(SS) Gilbert N. Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GILBERT NILE BROWN, Case No. 1:19-cv-01706-HBK 12 Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER TO REMAND CASE TO COMMISSIONER2 13 v. (Doc. No. 17) 14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 15 SECURITY,1 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Gilbert Nile Brown (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 20 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for 21 supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 1). The matter is 22 currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument. 23 (Doc. Nos. 17, 23, 29). For the reasons stated, the Court orders this matter REMANDED for 24 further administrative proceedings. 25 1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule 26 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Kilolo Kijakazi is substituted for Andrew M. Saul as the defendant in this suit. 27 2 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1). (Doc. No. 32). 28 1 I. JURISDICTION 2 Plaintiff filed for supplemental security income on December 21, 2015, alleging an onset 3 date of August 30, 2000. (AR 318-27). Benefits were denied initially (AR 248-51), and upon 4 reconsideration (AR 258-63). Plaintiff appeared before Administrative Law Judge Timothy S. 5 Snelling (“ALJ”) on May 23, 2018. (AR 137-75). Plaintiff was represented by counsel and 6 testified at the hearing. (Id.). On October 2, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision (AR 7 119-36), and on September 9, 2019, the Appeals Council denied review (AR 4-10). The matter is 8 now before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). 9 II. BACKGROUND 10 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, the ALJ’s 11 decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and Commissioner. Only the most pertinent facts are 12 summarized here. 13 Plaintiff was 53 years old at the time of the hearing. (AR 146). He graduated from high 14 school. (Id.). He lives with his wife. (Id.). Plaintiff has no relevant work history. (AR 146). 15 Plaintiff testified that he has limited work history because of his seizure disorder; and he has one 16 to two seizures per month, on average, but sometimes has four or five in a one-month period. 17 (AR 161, 164-65). He reported the longest he has gone without a seizure is six months, but they 18 are unpredictable and come on without warning. (AR 166-67). Plaintiff is on three seizure 19 medications but reported that the “seizures can just flare up at any time.” (AR 154-55, 163). 20 Plaintiff testified, he has to take a one to two-hour nap, after he experiences a seizure, to recover. 21 (AR 160-61). 22 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 23 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is 24 governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the 25 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or 26 is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial 27 evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 28 conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence 1 equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and 2 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must 3 consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. 4 Id. 5 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of 6 the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible 7 to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 8 2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is 9 harmless. Id. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate 10 nondisability determination.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s 11 decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 12 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009). 13 IV. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 14 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the meaning of 15 the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful 16 activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 17 expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 18 of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment 19 must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, 20 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 21 gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 22 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a 23 claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the 24 Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the 25 claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the 26 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 27 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step 28 two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20 1 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of 2 impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work 3 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s 4 impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the 5 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). 6 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe 7 impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from 8 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as 9 severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the 10 claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 11 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the 12 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual 13 functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s 14 ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her 15 limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis. 16 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 17 claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant 18 work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant 19 work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If 20 the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 21 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the 22 claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 23 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational 24 factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 25 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must 26 find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of 27 adjusting to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is 28 therefore entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). 1 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel, 2 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the 3 Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such 4 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran 5 v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 V. ALJ’S FINDINGS 7 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 8 since December 21, 2015, the application date. (AR 124). At step two, the ALJ found that 9 Plaintiff has the following medically severe combination of impairments: seizure disorder versus 10 generalized convulsive epilepsy; anxiety disorder; depression; a history of polysubstance abuse in 11 sustained full remission; a history of possible demyelinating disease; a history of possible 12 Parkinson’s disease; and a history of soft tissue edema. (AR 125). At step three, the ALJ found 13 that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 14 equals the severity of a listed impairment. (AR 126). The ALJ then found Plaintiff has the RFC 15 to perform a wide range of work at all exertional levels, but [Plaintiff] has the following nonexertional limitations: [Plaintiff] cannot climb 16 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but climbing ramps and stairs, stooping, crouching, crawling, and kneeling can be performed without 17 limitation; [Plaintiff] must avoid concentrated exposure to work performed at unprotected and dangerous heights or walk on uneven 18 terrain or work around dangerous moving machinery or swim unattended or work around deep water or cook or drive motor 19 vehicles and he should wear a helmet at work. 20 (AR 126). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 130). At 21 step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 22 there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, 23 including: dining room attendant, porter, and warehouse worker. (AR 131). On that basis, the 24 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 25 since December 21, 2015, the date the application was filed. (AR 131). 26 VI. ISSUES 27 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying him 28 supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 1). 1 Plaintiff raises the following issues for this Court’s review: 2 1. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; 3 2. Whether the ALJ erred at step three; 4 3. Whether the ALJ decision was supported by substantial evidence including “new 5 evidence” not considered by the Appeals Council; and 6 4. Whether the ALJ erred in assessing the RFC. 7 (Doc. No. 17 at 14-26). 8 VII. DISCUSSION 9 A. Symptom Claims 10 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis when evaluating a claimant’s testimony regarding 11 subjective pain or symptoms. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). 12 The ALJ first must determine whether there is “objective medical evidence of an underlying 13 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 14 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The claimant is not required to show that his impairment 15 could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom he has alleged; he need only 16 show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 17 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the 19 ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] 20 gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 21 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “General findings are 22 insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence 23 undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 24 1995)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he ALJ must make a 25 credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that 26 the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.”). “The clear and convincing 27 [evidence] standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. 28 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 1 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 2 Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 3 expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 4 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the 5 medical evidence and other evidence in the record” because they are “inconsistent with the 6 number of seizures reported to his physicians. Furthermore, he reported to [treating physician] 7 Dr. Thiagarajan that he had a grand mal seizure at the SSA field office but documentation from 8 the field office notes [Plaintiff] had hand tremors. The medical evidence shows that when stable 9 on anti-epileptic medications, [Plaintiff] experiences fewer than his alleged two seizures per 10 month as described in greater detail [elsewhere in the decision].” (AR 127). 11 As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit does “not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line 12 exegesis of the claimant's testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying 13 benefits.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). But in considering Plaintiff’s 14 symptom claims, the ALJ must specifically identify the statements he finds not to be credible, and 15 the evidence that allegedly undermines those statements. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 16 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). “To ensure that our review of the ALJ’s credibility determination is 17 meaningful, and that the claimant’s testimony is not rejected arbitrarily, we require the ALJ to 18 specify which testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons, 19 supported by the evidence in the record, to support that credibility determination.” Brown-Hunter 20 v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting the ALJ did not specifically identify any 21 inconsistencies between the claimant’s testimony and the record; rather, “she simply stated her 22 non-credibility conclusion and then summarized the medical evidence supporting her RFC 23 determination.”). Here, aside from a single statement made by Plaintiff about a particular seizure, 24 the ALJ fails to identify any specific statements he found “inconsistent” with the medical 25 evidence, nor does he explain how the medical evidence undermines Plaintiff’s testimony. 26 Furthermore, as noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons to reject 27 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony regarding the severity and frequency of his seizure disorder. (Doc. 28 No. 17 at 27-29). 1 First, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements were generally “inconsistent with the number 2 of seizures reported to his physicians,” and one particular statement to his treating physician was 3 inconsistent with field notes from the SSA office. (AR 130). In evaluating the severity of 4 Plaintiff’s symptoms, the ALJ may consider inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s statements, and/or 5 between his testimony and his conduct. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59; Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 6 at 1039 (prior inconsistent statements may be considered). In support of this finding, the ALJ 7 cites an alleged inconsistency between Plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Thiagarajan that he 8 experienced a “grand mal seizure” “during his intake interview” at the SSA office, and 9 observations by the field office representative that “noted only uncontrollable left hand 10 movements.” (AR 127, 130). However, the Court’s review of the longitudinal record does not 11 support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff reported to Dr. Thiagarajan that he had a “grand mal” 12 seizure “during” his interview at the SSA office; rather, the treatment record indicates that he had 13 “one [seizure] at the time of interview in social security office” without reference to the type of 14 seizure. (AR 434). The documentation from the field office observes that Plaintiff was 15 experiencing “an uncontrollable hand movement (left)” at the time of the interview. (AR 340). 16 Based on the record, without more evidence as to the type of seizure experienced at the interview, 17 the Court finds this “single discrepancy fails to justify the wholesale dismissal of Plaintiff’s 18 testimony.” See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2006). 19 The ALJ additionally found, without identifying supporting evidence from the record, or 20 providing explanation as to how his statements were inconsistent, that Plaintiff’s statements were 21 “inconsistent with the number of seizures reported to his physicians.” (AR 130). As noted by 22 Plaintiff, “there is no citation to evidence by the ALJ that [Plaintiff] only experience ‘X seizures 23 per month,’ and/or any citation to objective evidence of record from [Plaintiff’s] multiple treating 24 specialists documenting that his seizures somehow were not occurring.” (Doc. No. 17 at 29). 25 Defendant generally argues that the ALJ “cited repeatedly to the record when he assessed and 26 summarized the medical record, analyzed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and contrasted 27 subjective complaints regarding seizures and the conflicting reports regarding seizures in the 28 medical evidence.” (Doc. 23 at 20). Presumably, Defendant is referencing the ALJ’s summary of 1 Plaintiff’s reports to medical providers regarding his seizures, which included: his report in 2 March 2015 that his last seizure was six weeks ago and he had five seizures since his prior 3 appointment in December; report in October 2015 that he had one seizure two weeks before and 4 two seizures since his last visit; report in January 2016 that he had two grand mal seizures since 5 the December 2015 visit; report in April 2016 that he had two seizures in March and two in April; 6 report in August 2016 that his last seizure was six week prior; report in September 2016 that his 7 last seizure was over four months prior; and his report in July 2017 that he had three seizures 8 since his last appointment (AR 128-29, 397, 406, 434, 437, 460, 465, 532). However, Plaintiff 9 testified that he has “on average, one to two” seizures a month: “[s]ometimes I go a couple of 10 months without [a seizure]. But sometimes I go in to like four or five in that period of one month. 11 It, it fluctuates in other words.” (AR 164-65). Plaintiff also acknowledged that the longest he has 12 gone without a seizure is six months, according to the records kept by his wife, and noted that at 13 the time of the hearing he recently had three generalized motor seizures while hospitalized in in 14 the Epilepsy Monitoring Unit. (AR 166). Based on the overall record, the Court finds the ALJ 15 fails to explain with specificity how Plaintiff’s consistent reports of seizure activity to his medical 16 providers was inconsistent with his testimony. See Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208. This was not a 17 clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, for the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s 18 symptom claims. 19 Second, the ALJ found “the medical evidence shows that when stable on anti-epileptic 20 medications, [Plaintiff] experiences fewer than his alleged two seizures per month.” (AR 130). 21 Defendant is correct that a favorable response to treatment can undermine a claimant's complaints 22 of debilitating pain or other severe limitations. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040; Warre v. 23 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (Conditions effectively 24 controlled with medication are not disabling for purposes of determining eligibility for benefits). 25 However, the ALJ fails to cite any specific evidence in support of this finding aside from a 26 reference to “greater detail” provided in his summary of the medical evidence. (AR 130). The 27 Court’s review of this evidence indicates that in March 2015, Plaintiff’s treating provider noted 28 “moderate improvement” in seizure frequency, intensity, and duration, and in July 2016 his 1 treating provider noted “significant improvement” in seizure frequency, intensity and duration. 2 (AR 128, 397, 460). However, as noted by Plaintiff, “there is no reference in the objective record 3 to [Plaintiff’s] condition stabilizing with medication; and there is no reference to any statement by 4 a physician that [Plaintiff] was not compliant with medication regimen, as his medication levels 5 were continuously tested and his seizures were noted to occur ‘despite compliance with 6 medication.’” (Doc. No. 17 at 28). Moreover, the same summary of medical evidence referenced 7 by the ALJ to support this finding also indicates that Plaintiff reported anywhere from two to four 8 seizures in a single month while consistently taking his medication. (AR 128-29, 394 (reporting 9 six seizures since last visit)). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s symptom 10 claims because Plaintiff was “stable” on his medication and “experiences fewer than his alleged 11 two seizures per month” due to the medication is not supported by substantial evidence. This was 12 not a clear and convincing reason for the ALJ to reject Plaintiff’s symptom claims. The ALJ 13 must reconsider Plaintiff’s symptom claims on remand. 14 B. Additional Assignments of Error 15 Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred at step three, that the step three finding is 16 not supported by substantial evidence in light of “new and material” evidence submitted to the 17 Appeals Council after the decision, and the RFC “does not reflect substantial evidence of record.” 18 (Doc. No. 17 at 14-27). Because the analysis of step three and the RFC is dependent on the 19 ALJ’s reevaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom claims, the Court declines to address these challenges 20 in detail here. The reconsideration of Plaintiff’s symptom claims is particularly relevant in this 21 case as the Listing at 11.02 is based, in large part, on the type and number of seizures experienced 22 by Plaintiff in a certain time period. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.02. In 23 addition, it is unnecessary for the Court to make any findings regarding the “new and material” 24 evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, as it will now be part of the record considered on 25 remand. See Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 682 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (when a 26 claimant submits evidence for the first time to the Appeals Council, which considers that 27 evidence in denying review of the ALJ’s decision, the new evidence is part of the administrative 28 record which the district court must consider in determining whether the Commissioner’s 1 decision is supported by substantial evidence). On remand, the ALJ is instructed to reconsider 2 Plaintiff’s symptom claims and conduct a new sequential analysis considering all of the evidence 3 in the record, including a reevaluation of step three, and a reassessment of the RFC and step five 4 finding if necessary. 5 C. Remedy 6 Plaintiff contends that the Court should remand for a payment of benefits. (Doc. No. 17 at 7 30). The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and award benefits is 8 within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 9 1989). An immediate award of benefits is appropriate where “no useful purpose would be served 10 by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been thoroughly developed,” 11 Varney v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988), or when the 12 delay caused by remand would be “unduly burdensome[.]” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 13 1280 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 (noting that a district court may abuse 14 its discretion not to remand for benefits when all of these conditions are met). This policy is 15 based on the “need to expedite disability claims.” Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401. But where there are 16 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it is not clear 17 from the record that the ALJ would be required to find a claimant disabled if all the evidence 18 were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 19 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000). 20 The Court finds in this case that further administrative proceedings are appropriate. See 21 Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for 22 benefits is not appropriate when further administrative proceedings would serve a useful 23 purpose). Here, the ALJ improperly considered Plaintiff’s symptom claims, which calls into 24 question whether the assessed RFC, and resulting hypothetical propounded to the vocational 25 expert, are supported by substantial evidence. “Where,” as here, “there is conflicting evidence, 26 and not all essential factual issues have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is 27 inappropriate.” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101. Instead, the Court remands this case for further 28 proceedings. On remand, the ALJ should reevaluate Plaintiff’s symptom claims, as well as all 1 | relevant medical evidence. If necessary, the ALJ should order additional consultative 2 | examinations and, if appropriate, take additional testimony from medical experts. The ALJ 3 | should conduct a new sequential analysis, reassess Plaintiff's RFC and, if necessary, take 4 | additional testimony from a vocational expert which includes all of the limitations credited by the 5 | ALJ. 6 Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 7 1. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), the Court REVERSES the 8 Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS this case back to the Commissioner of 9 Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 10 2. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 11 3. The Clerk shall terminate any motions and deadlines and close this case. 12 'S | Dated: _ February 22, 2022 Mile. Wh fareh Zaskth 14 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12