Fuentes v. Humanity for Horses ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JERRY FUENTES, an individual, No. 2:21-cv-02350-JAM-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION; ORDER 14 HUMANITY FOR HORSES, et al. DENYING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 15 Defendants. 16 17 Jerry Fuentes (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit in the 18 Superior Court of the State of California, County of Siskiyou 19 against Humanity for Horses (“HFH”), Claudio Rubio (“Rubio”), and 20 various fictious persons (collectively “Defendants”), alleging a 21 host of civil rights and wage and hour violations relating to 22 Plaintiff’s employment at HFH. Exh. A to Notice of Removal 23 (“Removal”), ECF No. 1. Only one claim, the Eighth Cause of 24 Action, involves federal law. Id. ¶ 135. After removing this 25 action to federal court, Defendants now seek the dismissal of 26 Plaintiff’s entire action and/or an order striking portions of 27 Plaintiff’s complaint. Mot. to Dismiss. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 15. 28 /// 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants 2 motion to dismiss the Eighth Cause of Action, DENIES Defendants 3 request to strike as moot and DENIES to exercise supplemental 4 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.1 5 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 On August 16, 2016, Defendants hired Plaintiff as an 8 employee. Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 14. In 9 or around August 2018, Rubio became Plaintiff’s supervisor. Id. 10 ¶ 13. On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19 11 and was instructed by his doctor to quarantine. Id. ¶ 21. 12 Plaintiff notified and provided a doctor’s note to Rubio about 13 his diagnosis. Plaintiff asked Rubio if he would receive pay for 14 his two weeks of quarantine. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Rubio allegedly told 15 Plaintiff he would not and instructed Plaintiff to use his 16 vacation time. Id. ¶ 21. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff alleges 17 he returned to work and Rubio jokingly told Plaintiff “you got 18 saved Chilean” and to “put more effort in” to his work because of 19 Plaintiff’s COVID-19 quarantine. Id. ¶ 23. On January 7, 2021, 20 Rubio terminated Plaintiff’s employment with HFH. Id. ¶ 24. 21 Plaintiff’s original complaint in Siskiyou County Superior 22 Court contained thirteen causes of action. Of the thirteen, only 23 one implicated federal law: Plaintiff’s Eighth claim alleging 24 Defendants violated the Families First Coronavirus Response Act 25 (“FFCRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and Fair Labor Standards Act 26 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 28 scheduled for August 9, 2022. 1 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. After Defendants removed this 2 case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), ECF No. 1, 3 Plaintiff filed first and second amended complaints. ECF Nos.11, 4 14. Defendants then filed their motion to dismiss all claims in 5 the SAC. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff filed his opposition and 6 Defendants replied. See Pl.’s Opp’n, (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 17, 7 Defs.’ Reply, (“Reply”), ECF No. 18. 8 9 II. OPINION 10 A. Legal Standard 11 When weighing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept factual 12 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 13 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 14 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 15 2008).” Nevertheless, “a complaint must contain sufficient 16 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 17 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 18 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 19 1955, 1974 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when “the 20 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 22 misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “a formulaic recitation of a 23 cause of action's elements will not do.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 24 1965. Such statements are “legal conclusion[s] couched as 25 factual allegation[s]” that must be dismissed. Papasan v. 26 Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986). 27 /// 28 /// 1 B. Claim Number Eight: Retaliation Under the FFCRA and 2 FLSA 3 Plaintiff claims Defendants violated the FCCRA and FLSA by 4 terminating him on January 7, 2021 in retaliation for Plaintiff 5 requesting accommodation and exercising his right to leave around 6 August 20, 2020 following his COVID-19 diagnosis. SAC ¶ 135. 7 Plaintiff’s allegation relies on FFRCA’s Division E, entitled the 8 Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (“EPSLA”). Pub. L. No. 116-127, 9 § 5101, 134 Stat. 178, 195-198 (2020). The EPSLA makes it 10 unlawful for an employer “to discharge, discipline, or in any 11 other manner discriminate against any employee who: (1) takes 12 leave in accordance with this Act; and (2) has filed any 13 complaint or instituted any proceeding under or related to this 14 Act . . . or has testified or is about testify in any such 15 proceeding.” § 1504 at 197. An employer who disregards this 16 provision is “considered to be in violation of [§] 15(a)(3) of 17 the Fair Labor Standards Act [“FLSA”] . . .” and subject to the 18 penalties described in §§ 16 and 17 of the FLSA. § 1505(b) at 19 197. 20 Thus, as other district courts have found, a claim for FFCRA 21 retaliation is properly analyzed under the FLSA framework. See 22 Colombe v. SGN, Inc., No 5:20-CV-374-REW, 2021 WL 1198304, at *3 23 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2021) (finding that FFCRA retaliation can be 24 brought under the FLSA and using FLSA retaliation framework to 25 analyze plaintiff’s FFCRA retaliation claim). In the Ninth 26 Circuit, a prima facie claim for FLSA retaliation requires 27 plaintiffs to prove: (1) they engaged in statutorily protected 28 conduct; (2) they suffered an adverse employment action; and 1 (3) a causal link exists between the conduct and the employment 2 action. See Henson v. McKinley Trailer Vill., No. 2:21-CV-02189 3 WBS AC, 2022 WL 515691, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022). 4 Here, Plaintiff’s SAC falls short of this three-part standard 5 because it does not satisfy the first and third prongs. 6 Plaintiff fails to adequately plead the first element of his 7 prima facie claim because his SAC does not include allegations 8 that he engaged in statutorily protected conduct. Under the 9 EPSLA, an employee takes part in statutorily protected activity 10 if he: (1) took leave under the Act; and (2) lodged a complaint, 11 initiated a proceeding, or participating in a proceeding relating 12 to EPSLA. § 1504 at 197. Plaintiff, however, only alleged that 13 Defendant “willfully terminat[ed] Plaintiff in retaliation for 14 exercising his right to leave under the FFCRA and requesting 15 accommodation under the same due to COVID-19 concerns” without 16 including any specific facts to support his allegations. SAC 17 ¶¶ 130, 135. Plaintiff’s SAC, in turn, lacks any contention that 18 he complained to Defendants or third-parties responsible for 19 EPSLA’s enforcement about HFH’s and Rubio’s supposed infractions. 20 Lambert, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (finding a plaintiff engages in FLSA 21 protected activity when he: (1) directly complains to his 22 employer about an FLSA violation; (2) files a complaint regarding 23 FLSA infractions with his employer or a third-party tasked with 24 enforcing the FLSA—like a labor union or the Department of Labor; 25 or (3) looks to the courts for a remedy). The absence of such 26 facts prevents this Court from reasonably inferring Defendants 27 are liable for the violations Plaintiff alleges. Plaintiff’s 28 accusations, as a result, are nothing more than legal conclusions 1 veiled as factual allegations that cannot survive a motion to 2 dismiss. 3 Further, Plaintiff also falls short of properly pleading the 4 third element, which requires Plaintiff to show a causal link 5 between his protected activity and Defendants’ termination of his 6 employment. Henson, 2022 WL 515691 at *2. Courts may find a 7 causal link based on direct or circumstantial evidence. See 8 Bowen v. M. Caratan, Inc., 142 F.Supp.3d 1007, 1025 (E.D. Cal., 9 2015) citing Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir.2010) 10 (finding an employer’s retaliatory statements or actions as 11 direct evidence); Mayes v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 2014 WL 12 2506195 at *9 (E.D. Cal., 2014) (suggesting temporal proximity 13 between protected activity and an adverse employment action can 14 support the inference of a causal link under an FLSA retaliation 15 claim). 16 Plaintiff’s allegations insufficiently demonstrate a causal 17 link between his protected leave and his termination. In his 18 SAC, Plaintiff alleged that his supervisor, Rubio, made 19 disparaging remarks after he took leave. SAC ¶ 23 (Rubio told 20 Plaintiff, “you got saved Chilean” and to “put more effort in” 21 after Plaintiff returned to work.). Such statements do not 22 directly demonstrate retaliatory animus since they do not 23 suggest Rubio disapproved of or fired Plaintiff because he 24 quarantined under EPSLA. See Bowen, 142 F. Supp.3d at 1024 25 quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 26 2003) (finding plaintiff can satisfy “substantial factor” by 27 pointing to employer statements showing its disapproval of 28 protected activity). Also, because more than four months passed 1 between Plaintiff’s protected leave (August 2020) and his 2 termination (January 2021), the two events’ temporal proximity 3 do not independently support Plaintiff’s contention that he was 4 terminated for taking quarantine. See Bowen, 142 F. Supp.3d at 5 1024 (finding one month between protected activity and adverse 6 employment action demonstrates causation); Mayes, 2014 WL 7 2506195 at *9 (finding two days between protected activity and 8 adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of 9 causation.). Because he has failed to adequately plead both the 10 first and third prongs of his prima facie claim, Plaintiff’s 11 retaliation claim under FFCRA’s EPSLA is dismissed. 12 The Court further dismisses the Eighth Cause of Action with 13 prejudice as the Court finds that amendment would be futile 14 given Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to cure the pleading 15 deficiencies. See Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th 16 Cir. 2002) (finding leave to amend need not be granted when 17 amendment would be futile). 18 C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 19 A district court may sua sponte decline to exercise 20 supplemental jurisdiction over pendant state law claims if it 21 “has dismissed all claims over which it has original 22 jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court has original 23 jurisdiction only over Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action under 24 FFCRA and FLSA. Having dismissed this claim, the Court declines 25 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 26 law claims. 27 /// 28 /// nnn een enn enn nn nnn en nn nn OS I EE 1 Til. ORDER 2 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 3 Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action under FFCRA and FLSA with prejudice. Plaintiff’s remaining state 5 law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice given that the Court 6 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these pendant 7 causes of action. The Court further DISMISSES Defendant’s Motion 8 to Strike as moot. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: October 5, 2022 11 opens JOHN A. MENDEZ 13 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28