Gilbert v. Samra ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DARREN GILBERT, Case No. 1:22-cv-00552-ADA-BAM 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND DISMISSING 14 HARKIRAT SINGH SAMRA dba BILL’S STATE LAW CLAIMS WITHOUT SPORT & BAIT SHOP, et al., PREJUDICE 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff Darren Gilbert initiated this action against Defendants Harkirat 19 Singh Samra dba Bill’s Sport & Bait Shop and Fahmi Abdo Alsumeri. (Doc. 1.) The Complaint 20 asserts claims for injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) 21 and the California Health and Safety Code and a claim for statutory damages under California’s 22 Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). (Id.) Defendants have not appeared in this action, and 23 default has been entered. (Doc. 6.) On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for default 24 judgment against Defendants. (Doc. 19.) On December 2, 2022, this Court issued findings and 25 recommendations recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be granted in part. 26 (Doc. 21.) The Court vacated the findings and recommendations. (Doc. 23.) The Court will not 27 address Plaintiff’s pending Motion for Default Judgment until after resolution of these Findings 28 1 and Recommendations. 2 On January 19, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not 3 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim for the reasons 4 stated in Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022) and Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 5 2021). (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff filed a response on February 3, 2023. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons 6 discussed below, the Court recommends declining supplemental jurisdiction and dismissing 7 Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice. 8 I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 9 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, that court “shall 10 have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 11 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 12 III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even if supplemental jurisdiction 13 exists, district courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: 14 The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 15 claim under subsection (a) if— 16 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 17 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which 18 the district court has original jurisdiction, 19 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 20 21 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 22 23 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court has described 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) as a “codification” 24 of the principles of “economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” that underlie the Supreme 25 Court’s earlier jurisprudence concerning pendent jurisdiction. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of 26 Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 27 357 (1988)); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Gibbs”). In 28 Gibbs, the Supreme Court noted that it “has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction 1 is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The justification for 2 pendent jurisdiction “lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 3 litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state 4 claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.” Id. The Court emphasized that 5 “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote 6 justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. 7 District courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims 8 “[d]epending on a host of factors” including “the circumstances of the particular case, the nature 9 of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the 10 state and federal claims.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 173. The supplemental jurisdiction statute 11 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a 12 federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 13 values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 14 350). 15 The Ninth Circuit does not require an “explanation for a district court’s reasons [for 16 declining supplemental jurisdiction] when the district court acts under” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)- 17 (3), San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998), but does 18 require a district court to “articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional in addition 19 to inquiring whether the balance of the Gibbs values provide compelling reasons for declining 20 jurisdiction in such circumstances.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the 21 Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558 (9th Cir. 1994); Vo, 49 F.4th at 1169-1170 (“a district 22 court must: (1) sufficiently explain ‘why the circumstances of the case are exceptional’ under § 23 1367(c)(4); and (2) show that ‘the balance of the Gibbs values provides compelling reasons for 24 declining jurisdiction in such circumstances.’”). According to the Ninth Circuit, this “inquiry is 25 not particularly burdensome.” Executive Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558; Vo, 49 F.4th at 26 1171. When declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), “the 27 court must identify the predicate that triggers the applicability of the category (the exceptional 28 circumstances), and then determine whether, in its judgment, the underlying Gibbs values are best 1 served by declining jurisdiction in the particular case (the compelling reasons).” Executive 2 Software N. Am. Inc, 24 F.3d at 1558. 3 II. DISCUSSION 4 This Court concludes, as have numerous courts before it, the circumstances here are 5 exceptional. See e.g., Garcia v. Maciel, No. 21-CV-03743-JCS, 2022 WL 395316, at *2 (N.D. 6 Cal. Feb. 9, 2022) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court properly 7 declined supplemental jurisdiction in a joint Unruh Act and ADA case based upon the heightened 8 pleading requirements California imposes upon high-frequency litigants. Vo, 49 F.4th. The 9 “high-frequency litigants” subject to those heightened pleading requirements are defined as: 10 A plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints alleging a construction- related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 11 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related 12 accessibility violation. 13 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(1). The definition of “high-frequency litigant” also extends to 14 attorneys. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(b)(2). “High-frequency litigants” are subject to a 15 special filing fee and further heightened pleading requirements. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70616.5; 16 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 17 Plaintiff admits that he has filed more than ten complaints alleging a construction-related 18 accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing of the 19 complaint in this action and thus would be classified as a “high-frequency litigant” had he filed 20 this case in California state court. (Doc. 24 at 2, Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause; 21 Doc. 24-2, Declaration of Darren Gilbert in Response to Order to Show Cause.) Indeed, as noted 22 in the OSC, “Plaintiff Gilbert appears to be a high-frequency litigant, with at least 80 cases filed 23 in this district within the 12-month period from May 6, 2021 to May 6, 2022.” (Doc. 23 at 3.) 24 Counsel for Plaintiff states in her declaration that she is not a high-frequency litigant. (Doc. 24-1, 25 Declaration of Tanya E. Moore in Support of Plaintiff Darren Gilbert’s Response to Order to 26 Show Cause.) 27 Even if Plaintiff or counsel were not a high-frequency litigant, the Ninth Circuit has held 28 1 that district courts need not adjudicate this threshold matter. Forcing the district court to 2 determine if Plaintiff or counsel is a high-frequency litigant would itself run afoul of the Gibbs 3 values—especially comity. Accord Brooke v. Sarodia Suncity LLC, No. ED CV-22-1374 JGB 4 SPX, 2022 WL 17363913, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2022), citing Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173. As Gibbs 5 explains, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to 6 promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable 7 law” by the state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th at 1173–74, citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. If the federal 8 district court is required to adjudicate these threshold matters, it will “deprive the state courts of 9 their critical role in effectuating the policies underlying those reforms.” Id., citing Arroyo, 19 10 F.4th at 1213. 11 If this Court were to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim, 12 the “distinctive configuration of California-law rules—which pair a damages remedy with special 13 procedural requirements aimed at limiting suits by high-frequency litigants—would be rendered 14 ineffectual.” See Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. Indeed, courts have recognized that California's 15 heightened pleading and filing requirements are not limited to accessibility related Unruh Act 16 claims and apply to all construction-related accessibility claims. See Gilbert v. Singh, No. 1:21- 17 CV-01338 AWI HBK, 2023 WL 2239335, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2023) (noting that a 18 plaintiff’s claims under “Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 19955 and 19959 are ‘construction-related 19 accessibility claims’ that are subject to the same pleading and filing requirements as Plaintiff's 20 Unruh Act claim”) (citing Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206). “By enacting restrictions on the filing of 21 construction-related accessibility claims, California has expressed a desire to limit the financial 22 burdens California’s businesses may face for claims for statutory damages under the Unruh Act. 23 Plaintiffs who file these actions in federal court evade these limits and pursue state law damages 24 in a manner inconsistent with the state law’s requirements.” Id. at 1206-07, 1209; (Doc. 27, OSC 25 at 2.) It is not, under the Gibbs factors, “fair” to defendants that a plaintiff may pursue 26 construction-related accessibility claims in this Court while evading the limitations California 27 state law has imposed on such claims. In addition, to allow federal courts to become an “escape 28 hatch” for plaintiffs is also an affront to the comity between federal and state courts. Vo, 49 F.4th 1 (affirming the district court holding that allowing federal courts to be an ‘escape hatch’ for 2 plaintiffs seeking to avoid the heightened requirements would be an “affront to the comity 3 between federal and state courts.”) 4 Moreover, permitting high-frequency litigants to evade California’s limitations on 5 construction-related accessibility claims places tremendous strain on the federal courts. As noted, 6 Plaintiff Gilbert has filed over 80 cases in this district within the year preceding the filing of this 7 lawsuit. (Doc. 23 at 3.) This high-frequency filing suggests that it is precisely because the 8 federal courts have not adopted California’s limitations on such claims that federal courts have 9 become the preferred forum for such claims. See generally Garibay v. Rodriguez, 2019 WL 10 5204294, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“Indeed, those reasons, if true at all, do not explain why nearly 11 9 times more construction-related accessibility actions are being filed in the Central District in 12 2019 than were filed in 2013.”) Permitting federal courts “to become an escape hatch” that 13 allows plaintiffs like Gilbert to pursue such claims offends the comity between state and federal 14 courts. Declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims early in the 15 litigation preserves federal judicial resources for the consideration of federal claims, while still 16 allowing plaintiffs to pursue their state law claims in state court. See e.g., Brooke, 2022 WL 17 17363913, at *5 (“Continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in these extraordinary 18 circumstances would unnecessarily force this Court to expend resources to resolve state law 19 claims for relatively modest statutory damages and attorneys’ fees even after the federal claim is 20 moot.”) 21 Plaintiff Gilbert argues that fairness, economy, and convenience disfavor declining 22 supplemental jurisdiction because litigating his claims in separate forums would duplicate work, 23 increase costs, and risk inconsistent results. (Doc. 24 at 3.) However, the Court finds that 24 fairness favors declining jurisdiction because Plaintiff can pursue identical remedies in state 25 court. Exercising the Court’s discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction does not deprive 26 Plaintiff of any remedies. Indeed, an ADA claim for injunctive relief remains pending in this 27 Court. 28 /// 1 Accordingly, the Court concludes that California’s enactment of laws restricting 2 construction-related accessibility claims, combined with the burden the ever-increasing number of 3 such cases poses to the federal courts, presents “exceptional circumstances” and “compelling 4 reasons” that justify the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 5 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). See Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F. 6 Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (relying on Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 7 (1965), for the proposition that federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction to 8 discourage improper forum-shopping, such as ADA plaintiffs’ “use [of] federal court as an end- 9 around to California’s pleading requirements”). Moreover, the Court sees no prejudice in 10 requiring Plaintiff Gilbert’s state-law claims be heard in state court. See Garibay, 2019 WL 11 5204294, at *6 (“[D]eclin[ing] supplemental jurisdiction does not deprive plaintiff of any 12 remedies. Nor does it allow an ADA claim for injunctive relief to go unaddressed.”). 13 For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby recommended that the Court, in its discretion, 14 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act, California Health and 15 Safety Code, and any other state law construction-related accessibility claim and that any such 16 claims be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 17 III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows: 19 1. The Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 20 claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and any other state law 21 construction-related accessibility claim; and 22 2. Plaintiff's Unruh Act claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and any 23 other state law construction-related accessibility claim be dismissed without 24 prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 25 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 26 Judge assigned to the case, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after 27 being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections 28 with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 1 and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the 2 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual 3 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 4 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: March 15, 2023 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28