(PC) Haywood v. Reed ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAMERON LEE HAYWOOD, No. 2:23-cv-0078 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 REED, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to 19 protect him. Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 20 No. 2) and his complaint (ECF No. 1) for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the 21 undersigned will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and give plaintiff the option to 22 proceed immediately with his cognizable claim or to amend the complaint. 23 IN FORMA PAUPERS 24 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 26 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 27 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 28 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 1 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 2 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 3 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. 4 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 5 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1915(b)(2). SCREENING 7 I. Legal Standards 8 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 9 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 10 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 11 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 12 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 14 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 16 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 17 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 18 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 19 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 23 AtlanticCorp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 24 (1957)). 25 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must 26 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain 27 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 28 1 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 2 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 3 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 4 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 5 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 6 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 7 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 8 or other proper proceeding for redress. 9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 10 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 11 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 12 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 13 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 14 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 15 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 16 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 17 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 18 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 19 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 20 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 21 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 22 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 23 II. Allegations in the Complaint 24 Plaintiff states the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was incarcerated at 25 California State Prison, Sacramento (“SAC”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff has identified SAC 26 correctional officer Reed along with a “John Doe” correctional officer and a “John Doe” 27 correctional sergeant. (Id. at 1, 2.) 28 //// 1 Plaintiff alleges that on an unknown date, officer Reed assigned plaintiff to a cell in the 2 general population even though plaintiff is a documented administrative segregation inmate with 3 safety concerns. (Id. at 3.) He further states Reed placed him in a cell with a known enemy. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff next states, “Reed slammed [him] to the ground then shoved his fingers inside of [his] 5 rectum after he punched and kicked me several times.” (Id.) However, he also states that he was 6 assaulted by his cellmate. (see id., id. at 4, 5.) 7 Plaintiff states that officer Doe escorted him and placed him in a general population cell 8 even after plaintiff told him that he is an administrative segregation inmate. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 9 alleges sergeant Doe “approved” his placement onto the general population yard even though he 10 is documented as administrative segregation status in the computer and plaintiff verbally told him 11 the same. (Id.) Plaintiff further states sergeant Doe placed him in a cell with a known enemy. 12 III. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983? 13 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. 14 Const. amend. VIII. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual 15 punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); 16 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). 17 Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy 18 and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited 19 by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 20 1. Excessive Force 21 “When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the inmates’ 22 Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 23 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish a claim for excessive force, the plaintiff must show 24 that the officer applied the force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good- 25 faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). 26 However, “[not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of 27 action.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). That is, “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates a prisoner’s 28 constitutional rights.” Id. (citation omitted). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and 1 unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of 2 physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of 3 mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, “prison administrators . . . 4 should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 5 practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 6 maintain institutional security.” Id. at 6 (ellipses in original) (citation omitted). 7 The allegations in the complaint are conflicting with regard to whether correctional officer 8 Reed was the individual who assaulted plaintiff, or whether it was plaintiff’s cellmate. (ECF No. 9 1 at 3-5.) If officer Reed was the individual plaintiff alleges slammed him to the ground, 10 punched, kicked, and shoved his fingers inside plaintiff’s rectum, then plaintiff has also alleged 11 facts sufficient to state a cognizable excessive force claim against officer Reed. Because it is not 12 clear whether it was officer Reed or plaintiff’s cellmate who took such action, the undersigned 13 declines to find that the complaint states an excessive force claim. However, plaintiff may file an 14 amended complaint clarifying whether officer Reed or his cellmate assaulted him in the cell. 15 2. Failure to Protect 16 A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the 17 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 18 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial 19 risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from 20 circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 21 substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The 22 duty to protect a prisoner from serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable 23 measures to guarantee the safety and well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33; Frost v. Agnos, 24 152 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1998). Because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 25 pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant acted 26 with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal 27 quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted). 28 //// 1 Here, plaintiff has alleged that officer Reed and the two Doe defendants knowingly placed 2 him in the general population, where he had a known enemy, even though plaintiff should have 3 been housed in administrative segregation. (ECF No. 1 at 3-5.) Such allegations are sufficient to 4 state a failure to protect claim. 5 The use of John Does in pleading practice is generally disfavored – but it is not prohibited. 6 See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 7 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999); Lopes v. Viera, 543 F. Supp.2d 1149, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 8 However, the court cannot serve Doe defendants because the United States Marshal cannot 9 initiate service of process on unknown defendants. Should plaintiff elect to proceed immediately 10 on his failure to protect claim he may be afforded the opportunity for limited, preliminary 11 discovery to identify the names of the John Does. See Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163 (citing 12 Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642) (plaintiff should be given the opportunity through discovery to 13 identify unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities 14 and only after the court is satisfied that plaintiff has exhausted other possibilities of finding their 15 names). 16 Once the identity of a Doe defendant is ascertained, plaintiff must file a motion to amend 17 his complaint only to identify the name of the Doe defendant so that service by the United States 18 Marshal can be attempted. Plaintiff is advised that should he fail to identify either Doe defendant 19 during the course of discovery, the court will recommend that they be dismissed from this action. 20 In the event plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, he should use the time given to 21 amend to do everything he can to supply the names of the Doe defendants without further 22 assistance from the court. He may seek extensions of time for the filing of an amended complaint 23 for that purpose if necessary. 24 AMENDING THE COMPLAINT 25 As set forth above, plaintiff has alleged a potentially cognizable failure to protect claim, 26 but has failed to state a potentially cognizable excessive force claim. Accordingly, plaintiff may, 27 but is not required, to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that in an amended 28 complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated 1 his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s 2 charging allegations are as to each named defendant. The charging allegations must be set forth 3 in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting. 4 That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff 5 should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 6 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought 7 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must 8 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who 9 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. 10 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation 11 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act 12 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). 13 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed. 14 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed. 15 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or 16 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). 17 The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 18 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any 19 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be 21 set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 22 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, 23 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 24 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. 25 E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded. 26 Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If 27 plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended 28 complaint. 1 By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and 2 | has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose 3 | sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 6 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 7 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 8 || is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 9 | § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 10 | Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 11 | herewith. 12 3. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) states potentially cognizable failure to protect claim 13 | as set forth in Section HI above. The complaint does not contain any additional cognizable 14 | claims. Accordingly, plaintiff will have the option to proceed with the complaint as screened or 15 | amend the complaint. 16 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall fill out and return the 17 | attached form indicating how he would like to proceed in this action. 18 3. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be 19 || dismissed. 20 | Dated: June 20, 2023 22 3 ORAH BARNES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 | pB:12 38 DB/DB Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/hayw0078.scrn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CAMERON LEE HAYWOOD, No. 2:23-cv-0078 DB P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION 14 REED, 15 Defendant 16 17 18 Check one: 19 _____ Plaintiff wants to proceed immediately on his failure to protect claim against defendant 20 Reed. Plaintiff understands that by going forward without amending the complaint he is 21 voluntarily dismissing all other claims. 22 23 _____ Plaintiff wants to amend the complaint. 24 25 DATED:_______________________ 26 27 Cameron Lee Haywood Plaintiff pro se 28