Peterson v. Nevada County, CA ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DAVID PETERSON, an No. 2:19-cv-00949-JAM-DB individual, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S v. MOTION TO AMEND 14 NEVADA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et 15 al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 John David Peterson (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit on 19 May 24,2019, against Nevada County, the Nevada County Sheriff’s 20 Department, Correctional Medical Group Companies, Inc. (“CMCG)”, 21 and fictious persons (collectively “Defendants,”) alleging a host 22 of civil rights violations relating to Plaintiff’s medical care 23 while in Wayne Brown Correction Facility (“WBCF”) custody. 24 Plaintiff now seeks leave to amend his First Amended Complaint 25 (“FAC”) to: (1) remove dismissed claims, (2) revise factual and 26 legal allegations, (3) refer to CMCG under its current operating 27 name, Wellpath Management, Inc. (“Wellpath”), (4) conform 28 evidence obtained during discovery, and (5) add a new cause of 1 action against Nevada County. See Mot. for Leave to File a 2 Second Am. Compl. (“Mot.”) at 2-3, ECF No. 53. Nevada County 3 opposes the new cause of action’s addition. See Opposition 4 (“Opp’n) at 1, ECF No. 57. See Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n 5 (“Reply”), ECF No. 61. 6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS 7 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. 8 9 I. BACKGROUND 10 On September 5, 2018, Grass Valley Police Officers arrested 11 Plaintiff and took him to Nevada County’s Wayne Brown 12 Correctional Facility (“WBCF”). See FAC, ¶ 23, ECF No 15. 13 Plaintiff’s leg was injured between his arrest and transfer to 14 WBCF. Id. ¶¶ 19-22. Nevada County contracts Correctional 15 Medical Group Companies, Inc. (“CMCG”) to provide medical care to 16 WBCF inmates. Id. ¶ 8. During Plaintiff’s booking at WBCF, a 17 nurse evaluated Plaintiff’s injury. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. While Plaintiff 18 remained in WBCF custody, his leg developed infection symptoms 19 that CMCG personnel periodically assessed. Id. ¶ 24-25. On 20 September 7, 2018, a WBCF Officer informed Plaintiff he would be 21 released. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff asked the Officer permission to 22 call someone to transport him home. Id. Plaintiff was allowed 23 two calls but did not contact anyone. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff was 24 then released from WBCF on foot even though he was in great pain 25 and feverish. Id. ¶ 27. He walked to a gas station off the 26 Highway 49 freeway and borrowed a phone to call an ambulance 27 because of his condition. Id. Plaintiff was taken to Sierra 28 Nevada Medical Hospital where he was treated for a life- 1 threatening condition for forty-five days. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 2 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on May 24, 2019 and submitted 3 his FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 15 on 4 August 9, 2019. FAC, ECF No. 15. The FAC contained seventeen 5 claims against Defendants. Id. Five claims remain: (1) the 6 fifth claim for Monell liability alleging Nevada County 7 deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s medical needs; (2) the 8 seventh claim for Monell liability alleging CMCG deliberately 9 disregarded Plaintiff’s medical needs, (3) the eighth claim 10 alleging Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff’s 11 constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) the fifteenth 12 claim alleging Nevada County’s liability under California State 13 law’s respondeat superior doctrine; and (5) the seventeenth claim 14 alleging CMCG committed medical malpractice under California 15 State law. See Minutes for Proceedings Held August 25, 2020, ECF 16 No. 41; Order, ECF No. 46. See FAC ¶¶ 71, 89, 102, 138, 146. 17 On April 1, 2021, Plaintiff deposed Officer Ryan Stanley, 18 who processed Plaintiff’s release from the Nevada County Jail, 19 and Deputy Richard Osborne, who was in charge at the time of 20 Plaintiff’s release. Opp’n at 2. On June 25, 2021, this Court 21 entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order that disposed of all claims 22 naming fictious persons as defendants. See Pretrial Scheduling 23 Order (“Scheduling Order”), ECF No. 48. On August 31, 2021 and 24 December 16, 2021, Plaintiff deposed CMCG employees Amanda 25 Tirpack and Laurie Adams, respectively. Id. Plaintiff then 26 deposed three more CMCG employees—including Andrea Boucher on 27 July 14, 2022. Suppl. Decl. of Patrick H. Dwyer in Supp. of 28 Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s. Suppl. Decl.”) at 4, ECF No. 61. 1 Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a second amended complaint 2 (SAC) that: 1) removes dismissed claims; 2) revises factual and 3 legal allegations; 3) refers to CMCG under its current operating 4 name, Wellpath Management, Inc. (“Wellpath”); 4) conforms 5 evidence obtained during discovery; and 5) adds a new Monell 6 claim against Nevada County alleging its policies were the moving 7 force behind Wellpath’s failure to provide Plaintiff 8 constitutionally adequate medical care. See Exh. A to Mot., 9 “Second Amended Complaint” (“SAC”) ¶¶ 5, 80, ECF No. 53. Nevada 10 County opposes the SAC because of the new Monell claim. Opp’n at 11 1. 12 13 II. OPINION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 Once the court enters a pretrial scheduling order, FRCP Rule 16 16(b) governs a party’s motion to amend the pleadings. Johnson 17 v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). 18 Under Rule 16, the movant must demonstrate “good cause,” which 19 requires the court to evaluate the movant’s diligence and 20 “reasons for seeking modification.” Id. If the “moving party 21 was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 22 If good cause exists, parties next must satisfy Rule 15. 23 Id. Rule 15 requires the Court to grant leave to amend “when 24 justice so requires” and to do so “with extreme liberality.” 25 Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Morongo Band of 26 Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). 27 Although the Court should not grant leave to amend under Rule 15 28 “automatically,” granting leave is appropriate absent a showing 1 of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, or 2 futility of amendment. In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas (“In 3 re W. States”), 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013). 4 B. Analysis 5 Wellpath neither opposed or stipulated to Plaintiff’s SAC. 6 Reply at 1. Nevada County contests the addition of the new 7 Monell claim because it contends Plaintiff seeks amendment 8 without good cause. Opp’n at 1. Plaintiff’s other proposed 9 amendments are unchallenged. After reviewing the parties’ 10 briefings, the Court finds Plaintiff’s unopposed modifications 11 meet Rule 16’s and Rule 15’s standards and grants Plaintiff leave 12 to amend accordingly. The Court’s remaining analysis is limited 13 to the contested Monell claim as a result. 14 1. Rule 16(b) 15 Rule 16(b)’s good cause requirement “typically will not be 16 met where the party seeking to modify the pretrial scheduling 17 order has been aware of the facts and theories supporting 18 amendment since the inception of the action.” Id. at 737. 19 “[C]arelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and 20 offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 21 610. Plaintiff argues he had good cause to add the new Monell 22 claim because Wellpath’s counsel engaged in “unwarranted delays” 23 in response to Plaintiff’s requests to depose its employees. 24 Decl. of Patrick H. Dwyer in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Decl.”) 25 at 19, ECF No. 53. Because of this behavior, Plaintiff argues: 26 (1) he was unable to depose Boucher until June 14, 2022; 27 (2) Boucher’s testimony provides evidence showing Nevada County 28 acted as the moving force behind Wellpath’s conduct; and (3) he 1 could only assert his new claim in accordance with FRCP Rule 2 11(b) after acquiring this evidence. Pl.’s Suppl. Decl. at 4. 3 Nevada County argues Plaintiff fails to show good cause 4 because the SAC is not based on new facts and Plaintiff should 5 have sought leave to amend his complaint earlier than two weeks 6 before the close of discovery. Opp’n at 3. Specifically, the 7 County contends good cause cannot be shown where a party knew of 8 facts and theories supporting amendment “long ago,” and that 9 Plaintiff could have contemplated the new claim following 10 Stanley’s, Osborne’s, Tirpak’s, and Adams’s depositions that were 11 completed by December 16, 2021. Opp’n at 5. The County also 12 points to Plaintiff providing a draft of the SAC on June 6, 2022 13 including the new claim prior to Boucher’s deposition on 14 June 14,2022. Id. As a result, the County concludes it “is 15 extremely misleading” of Plaintiff to argue Boucher’s testimony 16 was “necessary for adding the new cause of action when Plaintiff 17 already had a proposed SAC before these depositions.” Opp’n at 18 6. 19 To support its contentions, Nevada County points to caselaw 20 where leave to amend was denied. See Nails v. Haid, SACV 12-0439 21 GW SS, 2014 WL 8734139, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014) (denying 22 plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend its complaint to add 23 thirteen new defendants near discovery’s close where plaintiff 24 offered no explanation for its delayed request); Xyratex Tech., 25 Ltd. v. Teradyne, Inc., No. CV08-04545 SJO PLAX, 2009 WL 26 10702551, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2009) (denying defendant’s 27 motion to amend its reply to include counterclaims where 28 defendant failed to explain why it wanted bring two patent 1 infringement claims when it originally filed two minor 2 counterclaims); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 3 465 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding District Court’s 4 order denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend because 5 plaintiff failed to explain why it drastically changed its 6 litigation that could have potentially caused defendant 7 additional litigation costs). 8 The Court finds these cases are incongruent to the instant 9 one. Here, adding the new Monell claim will not greatly alter 10 the nature of the litigation or heighten the party’s expenses 11 because Plaintiff already has an existing Monell claim against 12 Nevada County. As a result, unlike the cases above, Monell 13 liability has been a part of this case’s nature since its 14 genesis. Moreover, Plaintiff reasonably explains why he seeks 15 amendment now. In turn, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument 16 that he could viably assert his new Monell claims only after 17 acquiring Boucher’s testimony persuasive. The Court also finds 18 Plaintiff was not careless or at fault for the timing of 19 Boucher’s deposition. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has 20 shown good cause under Rule 16(b). 21 2. Rule 15 22 Rule 15 requires leave to amend be freely given when justice 23 so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Ninth Circuit has 24 repeatedly stated that “this policy is to be applied with extreme 25 liberality.” See, e.g., Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 26 Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001); Morongo Band of Mission 27 Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). Nevada 28 County only opposes Plaintiff’s amendment on the grounds that it 1 is futile and prejudicial. See Opp'n at 5–6. Neither factor 2 suggests Plaintiffs’ motion falls short of Rule 15’s forgiving 3 standard. 4 a. Futile 5 Courts consistently find an amendment futile where parties 6 seek the addition of a claim that lacks a valid legal or factual 7 basis. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) 8 (affirming district court ruling denying plaintiff’s SAC where 9 the claim sought lacked a legal basis); Maldonado v. City of 10 Ripon, No. 217CV00478TLNKJN, 2021 WL 2682163, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 11 June 30, 2021) (denying party’s SAC where plaintiff failed to 12 allege any new facts that would support its claim because such an 13 amendment would be futile.). 14 Plaintiff contends his new Monell claim is not futile 15 because it is grounded in a viable legal theory that Hagan v. 16 California Forensic Med. Grp., CIVS07-1095 LKK/DAD, 2009 WL 17 728465, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009) recognized. Pl.’s Mem. in 18 Supp. of Mot. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 7-8, ECF No. 53. In that case, 19 Hagan died of severe asthma complications after receiving 20 questionable medical care while being transferred between prison 21 facilities. His family filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims thereafter. 22 Although the Hagan Court ultimately denied Hagan’s survivors 23 relief, it did find Monell liability applicable to a municipality 24 where a contracted medical provider commits “a constitutional 25 violation, and the moving force behind this violation was a 26 [c]ounty policy manifesting deliberate indifference to 27 constitutional rights. . . .” Id. 28 Plaintiff alleges Nevada County implements polices that are 1 deliberately indifferent to the medical care WBCF inmates are 2 constitutionally entitled, and that these polices acted as a 3 moving force behind Wellpath’s unconstitutional treatment of 4 Plaintiff. Pl.’s Mem. at 7-8. As a result, Plaintiff argues 5 Hagan’s theory of Monell liability provides him with a viable and 6 applicable cause of action. Id. The County responds this claim 7 is futile “since it does not create a new basis for liability 8 against the county.” Opp’n at 7. 9 The Court disagrees with Nevada County. Although it is true 10 Plaintiff’s new claim results in two Monell actions against the 11 County, the second one is not duplicative of the first. Instead, 12 the new Monell claim is based on a different theory of liability 13 that Hagan found actionable. Further, Nevada County does not 14 allege Plaintiff’s amendment is futile because it lacks a factual 15 basis. As a result, this Court finds the amendment is not futile 16 under Rule 15. 17 b. Prejudice 18 The Court also finds Plaintiff’s amendment of the SAC will 19 not cause Defendants undue prejudice. Prejudice is the 20 “touchstone of the inquiry under [R]ule 15(a).” Eminence Capital, 21 LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 22 Indeed, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 23 party that carries the greatest weight” when a court decides 24 whether granting leave to amend is proper. Id. In turn, courts 25 have found a proposed amendment does not prejudice a defendant 26 when “the operative facts remain the same.” Hurn v. Ret. Fund 27 Tr. of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Indus. of S. California, 648 28 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, prejudice occurs when 1 new claims “greatly alter[] the nature of litigation” so that 2 defendants must undertake “an entirely new course of defense.” 3 Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 893 F.2d at 1079. 4 Plaintiff argues its new claim does not prejudice Nevada 5 County because they have been on notice since this action’s 6 inception that their operational relationship with Wellpath would 7 be a focal point of litigation. Pl.’s Mem. at 8. Plaintiff 8 argues the same is true of Defendants’ respective medical 9 policies, practices, and procedures (“Medical PPPs”). Id. The 10 County, in response, argues the SAC’s new claim will require 11 additional written discovery and depositions regarding Wellpath’s 12 Medical PPPs since its litigation strategy is based “on the known 13 claims for relief.” Opp’n at 6. 14 The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive because: 15 (1) the operative facts remain the same here in that Plaintiff 16 always alleged Defendants’ Medical PPPs and operational 17 relationship violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and 18 (2) the new claim will not significantly alter the nature of the 19 litigation since Plaintiff’s FAC alleged Nevada County was liable 20 under Monell. Moreover, as ordered below, the Court will permit 21 additional discovery to be conducted by the parties as needed. 22 23 III. SANCTIONS 24 This Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements on 25 June 25, 2021. See Scheduling Order. This Scheduling Order 26 limits reply memoranda to five pages. Scheduling Order at 27 3. The Scheduling Order also states that an attorney who exceeds 28 the page limit must pay monetary sanctions of $50 per ——— mee III IIE IIIS REINO EI IEE IIE DS eee eee 1] page. Id. Plaintiff exceeded the Court’s five-page limit on 2 reply memoranda by five pages. See Reply. The Court therefore 3 ORDERS Plaintiff’s counsel to pay $250.00 to the Clerk for the 4 EBastern District of California no later than seven days from the 5 | date of this Order. 6 7 Iv. ORDER 8 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 9 Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 10 Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall be filed within five (5) days 11 of this order. Defendants’ responsive pleadings are due twenty 12 (20) days thereafter. The Court vacates the original and 13 | modified scheduling orders at ECF No. 48 and Defendants’ Motions 14 for Summary Judgment at ECF Nos. 68 & 69. After Defendants’ 15 responsive pleadings are filed, the parties shall file a joint 16 status conference statement, proposing new dates for discovery 17 cut off, expert witness disclosures, expert discovery cut off, 18 dispositive motions, pretrial conference, and trial. The Court 19 | will issue a new scheduling order upon receipt of the joint 20 statement. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 Dated: September 19, 2022 23 opens JOHN A. MENDEZ 25 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 26 27 28 11