Banks v. Stockton Unified School District ( 2023 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ELINOR BANKS, et al., No. 2:21-cv-00936-JAM-AC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS 14 STOCKTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 15 Defendant. 16 17 Elinor Banks, Keenan Mancho, Artia Taylor, and Kyndal Mancho 18 (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this lawsuit against the 19 Stockton Unified School District (“SUSD”), Christopher Anderson 20 (“Anderson”), Kathryn Corona-Jackson (“Corona-Jackson”), Dante 21 Marsh (“Marsh”), Brian Biederman (“Biederman”), Booker Guyton 22 (“Guyton”), Tony Tracy, Louie Tolentino, Brett Toliver 23 (“Toliver”), Valente Aguilar (“Aguilar”), Sonny Larkins 24 (“Larkins”), Melissa Dougherty (“Dougherty”), Stephanie Reeves, 25 Fhanysha Gaddis, Jovan Jacobs, Matthew Atad, Kevin Shum (“Shum,” 26 erroneously sued as “Stockton Unified School District Police 27 Officer Shum, Badge No. 15”), Stockton Unified School District 28 Police Officer A. Andrews, and other fictious persons. See 1 Compl. ¶¶ 12-30, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege various federal 2 and state constitutional violations. See Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Anderson, 3 Marsh, Biederman, Toliver, Aguilar, Larkins, Dougherty, and Shum 4 filed a motion to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss I (“MTD I”), ECF 5 No. 26. Thereafter SUSD, Corona-Jackson, and Guyton filed a 6 motion to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss II (“MTD II”), ECF 7 No. 35. The moving parties (collectively “Defendants”) asked the 8 Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint entirely and included 9 requests for judicial notice with their motions. See Request for 10 Judicial Notice I, ECF No. 26- 1; Request for Judicial Notice II, 11 ECF No. 35-3. Plaintiffs opposed the first motion—but not the 12 second—and a reply was filed. See Opp’n, ECF No. 31.; Reply, ECF 13 No. 33. 14 For the reasons set for below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 15 motions to dismiss. 1 16 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 17 Artia Taylor (“Artia”) attended Edison High School (EHS) 18 in the SUSD from August 2018 to June 2020. See ¶ 31. Artia’s 19 brother, Keenan Mancho,(“Keenan”) and sister, Kyndal Mancho, 20 (“Kyndal”) were respectively employed by EHS as an assistant 21 football coach and substitute teacher in May 2019. See Id. 22 Elinor Banks (“Elinor”) is Artia’s mother. See Id. 23 During the 2018/19 school year, Artia played for EHS’s 24 football team. In May of 2019, Artia’s family took in 25 26 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing for the first 27 motion to dismiss was scheduled for January 24, 2023. The hearing for the second motion to dismiss was scheduled for 28 February 28, 2023. 1 Christopher Marsh—a teammate of Artia’s and son of EHS football 2 coach, Defendant Marsh—after his father kicked him out of their 3 home. See Id ¶ 32. Plaintiffs sheltered Christopher because he 4 told Artia and Keenan that Marsh physically abused him. See. Id. 5 Around this same time, Banks learned Artia was not receiving the 6 learning accommodations he was entitled to pursuant to his 7 Individual Education Plan (“IEP”). As a result, Elinor brought 8 this matter to the attention of EHS and SUSD officials. See Id. 9 ¶ 31. 10 After taking Christopher in and questioning the handling of 11 Artia’s IEP, Plaintiffs allege various EHS and SUSD officials 12 retaliated against them for “exercising their First Amendment 13 right to report misconduct by the administrators and staff in 14 pursuing Artia[‘s] [] right, and [] for reporting child abuse by 15 Defendant Dante Marsh.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants 16 engaged in retaliatory acts when: (1) Artia was falsely accused 17 of being under the influence of and distributing marijuana on 18 campus; (2) EHS administrators lodged false complaints against 19 Keenan and Elinor that resulted in their ban from the EHS campus 20 for fourteen days; (3) Artia was treated differently than his 21 teammates during the 2018/19 and 2019/20 football seasons; 22 (4) Artia was confined to a conference room for four days to 23 complete work for the Spring Semester; and (5) an EHS official 24 threatened to fire Kyndal because she allowed Artia to use her 25 classroom as a refuge to “get away from the drama.” See Id. 26 ¶¶ 35, 39, 45, 32. 27 Plaintiffs then initiated this action in May of 2021 under 28 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California State Constitution against 1 various EHS and SUSD employees in their official capacities. 2 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their right 3 to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 4 right to liberty speech under the California State Constitution. 5 See Compl. ¶¶ 53, 58. Defendants Anderson, Marsh, Biederman, 6 Toliver, Aguilar, Larkins, Dougherty, and Shum filed a motion to 7 dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss I (‘MTD I”). Plaintiffs opposed 8 and Defendants replied. See Opp’n, ECF No. 31; Reply, ECF 9 No. 33. Defendants SUSD, Corona-Jackson, and Guyton then filed a 10 separate Motion to Dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss II (“MTD II”). 11 Plaintiffs, however, did not file an opposition. 12 II. OPINION 13 A. Legal Standard 14 When weighing a motion to dismiss, courts “accept factual 15 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings 16 in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. 17 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 18 2008). However, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 20 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 21 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 22 1974 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when “the plaintiff 23 pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 24 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 25 misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “a formulaic recitation of a 26 cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 27 1965. Such statements are “legal conclusion[s] couched as 28 factual allegation[s]” that must be dismissed. Papasan v. 1 Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2944 (1986). 2 B. Analysis 3 Plaintiffs’ complaint names Defendants in their official 4 capacities. See Compl. ¶¶ 12-30. Defendants therefore move to 5 dismiss all claims against them pursuant to their sovereign 6 immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiffs do not dispute 7 that the Eleventh Amendment bars their suit. Instead, they 8 suggest “the description in the complaint stating ‘official 9 capacity’ was a typographical error” and ask the Court for leave 10 to file an amended complaint so they can sue Defendants 11 individually. See Opp’n at 3. 12 The Eleventh Amendment proscribes damages suits against a 13 State in federal court. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 14 169 (1985). This prohibition extends to state officials who are 15 sued for damages in their official capacity since such an action 16 “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against 17 the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 18 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Notably, “California school officials 19 sued in their official capacities are arms of the state and thus, 20 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” J.M. v. Parlier 21 Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:21-CV-0261 AWI BAM, 2021 WL 5234770, at 22 *2 (E.D. Cal. 2021). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment also 23 prohibits litigants from pursing state claims against state 24 officers in their official capacity in federal court. See 25 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 26 (1984) (finding “that a claim that state officials violated state 27 law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim 28 against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment” 1 and “this principle applies [] to state-law claims brought into 2 federal court under pendent jurisdiction”). 3 Given Defendants—who are all school or school district 4 officials—are named in their official capacity, the Court finds 5 Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a plausible claim for 6 relief. The Court, in turn, dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against 7 these Defendants, in their official capacities, with prejudice. 8 Furthermore, given the Ninth Circuit has determined that 9 plaintiffs can only amend their complaint to name a defendant in 10 their individual capacity by newly serving the defendant within 11 the appropriate statute of limitations, the Court cannot grant 12 Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file an amended complaint. See 13 Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended 14 (1996) (“We have held that new service within the statute of 15 limitations is necessary in order to satisfy the due process 16 requirement of notice when there is to be a change in the status 17 of defendants”). Here, the statute of limitations governing 18 Plaintiffs’ claims is two years and all of Plaintiffs’ 19 allegations concern actions that occurred more than three years 20 ago. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2014) 21 (finding actions brought under § 1983 apply the forum state’s 22 statute of limitations for personal injury actions); see also 23 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (stating statute of limitations for 24 personal injury claims are two years). Plaintiffs therefore 25 cannot serve Defendants with new notice within the required 26 statute of limitations, making their potential amendments to sue 27 Defendants individually impossible as a matter of law. 28 /// eee eee EOI IE NO EEO 1 Lastly, because the Court grants Defendants’ motions for 2 these specific reasons, it need not reach Defendants’ other 3 arguments and requests for judicial notice. 4 TILT. ORDER 5 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 6 | Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and dismisses all claims against 7 Defendants with prejudice. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: March 23, 2023 10 A as JOHN A. MENDEZ 12 SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28