Williams v. Kings County Superior Court ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AHKEEM D. WILLIAMS, Case No. 1:23-cv-00854-ADA-SAB 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSING THE 13 v. COMPLAINT 14 KINGS COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, et al., (ECF No. 1) 15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN TWENTY- ONE DAYS 16 17 18 19 20 Plaintiff Ahkeem D. Williams (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 21 initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 5, 2023, against the Kings 22 County Superior Court, Coney P., a supervising court clerk, and a DOE court clerk (collectively, 23 “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1.) The complaint is now before this Court for screening. For the 24 reasons stated herein, the Court recommends that the complaint be dismissed, without prejudice, 25 for failure to state a claim. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. 2 SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 In cases in which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to 4 screen each case, and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation 5 of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon 6 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 8 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 9 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th 10 Cir. 1984). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 11 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 12 490 U.S. at 327; see also Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining 13 frivolous as “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact”). An action is 14 malicious if it was filed with the “intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 15 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). 16 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must contain “a short and 17 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 8(a)(2). If the factual elements of a cause of action are present but are scattered throughout the 19 complaint and not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” dismissal for failure 20 to satisfy Rule 8 is proper. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, to 21 comply with Rule 8, a complaint should clearly and fully set forth “who is being sued, for what 22 relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” Id. Such notice pleading is 23 required in federal court in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim … is and the 24 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 555 25 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 26 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 27 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 28 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 1 rights violations are not sufficient ….” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 2 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 3 Plaintiffs proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 4 liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 5 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, to survive screening, a 6 plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the 7 Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 8 556 U.S. at 678–79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). That is, the 9 plaintiff must demonstrate each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. 10 Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has 11 acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 12 liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d 13 at 969. Thus, where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims … across the line from 14 conceivable to plausible[,]” the complaint is properly dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (internal 15 quotations omitted). 16 Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be 17 cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 II. 19 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 20 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte 21 screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 22 Plaintiff brings this civil action against the California Superior Court for Kings County, a 23 DOE clerk of the court that purportedly refused to give Plaintiff her name, and the 24 supervising/managing clerk of the court who only provided the name “Coney P.” (ECF No. 1 at 25 1–2.) Plaintiff purports to be asserting a claim for unspecified Eighteenth and Fifth Amendment 26 violations. (See id. at 4.) Plaintiff visited the state court to “put himself on the calendar to see a 27 judge” regarding alleged violations of policy and the California Constitution by members of the 28 Hanford Police Department. (Id. at 5.) It is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff had a 1 pending case before the state court, or sought to raise a complaint against the police directly 2 through the court. (See, generally, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges the clerk refused to put him on 3 the calendar. (Id. at 6.) Thereafter, the clerk’s manager/supervisor also refused to put Plaintiff on 4 the court’s calendar. (Id.) Plaintiff claims the clerks gave him the “run around,” and seeks an 5 order from this Court requiring the state court to “open it[s] doors for [Plaintiff’s case or claim 6 against the Hanford Police Department to] be granted.” (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damage 7 against Defendants based on their behavior. (Id. at 7.) 8 III. 9 DISCUSSION 10 A. Section 1983/Linking Requirement 11 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted 12 under color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution 13 or federal law. Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 14 Long v. Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 15 (1988)). This requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in 16 the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934; see also Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 17 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 18 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)) (a deprivation 19 occurs if the defendant “does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits 20 to perform an act which he is legally required to do”). In other words, to state a claim for relief 21 under § 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission 22 that demonstrates a violation of his federal rights. Moreover, the complaint must allege that each 23 defendant acted with the requisite state of mind to violate the underlying constitutional provision. 24 OSU Student All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state any claim. In fact, hardly any facts 26 are alleged whatsoever and it is unclear what rights Plaintiff claims were violated. Consequently, 27 Plaintiff’s bare assertion that Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth and Eighteenth 28 Amendments is conclusory and insufficient to state a cause of action against any Defendant. 1 B. Claims against Kings County Superior Court 2 With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against the Kings County Superior Court, the state court 3 is an arm of the State of California. Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 4 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). As an arm of the state, the superior court is entitled Eleventh Amendment 5 immunity. Id.; see also Greater L.A. Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 6 1987) (“We conclude that a suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by 7 the eleventh amendment.”). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against the Kings County Superior Court 8 are barred. 9 C. Official Capacity Claims – Eleventh Amendment Bar 10 Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are asserted against the clerks of the court in 11 their official capacity, Plaintiff is suing the entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 12 165–66 (1985) (suing a public employee in his official capacity under § 1983 is equivalent to 13 suing the entity itself). As claims against the superior court are barred by the Eleventh 14 Amendment, any claims against the clerks in their official capacities are similarly barred. 15 Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[t]he Eleventh 16 Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state 17 officials in their official capacities.”) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for money 18 damages against the Defendant clerks in their official capacities fails as a matter of law. 19 D. Individual Capacity Claims – Quasi-Judicial Immunity 20 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to sue Defendant clerks of the court Doe and her supervisor 21 (Coney P.) in their individual capacities, Plaintiff’s claim again appears to be barred. 22 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations 23 when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. 24 Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Morrison v. Jones, 607 25 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). In Mullis, a debtor brought a civil rights action against 26 bankruptcy court clerks. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. The debtor alleged that the bankruptcy court 27 clerks accepted and filed his bankruptcy petition, but then refused to accept and file an amended 28 petition in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the court clerks’ 1 refusal to accept and file an amended petition was a basic and integral part of the judicial process, 2 and as such, the clerks were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from damages. Id. (“The 3 commencement of an action by filing a complaint or petition is a basic and integral part of the 4 judicial process” and noting the clerk of court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom 5 such filing is done). 6 Here, Plaintiff claims the Defendant clerks of the court (Doe and Coney P.) refused to 7 schedule Plaintiff on the court’s docket calendar to state his grievances against the Hanford Police 8 Department to the state court judge. (ECF No. 1 at 5–6.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s request 9 related to an already pending civil action, or if Plaintiff was attempting to initiate an action at that 10 time and immediately be given a hearing date. Regardless, the court clerks’ decision not to put 11 Plaintiff’s unspecified matter on the court’s docket for hearing is a basic and integral part of the 12 judicial process. Accordingly, the Defendant clerks of the court are entitled to absolute quasi- 13 judicial immunity from damages in connection with their actions. See Mullis, 828 F.2d at 14 1390; see also Juarez v. Clerk, U.S. Fed. Ct., San Jose, No. C 08-5691 RMW (PR), 2009 WL 15 385796 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009) (district court clerk was entitled to absolute quasi- 16 judicial immunity for allegedly failing to send plaintiff court opinion denying his previously filed 17 federal case); White v. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 1:07-cv-01796 OWW-DLB PC, 2008 WL 5246161 at 18 *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008) (California Supreme Court clerk is immune from damages for 19 allegedly refusing to give plaintiff’s court documents to the magistrate judge); Palacios v. Fresno 20 Cnty. Super. Ct., No. 1:08cv0158 OWW DLB, 2008 WL 314337, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 21 2008) (Fresno County Superior Court clerks were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for 22 allegedly providing plaintiff with misinformation). As such, Plaintiff’s claims against the court 23 clerks in their individual capacities also fail. 24 E. Leave to Amend 25 Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “shall be freely 26 given when justice so requires,” because “the court must remain guided by the underlying 27 purpose of Rule 15 … to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 28 technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and 1 internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, a district court need not grant leave to amend 2 where the amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, 3 or if the party seeking amendment has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 4 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “The 5 decision of whether to grant leave to amend nevertheless remains within the discretion of the 6 district court.” Id. 7 Here, not only does the instant complaint fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim; 8 Plaintiff’s claims, as asserted against the defendant clerks of the court and the superior court, are 9 also barred as a matter of law based on Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunities. 10 These defects cannot be cured through the assertion of additional facts; therefore, amendment 11 would be futile. Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532. Accordingly, leave to amend should be 12 denied. 13 IV. 14 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 16 1. The complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED, without prejudice, for failure to state 17 a claim; and 18 2. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this action. 19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the District Judge assigned to this 20 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within twenty- 21 one (21) days of service of this recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections to these 22 findings and recommendations with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections 23 to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The District Judge will review the 24 Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// ] Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 2 | waiver of nights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 3 || Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 6 | Dated: _June 30, 2023 Of UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28