Cooper v. City of Fairfield ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 PATRICIA V. COOPER, No. 2:21-CV-01538-JAM-KJN individually as Guardian Ad 11 Litem for minors Z.R.; Z.R., JR.; and D.R., successors-in- 12 interest to ZACHARY T. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS ROBINSON, 13 Plaintiffs, 14 v. 15 CITY OF FAIRFIELD; FAIRFIELD 16 POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ITS OFFICERS; OFFICER KENNAN 17 SIEVERS; OFFICER MATTHEW THOMAS, 18 Defendants. 19 20 Plaintiff Patricia V. Cooper (“Plaintiff”) sued in her 21 individual capacity, as a successor-in-interest to Zachary T. 22 Robinson (“Decedent”), and as Guardian Ad Litem for minors Z.R., 23 Z.R., Junior and D.R., to recover punitive and compensatory 24 damages from the City of Fairfield, Kennan Sievers, and Matthew 25 Thomas (“Defendants”) for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First 26 Amended Compl. (“FAC”)1, ECF No. 21. Defendants moved to 27 1 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is properly referred to as the 28 “FAC” and not, as Defendants contend, the “SAC.” 1 dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 24. Plaintiff 2 opposed the motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 28. Several months before 3 the filing of the FAC, Defendants moved to dismiss the initial 4 complaint on separate grounds and Plaintiff moved for a 30-day 5 extension of time to file a motion in opposition. First Mot. to 6 Dismiss, ECF No. 3; Mot. for Ext. of Time, ECF No. 16. 7 For the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS 8 Defendants’ second motion to dismiss and DISMISSES AS MOOT 9 Defendants’ first motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s motion for an 10 extension of time. 11 12 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 13 On or around January 31, 2022, Decedent was operating a 14 Harley Davidson motorcycle going eastbound on Travis Boulevard 15 and stopped at an intersection before the on-ramp to I-80 East. 16 FAC ¶ 16. Defendant Officer Kennan Sievers was positioned in his 17 police car at the entrance of the on-ramp, where he saw Decedent 18 accelerate through the red light at the intersection and make a 19 left turn onto the freeway, passing Sievers’ car. Id. Sievers 20 positioned his car behind Decedent’s motorcycle to conduct a 21 traffic stop, where he observed the motorcycle quickly 22 accelerate. Id. Sievers activated his emergency lights and 23 siren as Decedent entered onto the freeway. Id. Decedent did 24 not yield to Sievers’ attempts to conduct a traffic stop and 25 continued to accelerate to a speed of approximately 105 miles per 26 hour. Id. Between the Lagoon Valley Road and Cherry Glen exits, 27 Decedent quickly decelerated, made a U-turn, and began driving 28 west on I-80 East into oncoming traffic. Id. At this point, 1 Sievers discontinued pursuit and provided a description to 2 dispatch of Decedent and his motorcycle. Id. 3 Due to safety concerns, no other officer started pursuit of 4 Decedent, instead providing observation updates. Id. Officers 5 observed Decedent exit I-80 at the Manuel Campos off-ramp and 6 continue south on North Texas Street. Id. Decedent then passed 7 through a red light at the intersection of North Texas Street and 8 Travis Boulevard, travelling approximately 70 miles per hour. 9 Id. Moments later, an officer reported they heard a collision on 10 North Texas Street as it curved into West Texas Street. Id. 11 Responding officers reported to the site and observed Decedent 12 had been in a collision and was unconscious. Id. Responding 13 officers provided medical assistant to Decedent, but Decedent 14 succumbed to his injuries at the scene. Id. Sievers noted 15 extensive damage to Decedent’s motorcycle, including sliding 16 damage to both sides and a severely deformed front wheel, and 17 damage to a portion of the cement sidewalk. Id. Sievers filed a 18 police report with these findings that was later reviewed by 19 Defendant Officer Matthew Thomas. Exhibit A, ECF No. 1. 20 Plaintiff alleges that there was also extensive damage to the 21 back of the motorcycle that made the vehicle inoperable. Id. 22 ¶ 17. Plaintiff attributes this damage to the alleged use of the 23 PIT (Pursuit Intervention Technique) maneuver, where unnamed, DOE 24 officers rear-ended Decedent’s motorcycle during pursuit. Id. 25 ¶¶ 19, 21. 26 On August 26, 2021, this action was removed from state 27 court. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. One week later, Defendants 28 moved to dismiss the initial complaint. First Mot. to Dismiss. 1 On March 21, 2022, Plaintiff moved for a 30-day extension of time 2 to file a motion in opposition. Mot. for Ext. of Time. Two 3 months later, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC, bringing causes 4 of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) detention and arrest, 5 (2) excessive force, (3) substantive due process, 6 (4) ratification, (5) inadequate training, (6) unconstitutional 7 custom, practice, or policy, and (7) civil conspiracy. See FAC. 8 Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under FRCP 12(b)(6) for 9 failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Mot. 10 at 4. Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Opp’n. 11 12 II. OPINION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 15 claim upon which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6), the 16 Court must accept the allegations in the FAC as true and draw 17 all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Moss v. U.S. 18 Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft 19 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The FAC must possess more 20 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 21 action;” it must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations 22 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 23 level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 24 (2007). 25 B. Analysis 26 1. Claim One: Detention and Arrest 27 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first claim alleging 28 Decedent’s unlawful detention and arrest under the Fourth 1 Amendment should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s pleading is 2 insufficient to establish Defendants Sievers and Thomas were 3 involved in the alleged conduct. Mot. at 5. Defendants note the 4 FAC makes no reference to Sievers or Thomas, instead solely 5 referring to the alleged actions of unnamed, DOE officers as the 6 perpetrators of both the high-speed chase of Decedent and the 7 later PIT maneuver on Decedent’s motorcycle. Id. 8 Plaintiff argues that the motion to dismiss concedes that 9 unnamed officers committed the alleged constitutional violation 10 against Decedent and that these uncontested facts are sufficient 11 to maintain the action against Defendant City of Fairfield and, 12 by extension, Officers Sievers and Thomas. Opp’n, at 9. 13 Plaintiff further states that Sievers and Thomas coordinated with 14 the unnamed officers and were at the scene of the collision, 15 which is enough for the Court to reasonably infer that Sievers 16 and Thomas committed the alleged constitutional violation. Id. 17 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts 18 sufficient to maintain this claim against Sievers and Thomas. 19 The FAC must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations 20 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 21 level.” Twombly, at 554. Here, in opposing this motion, 22 Plaintiff’s contention that Sievers and Thomas were involved in 23 the alleged constitutional violation fails to rise beyond 24 speculation. The FAC attributes the conduct at issue, namely the 25 high-speed chase and the execution of the PIT maneuver, entirely 26 to DOE officers. FAC ¶¶ 30-34. At no point does the FAC mention 27 Sievers or Thomas or allege any non-conclusory facts that could 28 lead to a reasonable inference that they were involved. In the 1 absence of these facts, the Court dismisses this claim against 2 Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice. 3 The Court further notes that the Fairfield Police Department 4 is not a properly named defendant for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. 5 See Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. 6 Cal. 1996) (finding the county was a proper defendant but that 7 suing an agency of the county was improper). It has also been 8 established that a municipal defendant cannot be held liable 9 under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. Hunter v. Cnty. 10 of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff 11 has failed to allege any facts under this first claim nor under 12 claims two, three, and seven to support liability against 13 Defendant City of Fairfield outside of respondeat superior, which 14 also makes the City of Fairfield an improper defendant for these 15 claims. The Court also dismisses Defendants Fairfield Police 16 Department and City of Fairfield from these claims with 17 prejudice. 18 2. Claim Two: Excessive Force 19 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s second claim alleging the 20 use of excessive force against Decedent in violation of the 21 Fourth Amendment should be dismissed for the same reasons as the 22 first claim, i.e., because Plaintiff’s pleading is insufficient 23 to establish that Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged 24 conduct. Mot. at 5-6. Defendants note the complaint makes no 25 reference to Sievers or Thomas, instead attributing the conduct 26 at issue, the alleged use of the PIT maneuver on Decedent’s 27 motorcycle, entirely to unnamed officers. Id. 28 Plaintiff argues that Sievers and Thomas worked together 1 with the unnamed officers to “corner and cause [D]ecedent to run 2 off the road.” Opp’n at 9. So, Plaintiff argues that the motion 3 fails to cast doubt on the culpability of Sievers and Thomas 4 alongside the unnamed officers. Id. 5 Once again, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to 6 allege facts sufficient to maintain this claim against Sievers 7 and Thomas. The FAC must contain non-conclusory, factual 8 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the 9 speculative level.” Twombly, at 554. Here, Plaintiff’s 10 argument that Sievers and Thomas worked with unnamed officers to 11 coordinate a PIT maneuver on Decedent’s motorcycle is entirely 12 conclusory and unsupported by the facts; Plaintiff offers no 13 evidence that Sievers resumed pursuit of Decedent and then 14 coordinated with DOE officers after Decedent made a U-turn on I- 15 80 or that Matthews was ever physically present at any of the 16 events relevant to this case. Plaintiff’s argument is also 17 inconsistent with the allegations in the FAC, which attribute 18 the use of excessive force entirely to the conduct of DOE 19 officers. In the absence of the non-conclusory, factual 20 allegations necessary to sustain this claim, the Court dismisses 21 this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas without 22 prejudice. 23 3. Claim Three: Substantive Due Process 24 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s third claim alleging due 25 process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment should be 26 dismissed because the pleading is insufficient to (1) establish 27 that Sievers and Thomas were involved in the alleged conduct and 28 (2) meet the heightened “shock the conscience” pleading standard 1 required for a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Mot. at 6. 2 Defendants contend that this third claim fails to attribute any 3 of the alleged wrongful conduct to either named officer, instead 4 attributing the conduct entirely to DOE officers. Id. Also, 5 Defendants point out that the alleged use of the PIT maneuver was 6 associated with a legitimate law enforcement objective and not 7 for the purpose of harming Decedent outside of that context. 8 Plaintiff’s claim therefore fails to meet the requisite pleading 9 standard under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 6-7. 10 Plaintiff’s argument in opposition does not address 11 Defendants’ insufficient pleading argument and instead cites 12 federal case law regarding the Fourteenth Amendment liberty 13 interests that exist for familial relations of decedents. Opp’n 14 at 9-10. Plaintiff notes the facts of Zion v. County of Orange, 15 874 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2017), stating that the circumstances of 16 that case are similar to this case as grounds for denying 17 Defendants’ motion. The Court disagrees. 18 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain 19 this third claim against Sievers and Thomas. The FAC must 20 contain non-conclusory, factual allegations sufficient “to raise 21 a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, at 22 554. Neither the FAC nor the opposing motion makes any mention 23 of Sievers or Thomas or any alleged actions by them that could 24 allow the Court to reasonably infer that they were involved in 25 the alleged substantive due process violation. The FAC states 26 that DOE officers violated Plaintiff’s substantive due process 27 rights and that DOE officers are the “direct and proximate 28 cause” of Plaintiff’s suffering, not Sievers or Thomas. FAC 1 ¶¶ 46-47. In the absence of the factual allegations necessary 2 to sustain this claim, the Court dismisses this claim against 3 Defendants Sievers and Thomas without prejudice. 4 4. Claims Four Through Six: Monell Liability 5 In claims four, five, and six, the FAC alleges Monell 6 liability against Defendant City of Fairfield on three separate 7 grounds: (1) ratification, (2) inadequate training, and 8 (3) unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy. FAC ¶¶ 50-80. 9 Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because 10 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support any of 11 the possible theories of liability. Mot. at 7 (citing Gillette 12 v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)). Defendants 13 argue that the FAC only lists the legal elements of each Monell 14 theory without supporting them with underlying facts. Id. at 8. 15 Plaintiff’s argument in opposition recites case law 16 regarding the imposition of liability on a municipal defendant, 17 particularly how inadequate training can result in liability; but 18 Plaintiff does not directly address Defendants’ arguments or 19 point to any factual support in the complaint for a Monell claim. 20 Opp’n at 11-12. 21 For all three claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 22 failed to allege facts sufficient to maintain its municipal 23 liability claims against City of Fairfield. To establish 24 municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show (1) they 25 possessed a constitutional right and were deprived of that 26 right, (2) the municipality had a policy, (3) the policy amounts 27 to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional 28 right, and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the 1 constitutional violation. Sweiha v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. 19- 2 CV-03098-LB, WL 48482227 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Plumeau v. 3 Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 4 1997)). Plaintiff must go beyond recitation of the Monell 5 elements and must allege sufficient allegations of underlying 6 facts to support her claim. Starr v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 7 (9th Cir. 2011), AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 8 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff has failed to do so in 9 this case. The FAC lacks the factual allegations that would 10 support any of the possible theories of liability. As 11 Defendants note, reciting a formula without providing any 12 underlying facts is insufficient to maintain a legal claim. In 13 the absence of the factual allegations necessary to sustain 14 these claims, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s 15 § 1983 municipal liability claims under Monell against Defendant 16 City of Fairfield. 17 5. Claim Seven: Civil Conspiracy 18 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s seventh claim alleging a 19 civil conspiracy to use unreasonable and excessive force against 20 Decedent should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s pleading is 21 insufficient to establish an agreement or meeting of the minds to 22 violate constitutional rights; the FAC simply states that 23 officers intentionally used the PIT maneuver on Decedent’s 24 motorcycle. Mot. at 8, FAC ¶ 82. Plaintiff argues in opposition 25 that officers coordinated with each other to perform the 26 maneuver, which is sufficient to show a meeting of the minds and, 27 as a result, a conspiracy to use unreasonable and excessive force 28 against Decedent. Opp’n at 12-13. 1 Once again, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient 2 to maintain this claim against Defendants Sievers and Thomas. In 3 order to allege a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show 4 “an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional 5 rights.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). To 6 be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the 7 exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least 8 share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. at 441. This 9 agreement or meeting of the minds may be inferred based on 10 circumstantial evidence, such as the actions of the defendants. 11 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th 12 Cir. 1999). The only fact alleged by Plaintiff to support this 13 claim is the conclusory statement that officers “acted in concert 14 to perform the PIT maneuver.” Opp’n at 12-13. Plaintiff offers 15 no non-conclusory facts in the FAC that could lead the Court to 16 the reasonable inference that either the named or DOE officers 17 acted together to perform the PIT maneuver on Decedent. On the 18 contrary, the facts suggest that (1) Officers Sievers and Thomas 19 were not involved in the pursuit that led to the alleged use of 20 the PIT maneuver and (2) that there was no coordination between 21 DOE officers outside of relaying updates on Decedent’s route and 22 location after Decedent exited I-80. FAC ¶ 16. In the absence 23 of factual allegations necessary to sustain this civil conspiracy 24 claim, the Court dismisses the claim against Defendants Sievers 25 and Thomas without prejudice. 26 6. Prior Motions 27 On September 9, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 28 initial complaint and Plaintiff moved for a 30-day extension of eee RE OO II EI INE IED Oe 1 time to file a motion in opposition. See First Mot. to Dismiss; 2 Mot. for Ext. of Time. On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed her FAC 3 in this Court, thereby rendering moot the initial motion to 4 dismiss and the motion for extension of time. Accordingly, the 5 | Court dismisses these motions as moot. 6 7 IIl. ORDER 8 For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS 9 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Claims one, two, three, and seven 10 against Defendants City of Fairfield and Fairfield Police 11 Department are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, because 12 amendment is not futile on the remaining claims, this Court 13 grants Plaintiff leave to amend the remaining claims. Eminence 14 Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003) 15 (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not 16 | appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not 17 be saved by amendment.”). 18 If Plaintiff elects to amend her complaint, she shall file a 19 Second Amended Complaint within twenty days of this Order. 20 Defendants’ responsive pleading is due twenty days thereafter. 21 Defendants’ September 9, 2021 motion to dismiss and 22 Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time are dismissed as 23 moot. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: September 19, 2022 26 27 a 7 Yond JOHN A. MENDEZ 28 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12