Mendoza v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc. ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIKA MENDOZA, et al., an individual, No. 1:20-cv-1133-TLN-CKD on behalf of herself and all others similarly 12 situated, 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER 14 v. 15 MIDEA MICROWAVE AND ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES 16 MANUFACTURING CO. LTD, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 This matter1 is before the Court on Defendant Midea Microwave and Electrical 20 Appliances Manufacturing Co., Ltd.’s (“Midea China”) Motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 199.) 21 Plaintiffs Erika Mendoza and James Hunt (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition. (ECF 22 No. 212.) Midea China filed a reply. (ECF No. 222.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 23 GRANTS Midea China’s motion. 24 25 1 The Court acknowledges the delay in the issuance of this Order. The overwhelming caseload in the Eastern District of California has been well publicized. On September 13, 2023, 26 Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller reassigned this action to the undersigned following the 27 appointment of Judge Ana de Alba to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court prioritized resolution of the pending motions to dismiss in this action. 28 1 Also before the Court is Defendant Midea America Corp.’s (“Midea America”)2 Motion 2 to Dismiss. (ECF No. 201.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition. (ECF No. 212.) Midea America filed 3 a reply. (ECF No. 220). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Midea America’s 4 motion. 5 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 The Court need not recount all background facts as they are fully set forth in the Court’s 7 September 6, 2022, order. (ECF No. 240.) In short, Plaintiffs are California residents who 8 allegedly suffered economic injury as the result of defective “over-the-range” (“OTR”) 9 microwaves, whose handles reached unsafe temperatures while the cooking surface below was in 10 use (the “handle defect”). (ECF No. 194 at 2, 4, 6.) Plaintiffs allege Midea China, a 11 manufacturing company incorporated and with its principal place of business in China, 12 manufactured several of the microwaves at issue (the “Microwaves”). (Id. at 8.) According to 13 Plaintiffs, Midea China performed product testing on the Microwaves before shipping them to the 14 United States, which showed the Microwaves’ handles reached unsafe temperatures while the 15 cooking surface below was in use. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs also allege Midea America, a company 16 incorporated in Florida with its principal place of business in New Jersey, conducted product 17 testing on the Microwaves and knew of the handle defect. (Id. at 6, 12.) Both Midea China and 18 Midea America are a part of Midea Group Co. Ltd. (“Midea Group”). (ECF No. 212 at 18.) 19 Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action on May 19, 2017, in Stanislaus County 20 Superior Court against Electrolux Home Products Inc. (“Electrolux”), a distributor of the 21 Microwaves. (ECF No. 1.) Electrolux removed this action to federal court and moved to transfer 22 venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 4 at 50.) Venue was 23 transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where the court consolidated this action with 24 related actions pending in that district, Rice v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., No. 4:15-cv- 25 00371-MWB, and Mauro v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc., Case No. 4:18-cv-00539-MWB. 26 (ECF No. 153 at 2.) On October 3, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated class action 27 2 The action involves eight named Defendants and ten Doe Defendants. Only Midea China 28 and Midea America are parties to the instant motions. 1 complaint against Electrolux, Midea China, Midea America, Modesto Direct Appliance 2 (“Modesto”), Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (“Lowe’s”), Sharp Appliances Thailand Limited 3 (“SATL”), and Sharp Manufacturing Company of America (“SMCA”) (collectively, 4 “Defendants”). Rice, No. 14:15-cv-00371-MWB, ECF No. 173. On August 13, 2020, the Middle 5 District of Pennsylvania transferred this action back to the Eastern District of California. (ECF 6 No. 155.) 7 On November 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), 8 alleging Defendants violated California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California’s 9 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song- 10 Beverly Act”). (ECF No. 194.) On November 30, 2020, Midea China, SAMC, SATL, and 11 Midea America each filed separate motions to dismiss, and Electrolux, Lowe’s, and Modesto 12 filed a joint motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 196, 198, 199, 201, 202.) On September 6, 2022, the 13 Court granted SMCA’s and SATL’s motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 196, 198) Plaintiffs’ claims 14 for lack of standing as to Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief only. (ECF No. 240.) The Court 15 also granted SMCA’s and SATL’s motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 196, 198) under Rule 12(b)(2) 16 for lack of personal jurisdiction with leave to amend. (ECF No. 240.) 17 In Midea China and Midea America’s instant motions to dismiss, both move to dismiss 18 Plaintiffs’ FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2) for lack of personal 19 jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable claim. (ECF No. 199-1 at 7.) 20 Because the Court GRANTS both motions under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, 21 the Court need not and does not address Midea China and Midea America’s remaining arguments 22 regarding Rule 12(b)(6). 23 II. WRIT OF MANDAMUS 24 As an initial matter, the Court will briefly address the procedural history in this action 25 relevant to the personal jurisdiction issue. In September 2020, SMCA, SATL, Midea China, and 26 Midea America filed petitions for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 27 Circuit, challenging the order of the Middle District of Pennsylvania transferring this action to 28 this Court. See In re Sharp Mfg. Co. Am., No. 20-3039, Doc. Nos. 1, 18; In re Sharp Appliances 1 Thailand Ltd., No. 20-2807 (3d. Cir.), Doc. Nos. 1, 30; In re Midea Microwave & Electrical 2 Appliances Mfg. Co. Ltd., No. 20-2806 (3d. Cir.), Doc. Nos. 1, 36; In re Midea America Corp., 3 No. 20-2914 (3d. Cir.), Doc. Nos. 1, 25. The Third Circuit denied the petitions, holding “any 4 error committed by the District Court was not so clear as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of 5 mandamus.” In re Sharp Mfg. Co. Am., No. 20-3039 (3d. Cir.), Doc. No. 18 at 2. On the issue of 6 personal jurisdiction, the Third Circuit stated: 7 We note that, in transferring the case, the District Court [for the Middle District of Pennsylvania] concluded that the plaintiffs made 8 a “prima facie showing” that the transferee court [in the Eastern District of California] has personal jurisdiction over the petitioning 9 defendants. In its transfer order, however, the District Court emphasized that it held plaintiffs only to a “light” burden on that 10 issue and expressly provided that defendants could “further challenge the jurisdictional issue in the Eastern District of 11 California.” Thus, we do not read the District Court’s order as deciding the issue of personal jurisdiction in a way that constitutes 12 law of the case in the transferee court under Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Co., 486 U.S. 800, 816–17 (1988). 13 14 Id. 15 Accordingly, the Court finds it is appropriate to address whether the Court 16 has personal jurisdiction over Midea China and Midea America. 17 III. STANDARD OF LAW 18 Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 19 When there is no federal statute authorizing personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law 20 of the state in which the district court sits. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 21 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). This Court sits in California, and California’s long-arm statute is 22 coextensive with federal due process requirements. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10. Accordingly, 23 the “jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” Mavrix Photo, 24 647 F.3d at 1223 (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 25 (2004)). 26 The traditional bases for exercising personal jurisdiction are: (1) service of process in the 27 forum state; (2) domicile within the forum state at the time the action is commenced; or (3) 28 consent to jurisdiction in the forum state. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 1 880 (2011). However, “[f]or a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 2 defendant, that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such 3 that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 4 justice.’” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 5 316(1945)). Under the minimum contacts test, there are two categories of personal jurisdiction: 6 general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126–27 7 (2014). 8 In opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff 9 bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over the defendant. Wash. Shoe Co. v. A– 10 Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671–72 (9th Cir. 2012). However, when the defendant’s 11 motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only 12 make a “prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Id. 13 (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Court resolves 14 all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 672. 15 IV. MIDEA CHINA’S MOTION TO DISMISS 16 Midea China asserts the Court should grant its motion under Rule 12(b)(2) because the 17 Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Midea China. (ECF No. 199-1 at 17.) In its briefing, 18 Plaintiffs do not allege Midea China waived or consented to personal jurisdiction in California or 19 that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Midea China. (See ECF No. 212 at 13–18.) 20 Instead, Plaintiffs assert the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Midea China. (Id. at 21 13.) 22 A. Specific Jurisdiction 23 Specific jurisdiction is satisfied when the defendant’s activities are directed toward the 24 forum state and the defendant’s liability arises out of or relates to those activities. Daimler, 571 25 U.S. at 127. In the Ninth Circuit, courts employ a three-part test to determine whether a 26 defendant’s contacts suffice to establish specific jurisdiction: “(1) the nonresident defendant must 27 have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some 28 affirmative act or conduct; (2) plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s 1 forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Roth v. Garcia 2 Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620–21 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the 3 first two prongs, and if they are met, the burden shifts to the defendant “to set forth a compelling 4 case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1227– 5 28 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 6 The first step of the three-part specific jurisdiction test addresses the directionality and 7 intent of a defendant’s conduct by examining whether a defendant has “purposefully availed” 8 itself of or “purposefully directed” its conduct at or to the forum. Where, as here, a case is based 9 on an alleged tort, courts in the Ninth Circuit employ a purposeful direction analysis under the 10 three-part Calder “effects” test. See Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 11 F.3d 597, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984)). Under the 12 Calder test, a plaintiff must allege a defendant: “(1) committed an intentional act[;] (2) expressly 13 aimed at the forum state[;] (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in 14 the forum state.” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 i. Intentional Act 16 Under the first element, a defendant commits an intentional act when the defendant acts 17 with “the intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world.” Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 18 F.3d at 806. In the instant case, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Midea China 19 committed an intentional act by manufacturing and performing product testing on the 20 Microwaves, which were later sold by Midea China to Electrolux for distribution in the United 21 States. (ECF No. 194 at 5, 8–9); see, e.g., Maeda v. Pinnacle Foods Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 22 1246 (D. Haw. 2019) (alleged deceptive labeling of a snack product sold in the forum state 23 constitutes an intentional act); Loomis v. Slendertone Dist., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1068 24 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (development, advertising, and sale of a product constitutes intentional act). 25 ii. Contacts with Forum State 26 Under the second element, Plaintiffs must allege Midea China’s “allegedly tortious act 27 was expressly aimed at the forum state.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 2015). 28 The express aiming requirement is not satisfied merely “by a defendant’s knowledge that harm 1 may be inflicted on a plaintiff in a particular forum.” AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 2 1201, 1209 n.5 (9th Cir. 2020). Rather, a court’s inquiry should focus on the “defendant’s 3 contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with the persons who reside 4 there.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). 5 In the instant case, Plaintiffs first argue Midea China expressly aimed its conduct at 6 California because “Midea China intentionally manufactured the Microwaves for distribution in 7 the United States, including California, as ‘Over-the Range’ Microwaves while knowingly 8 concealing the Handle Defect.” (ECF No. 212 at 16.) Put differently, Plaintiffs argue Midea 9 China aimed its conduct at California because Midea China placed the Microwaves it 10 manufactured into the stream of commerce. However, the Ninth Circuit has not adopted the 11 “stream of commerce” theory. Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 12 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (In the 13 Ninth Circuit, “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an 14 act purposefully directed toward a forum state.”)); Walsh v. LG Chem Ltd., 834 F.App’x 310 (9th 15 Cir. 2020) (“This is particularly true where … [a plaintiff] only identifies actions directed at the 16 entire United States market, rather than the relevant forum.”). 17 Rather, a plaintiff must allege additional conduct beyond merely placing a product in the 18 stream of commerce. Holland, 485 F.3d at 459. This conduct may include “designing the 19 product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for 20 providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a 21 distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 22 Plaintiffs have not alleged Midea China engaged in any of these activities. While Plaintiffs 23 contend Midea China knew the Microwaves would be sold in California because the Microwaves 24 included a warning stating, “[t]he California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act 25 requires the Governor of California to publish a list of substances known to the state to cause 26 cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm and requires businesses to warn customers of 27 potential exposure to such substances,” this warning hardly suggests Midea China designed or 28 marketed the Microwaves for sale in California. (See ECF No. 212 at 16.) As stated in the 1 Court’s September 6, 2022 Order, “[a]t most, the inclusion of this warning demonstrates 2 compliance with a state law and a possible awareness … that the product could end up being sold 3 in California.” (ECF No. 240 at 26.) However, “defendant’s awareness that the stream of 4 commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum state does not convert the mere act of 5 placing the product into the stream of commerce into an act purposefully directed toward the 6 forum state.” Holland, 485 F. 3d at 459. 7 Additionally, Plaintiffs argue Midea China purposefully directed the Microwaves toward 8 California because “Midea China entered into a contract with [Underwriter Laboratories] 9 concerning the Microwaves.” (ECF No. 212 at 16.) According to Plaintiffs, “Midea China 10 conducted and submitted all [Underwriter Laboratories] testing on behalf of Electrolux to 11 [Underwriter Laboratories] for certification and sale in the United States.” (ECF No. 194 at 14.) 12 “[I]n certifying the Microwaves’ compliance with [Underwriter Laboratories] for sale in the 13 United States, including California,” Plaintiffs allege Midea China purposefully directed its 14 conduct at California. (ECF No. 212 at 16.) However, once again, Plaintiffs allegations are 15 unavailing as they demonstrate nothing more than Midea China’s awareness that the Microwaves 16 would be sold in the United States. Certifying its product for sale in the United States alone, does 17 not demonstrate that Midea China purposefully targeted California. See Holland, 485 F. 3d at 18 459. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Midea China expressly aimed 19 any of its conduct at California. 20 iii. Knowledge 21 With regards to the third element, Plaintiffs argue Midea China knew the Microwaves 22 were likely to cause harm in California because, like the defendant in Monje v. Spinmaster, Midea 23 China was actively involved in the manufacturing and testing of the Microwaves and selected a 24 distributor to sell the Microwaves in the United States. CV091713PHXGMS 2013 WL 236988 at 25 *7–9 (D. Ariz. May 29, 2013); (ECF No. 212 at 16–17.) However, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Monje 26 is unpersuasive. In Monje, the court exercised specific personal jurisdiction over an Australian 27 company who was “involved in every aspect [of the product] from design, to manufacture, to 28 distribution.” Monje, 2013 WL 236988 at *21. The Australian company controlled the 1 distribution process by supplying the distributor with “a wealth of marketing material” and 2 “reach[ing] out to potential customers in the United States and invit[ing] them to try its product.” 3 Id. at *23–24. In contrast, Plaintiffs have not alleged Midea China exercised such control over 4 the distribution of the Microwaves in California. The FAC makes clear Midea China 5 manufactured the Microwaves in China, tested the Microwaves in China, and delivered the 6 Microwaves to Electrolux in China for distribution. (ECF No. 194 at 13–16.) Nowhere in the 7 FAC do Plaintiffs allege Midea China retained control over the distribution of the Microwaves 8 once Midea China sold the Microwaves to Electrolux in China. Thus, the Court finds there is no 9 evidence which establishes it was foreseeable to Midea China that its actions in China would 10 cause harm to Plaintiffs in California. 11 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not met their burden in demonstrating the 12 elements of the Calder effects test, and as a result, fail to sufficiently allege Midea China 13 purposefully directed its actions at California. As such, Plaintiffs fail step one of the of the 14 specific personal jurisdiction test, and the Court need not proceed to steps two and three. 15 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Midea China’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2). 16 Although the Court has serious doubts as to Plaintiffs’ ability to cure the deficiencies in the FAC, 17 the Court will give Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend based on the liberal standard in favor of 18 granting leave to amend. See Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) 19 (“Courts are free to grant a party leave to amend whenever justice so requires, and request for 20 leave should be granted with extreme liberality.”). However, the Court cautions Plaintiffs that 21 any amended complaint must cure the above-outlined deficiencies “without contradicting any of 22 the allegations of [the] [FAC].” Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 In other words, any subsequently amended complaint must not allege facts inconsistent with the 24 FAC. Id. at 296–97. 25 V. MIDEA AMERICA’S MOTION TO DISMISS 26 Midea America also asserts the Court should grant its motion under Rule 12(b)(2) because 27 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Midea America. (ECF No. 201-1 at 12.) In opposition, 28 Plaintiffs do not argue Midea America waived or consented to personal jurisdiction in California 1 or that the Court has general personal jurisdiction over Midea America. (See ECF No. 212 at 17– 2 18.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue this Court has specific jurisdiction over Midea America because 3 Midea America is the alter-ego of Midea China. (Id.) 4 “A party seeking to establish jurisdiction over a person or entity can either: (1) show each 5 defendant’s sufficient, direct contacts with the forum state, or (2) use the alter ego theory to 6 ‘extend personal jurisdiction to a foreign parent or subsidiary when, in actuality, the foreign entity 7 is not really separate from its domestic affiliate.’” In re Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 650 (9th 8 Cir. 2019) (quoting Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, under the 9 alter ego theory, a Court may attribute one entity’s contacts with a forum state to its parent 10 company or subsidiary when certain conditions are met. Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1072–73. 11 As previously discussed, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Midea China had 12 sufficient minimum contacts with California to establish personal jurisdiction. Therefore, 13 Plaintiffs cannot argue the Court has personal jurisdiction over Midea America because it is the 14 alter ego of Midea China. 15 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Midea China’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) 16 with leave to amend. 17 VI. JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY 18 Plaintiffs request the Court allow them to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery should 19 the Court find it does not have personal jurisdiction over Midea China and Midea America. (ECF 20 No. 212 at 18.) Discovery is ordinarily granted where “pertinent facts bearing on the question of 21 jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary.” 22 Butcher’s Union Local No. 498, United Foods & Commercial Workers v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 23 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 24 1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)). However, “[w]here a plaintiff’s claim of personal jurisdiction appears 25 to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by 26 defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery.” Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 27 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 259 (M.D.N.C. 28 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, limited discovery should not be permitted to 1 conduct a “fishing expedition.” Mackovich v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-00422-SMS (PC), 2008 2 WL 2053978, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (denying discovery where plaintiff made “no 3 showing that if further discovery were allowed, the outcome of the motion to dismiss would be 4 affected”). 5 In the instant case, the Court finds granting Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery 6 would be futile. Not only have Plaintiffs failed to identify how limited discovery would likely 7 reveal Midea China and Midea America had contacts with California that would give rise to 8 personal jurisdiction, but Plaintiffs have also failed to provide any argument or explanation as to 9 why limited jurisdictional discovery is warranted. Moreover, while this action was before the 10 Middle District of Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs also asked the court for jurisdictional discovery, which 11 the court denied because “Plaintiffs have already had years to conduct this discovery.” Rice, 15- 12 CV-00371-MWB, ECF No. 247 at 28 (“Where a plaintiff had the opportunity to conduct 13 jurisdictional discovery, and then fails to make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction, 14 courts are entitled to deny the plaintiff’s request for further jurisdictional discovery.”) Thus, 15 Plaintiffs had the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery before filing the operative 16 complaint and still failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. 17 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ current request for jurisdictional discovery. 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 VII. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Midea China and Midea America’s 3 | Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 199, 201.) Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint no later 4 | than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing date of the Court’s order resolving the last of 5 | the currently pending motions to dismiss in this action. Midea China and Midea America shall 6 | file responsive pleadings no later than twenty-one (21) days from the electronic filing date of 7 | Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. If Plaintiffs opt to not amend their complaint with regards to the 8 | Court’s personal jurisdiction over Midea China and Midea America, then the Court will dismiss 9 | Midea China and Midea America from this action. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Date: December 7, 2023 12 /) 1S “ \/ Lu 14 = AN Troy L. Nunley> } 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12