Chavez v. Cal-Fire ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PABLO CHAVEZ, Case No. 1:20-cv-00801-JLT-HBK 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 13 v. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS1 14 CAL-FIRE, MARIPOSA COUNTY, MT. BULLION FIRE CAMP, HOLLISTER FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 15 AIR ATTACK BASE, DYN CORP, and U.S. FOREST SERVICE 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter comes before the Court upon periodic review. As more fully set forth below, 19 the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to 20 prosecute this action and timely comply with this Court’s order. 21 I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff Chavez, while a state prisoner,2 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis filed a 23 civil complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). The Complaint stems from events that 24 occurred on October 8, 2014 while Chavez was assigned to a fire crew working in Yosemite National 25 Park before he was incarcerated. (Id. at 5). On November 22, 2021, the undersigned screened 26 27 1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 28 2 Based on the address on the docket, it appears Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint and found that it failed to state a cognizable claim. (Doc. No. 11). 2 Specifically, the Court found it failed to state a claim and, even assuming it states a cognizable claim, 3 the claim appears time barred. Before recommending dismissal of this action, the Court afforded 4 Plaintiff thirty(30) days to file an amended complaint, advise the Court whether he wishes to stand on 5 his Complaint or voluntarily dismiss this action. (Id. at 5). The Court expressly warned Plaintiff 6 that if he “fails to timely respond to this Court Order, i.e., fails to elect and notify the Court of any 7 of the three options, the undersigned will recommend that the district court dismiss this case as a 8 sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and for failing to prosecute this action. 9 (Id. at 6-7). The thirty-day deadline has lapsed and Plaintiff has not elected any of the three 10 options or otherwise moved for an extension of time. (See generally docket). 11 II. APPLICABLE LAW 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily dismiss an action 13 when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. 14 P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations 15 omitted); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) 16 (“[T]he consensus among our sister circuits, with which we agree, is that courts may dismiss 17 under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances.”). Local Rule 110 similarly 18 permits the court to impose sanctions on a party who fails to comply with any order of the court. 19 Involuntary dismissal is a harsh penalty, but it “is incumbent upon the Court to manage its 20 docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of litigants.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 21 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). Before dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the court 22 must consider: (1) the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 23 manage a docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) public policy favoring disposition on 24 the merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. See Applied Underwriters, 913 F.3d 25 at 889 (noting that these five factors “must” be analyzed before a Rule 41 involuntary dismissal) 26 (emphasis added); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (reviewing 27 five factors and independently reviewing the record because district court did not make finding as 28 to each factor); but see Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing 1 the same five factors, but noting the court need not make explicit findings as to each) (emphasis 2 added); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of pro se § 3 1983 action when plaintiff did not amend caption to remove “et al” as the court directed and 4 reiterating that an explicit finding of each factor is not required by the district court). 5 III. ANALYSIS 6 The undersigned considers each of the above-stated factors and concludes dismissing this 7 case is warranted. The expeditious resolution of litigation is deemed to be in the public interest, 8 satisfying the first factor. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 Turning to the second factor, the Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 10 overstated. This Court has “one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation,” and due to unfilled 11 judicial vacancies, which is further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, operates under a 12 declared judicial emergency. See Amended Standing Order in Light of Ongoing Judicial 13 Emergency in the Eastern District of California. The Court’s time is better spent on its other 14 matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a recalcitrant litigant. Indeed, “trial 15 courts do not have time to waste on multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and 16 requirements of our courts.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of 17 district court’s involuntary dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to 18 timely respond to court order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon 19 the size and load of the docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our 20 beleaguered trial judges.”). Delays have the inevitable and inherent risk that evidence will 21 become stale or witnesses' memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, 22 thereby satisfying the third factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Attempting a 23 less drastic action would be futile because Chavez was provided ample time to, at the minimum, 24 notify the court which of the three options from the November 22, 2021 Screening Order he 25 would elect and he has failed to respond. Finally, the instant dismissal is a dismissal without 26 prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with prejudice, thereby addressing the fifth 27 factor. 28 Considering these factors and those set forth supra, as well as binding case law, the 1 | undersigned recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and Local 2 | Rule 110. 3 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 4 This case be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to prosecute this action 5 | and/or comply with the Court’s order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 110. 6 NOTICE TO PARTIES 7 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 9 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 10 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 11 | Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 12 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 13 | 838-39 (Oth Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 14 1S Dated: _ September 26, 2022 oe Zh. Sareh Zackte 16 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28