filing should be titled “Second Amended Complaint.” 15 2. The Second Amended Complaint states, for screening purposes, viable First 16 | Amendment access to court and Equal Protection claims against defendants Marshak and 17 | Hurtado. It also states a viable First Amendment retaliation claim against Marshak. 18 3. Defendants shall have thirty days from the date of this order’s entry to file a responsive 19 | pleading. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ( q Sty - Dated: _ September 16, 2022 q——— 23 JEREMY D,. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 25 26 27 28