DeLeon v. Stewart ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DANNY DOUGLAS DELEON, No. 2:19-cv-01842-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CALEB STEWART; SGT. MORRISON; DOES 1 through 20 inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Officer Caleb Stewart and Sergeant Cliff 19 Morrison’s (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff Danny 20 Douglas DeLeon (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition (ECF No. 21), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 21 23). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On August 18, 2018, Officer Stewart stopped Plaintiff for an alleged seatbelt violation. 3 (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges he had been wearing his seatbelt. (Id.) During the stop, 4 Plaintiff was investigated for suspicion of driving under the influence. (Id.) Plaintiff was 5 subsequently arrested and charged with violation of California Vehicle Code §§ 23152(a) and 6 23152(b). (Id.) Plaintiff ultimately pled no contest to violating California Vehicle Code §§ 7 23103-23103.5 – Reckless Driving – Alcohol Related and was sentenced to one year of informal 8 probation.1 (ECF No. 20-1 at 2.) 9 On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants, alleging: (1) 10 false imprisonment; (2) trespass to chattels; (3) conspiracy; (4) false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 11 1983 (“§ 1983”); (5) deprivation of due process under § 1983 based on false statements and 12 denial of video evidence; (6) deprivation of due process under § 1983 based on Pitchess motions 13 and personnel file sanitation; (7) failure to train under § 1983; (8) assault and battery; and (9) 14 unlawful search under § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on 15 June 23, 2021. (ECF No. 19.) 16 II. STANDARD OF LAW 17 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 19 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 20 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See 21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the 22 complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon 23 which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 24 1 Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the criminal docket from Plaintiff’s 25 state criminal court case. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ request. (See ECF No. 21.) The Court may take judicial notice of facts that can be “accurately and readily 26 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 27 201(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit has held that the proceedings and determinations of the courts are a matter of public record suitable for judicial notice. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 28 1198 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request. 1 “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment 2 motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz 3 v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 4 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 5 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every 6 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 7 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 8 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 9 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 10 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 11 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 12 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 13 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 14 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 15 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 16 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 17 statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove 18 facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 19 been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 20 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 21 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 22 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 24 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 25 misconduct alleged.” Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability 26 requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 27 Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 28 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 1 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 2 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 3 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 4 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 5 III. ANALYSIS 6 Defendants argue the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support Plaintiff’s 7 claims. (ECF No. 19.) The Court agrees that the Complaint is deficient for several reasons. 8 First, the Complaint does not clearly state which claims are being alleged against which 9 Defendant. (See ECF No. 1.) Second, the Complaint fails to clearly allege the legal grounds for 10 each claim. (See id.; ECF No. 21.) For example, Plaintiff fails to set forth a coherent theory of 11 liability for his due process claims. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ 12 opposition fails to address the elements of each cause of action or cite legal authority to aid the 13 Court in determining whether Plaintiff has stated viable claims. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 21.) 14 Lastly, Plaintiff acknowledges that he raises new facts in his opposition that were omitted from 15 the Complaint and that may cure some of the deficiencies therein. (ECF No. 21 at 9.) 16 This lack of clarity permeates the entire Complaint and is a sufficient basis for dismissal. 17 If Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint, he should clearly delineate which claim is being 18 brought against which Defendant, as well which specific facts are allocated to the elements of 19 each claim. See Hughey v. Camacho, No. 2:13-cv-02665-TLN-AC, 2014 WL 5473184, at *4; see 20 also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[P]laintiffs would be well advised 21 to . . . focus on linking their factual allegations to actual legal claims.). The Court therefore 22 GRANTS Defendants’ motion on this basis. 23 In addition, the Court will briefly address Defendants’ assertion that even if the claims had 24 factual support, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 25 (ECF No. 19 at 2.) The Supreme Court held in Heck: 26 In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that 27 the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 28 authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by 1 a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction 2 or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a [plaintiff] seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the 3 district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 4 sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . . But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if 5 successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be 6 allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. 7 8 512 U.S. at 486–87. 9 Defendants argue Heck requires the Court to dismiss the § 1983 claims because the claims 10 directly related to Plaintiff’s criminal conviction and recovery would render this conviction 11 invalid. (ECF No. 19 at 6.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues Heck does not apply to claims that are 12 based on convictions by way of plea agreements since no evidence was used as the basis for the 13 conviction. (ECF No. 21 at 2.) Plaintiff cites to Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 14 2011), wherein the Ninth Circuit permitted a § 1983 suit to move forward despite a conviction 15 since the validity of the Plaintiff’s conviction, which derived from a plea, “does not in any way 16 depend upon the legality” of the detention and subsequent evidence obtained. (Id.) Defendants 17 offer only a short discussion of Heck in their motion, and they do not address Heck or Lockett in 18 their reply. (See ECF No. 23.) Based on the limited argument before the Court, Defendants fail 19 to persuade the Court that Heck necessarily bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Therefore, the Court 20 will give Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 3 | (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint not later than thirty (30) days from the 4 | electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file their responsive pleading not later than 5 || twenty-one (21) days thereafter. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the Court will 6 | dismiss this action and close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. () f /) 8 | DATED: September 29, 2022 “ ! ) bbw 9 Troy L. Nuhlep> □ 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28